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Abstract  
 
This thesis explores how English councils and their public service 
partners responded to the UK Coalition government’s ‘austerity’-related 
spending cuts between 2010 and 2015.  The research is distinctive in 
moving beyond a focus on the impacts of cuts to individual services, 
instead considering responses to austerity ‘in the round’, using a 
governance perspective.  The methodology was innovative, using 
principles of ‘action research’ and ‘appreciative inquiry’ to design the 
research collaboratively with Nottingham City Council.  Fieldwork was 
undertaken between 2012 and 2014, including a document review, 34 
interviews and two workshops with frontline staff, as well as informal 
participant observation.  The approach aimed to deliver academic 
rigour, as well as useful findings for practitioners addressing challenges 
in the field. 
Taking the locality of Nottingham as an exploratory and revelatory 
embedded single case study, the analysis combines insights from new 
institutionalist and interpretive theory.  It demonstrates that although the 
council showed institutional resilience, and was able to maintain a wide 
range of services, spending cuts were creating pressure to change both 
the ‘practices’ and ‘narratives’ underpinning service delivery.  Tensions 
in some service delivery partnerships suggested shifts in local 
‘traditions’ of governance, viewed by some actors as symptomatic of a 
wider change in the values underpinning governance institutions.  
Meanwhile the council was increasingly focussed on strategic forms of 
community leadership, whilst links with local communities were 
diminishing. 
Working with partners, the council had (at least temporarily) mitigated a 
dramatic reduction in income. Yet although change in service delivery 
was incremental, the potential for transformation in local governance 
was clear.  These findings are shown to have consistencies with wider 
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comparative studies.  Policy implications are discussed for the 2015 
Conservative government, as it implements a further round of austerity-
related cuts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The UK Coalition government’s ‘emergency budget’ of June 2010 
signalled the beginning of a retrenchment in UK public expenditure 
which was without parallel since the end of Second World War (Taylor-
Gooby 2012, p.226).  Within the spending cuts that followed, the 
Department of Communities and Local Government accepted the 
highest proportional reductions of any central government department, 
with a budget cut of 51 per cent, and funding for core grants to local 
authorities reduced by 27 per cent (HM Treasury 2010b p.10). Cuts to 
local government grants were ‘front-loaded’ with the most significant 
reductions made during the first three years of the spending review 
period.  Local authorities’ main lobbying body, the Local Government 
Association (LGA) termed the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review 
‘the toughest local government finance settlement in living memory’ 
(BBC News, 2010).   
For the period 2010 to 2015/16 the real terms reduction in government 
funding to local authorities was estimated to be 37 per cent (NAO, 
2014a).  The size of the UK’s local government workforce fell by 21 per 
cent, with a headcount reduction of 622,000 (ONS, 2015).  In this 
context one might have expected radical changes to the way local 
public services were provided and experienced at a local level.  Yet 
despite this huge reduction in resources dedicated to local service 
delivery, the impact on service provision appeared markedly less 
dramatic.   
In 2012 the Audit Commission, local government’s (then) main 
regulator, reported that the majority of councils had dealt well with the 
financial challenges, with only nine percent of local authorities 
experiencing ‘high in-year financial stress’, and most being well-placed 
to deal with future cuts (Audit Commission 2012 p.5).  In January 2013, 
Ipsos Mori found that 65 per cent of a sample of 1015 adults agreed 
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with the statement ‘I haven’t really noticed any changes to the services 
provided by my local council’ (Ipsos MORI, 2013a) and this conclusion 
was repeated by a BBC poll, prompting the headline ‘public service 
cuts: did we notice?’ (Easton, 2013).  Residents’ satisfaction with 
council services also remained stable at around 70 per cent (LGA 2013 
p.11).  Even in 2015, after the introduction of a sweeping programme of 
welfare reform and two further years of cumulative funding reductions, 
studies were continuing to report that ‘councils were largely managing 
(by their own account) to balance budgets without major loss of frontline 
services nor serious impacts on service quality’ (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 
2015 p. 590).  No councils attempted to set an illegal unbalanced 
budget between 2010 and 2015 (NAO, 2014a). 
The starting point for this research was to question how local public 
services were responding to the Coalition government’s austerity 
policies, and apparently maintaining their capacity to function, in the 
face of such a drastic decline in funding.  This question, later termed 
the ‘austerity puzzle’ (Gardner & Lowndes, 2015) encompassed three 
important areas of enquiry which had theoretical implications as well as 
significance for policy and practice. First, were austerity policies 
genuinely being delivered (as both central and local government 
claimed) with minimal effects on local services, and if so, how was this 
being achieved?  Second, had austerity affected local government’s 
role as a co-ordinator of ‘local governance’, including its capacity to 
deliver services in partnership with other public, private and voluntary 
sector organisations, and to act as a ‘community leader’?  Third, how 
rapidly, and to what extent, was local government and local governance 
changing in response to austerity?  
The research available in 2012 showed a division in perspectives, both 
at practice level and within the academy, in relation to the effects of 
cuts on services. This was exacerbated by the uneven application of 
spending cuts, as the greatest reductions to funding also occurred in 
local authority areas subject to highest levels of multiple deprivation 
(Hastings, Bramley, Bailey, & Watkins, 2012 p.13; Audit Commission, 
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2013 p.23).  Local authorities in affluent areas were less dependent on 
grant funding and experienced lower levels of financial pressure, which 
contributed to varying and localised impacts from austerity and an 
absence of shared experiences.   
Narratives from both central and local government tended to discourage 
critical comment about the effects of austerity on services.  The 
Government argued that there were multiple ways for councils to 
achieve ‘sensible savings’, and that these could be achieved with 
minimal effect on the frontline (DCLG, 2012; Osborne, 2013). The 
Coalition proved extremely successful at promoting their vision of 
austerity as an ‘unavoidable deficit reduction plan’ (HM Treasury, 2010 
p.5) packaged with ‘comrade-in-arms’ reassurance that ‘we are all in 
this together’ (Cameron, 2009).  If councils protested, they were 
accused of exaggerating the effect of reductions and building excessive 
financial reserves (DCLG, 2013; Johnstone, 2012).  Meanwhile the 
local government trade press offered a heroic narrative, emphasising 
that local government had done ‘a spectacular job of swallowing the 
cuts’ (Jameson, 2013) and reinforcing local government’s reputation as 
‘the most efficient part of the public sector’ (Downs, 2013). In this 
context, any council raising negative consequences from austerity 
risked accusations of acting against the national interest and condoning 
inefficiency. 
At the same time, academic discourse was divided on the 
consequences of austerity for local services.  Pierson’s new 
institutionalist perspective had demonstrated the resilience of the 
welfare state against retrenchment policies adopted by the Reagan and 
Thatcher governments during the 1980s (Pierson, 1994).  Early 
research on Coalition policies supported a historical institutionalist 
analysis, highlighting evidence of local government’s stability and 
creativity in the face of austerity policies (John, 2014; Lowndes & 
McCaughie, 2013).  Alternatively, critical policy approaches tended to 
focus on austerity as an attack on the values of the welfare state and 
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an extension of neo-liberal ideologies (see for instance Levitas, 2012; 
Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012).   
In a hybrid approach, Newman argued for recognition of greater 
complexity at a local level, where local authorities could function as 
‘landscapes of antagonism’ providing ‘incubators of new possibilities 
that may bend or adapt neoliberal logics or may establish new 
pathways’ (Newman, 2013 p.7).  Newman’s perspective identified a 
middle ground by highlighting the dynamic and iterative relationship 
between institutions and values.  However there was a gap in empirical 
studies taking a similar perspective. 
In relation to the second area of enquiry, although much comparative 
research had focussed on the impacts of cuts to services, (see for 
example Crawford & Phillips, 2012; Hastings et al., 2012; The Audit 
Commission, 2012) less attention had been given to how austerity 
policies were affecting the partnerships and commissioning 
relationships core to local governance.  Under the preceding Labour 
administration many councils had embraced an identity as a 
‘community leader’ (Leach & Roberts, 2011; Sullivan, 2007) and service 
‘convenor’ (Lyons, 2007 p.3).  These terms provided recognition for 
local government’s ‘place-shaping’ role in articulating civic ambitions 
and acting on community aspirations; and councils’ strategic 
responsibilities in planning and co-ordinating multi-agency service 
provision.  Both functions entailed the maintenance of extensive 
partnership relationships between local authorities and other service 
providers in the public, private and voluntary sectors.  However, 
academic research suggested ambiguity on the consequences of 
austerity for partnership.  On the one hand Lowndes and Pratchett 
noted that under Coalition arrangements, resources for partnership 
work had been depleted, potentially leaving strategic partnerships to 
‘wither on the vine’ (2012 p.29).  In a separate (2012) study Lowndes & 
Squires argued that, in practice, partnerships were still valued as a 
buffer against the harshest effects of austerity.  Further empirical 
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investigation was needed to understand how such tensions were 
playing out. 
The third area of enquiry concerned the pace and extent of change to 
local government occurring in response to austerity.  This research 
question was identified as a result of the mismatch between narratives 
that suggested that cuts could be delivered by minor adjustments with 
minimal impact at the frontline (Osborne, 2013) and academic and 
campaigning groups’ arguments that austerity was re-scaling the 
welfare state (Forbes, Dore, & Anderson, 2012; Hastings, Bailey, 
Gannon, Besemer, & Bramley, 2015; Taylor-Gooby, 2012).  It also 
involved important theoretical debate on the process and outcomes of 
change.  Would processes of change be incremental (in line with 
historical institutionalist explanations of change, see for instance 
Streeck & Thelen, 2005) or punctuated by sudden fluctuations in the 
manner described by Jones and Baumgartner (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2002; Jones et al., 2009)?  The outward stability of public services 
pointed towards incremental change, but the rapidity of cuts to public 
finances and resources raised the potential for punctuation, and 
contemporary studies were already cautioning in 2013 that the full 
impact of austerity measures had only been temporarily delayed by 
one-off spending reductions, rather than fully absorbed (Audit 
Commission, 2013; Hastings et al., 2013).   
In addition, whilst there were strong theoretical arguments that both 
incremental and punctuated change could have transformative effects 
(Jones et al., 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 
2005b) there had not yet been any attempt to assess the cumulative 
extent of austerity-related change for local government and its partners.  
This was partly an issue of timing, as previous studies of retrenchment 
had shown that an extended timescale was needed to understand the 
outcomes of policy changes (Pierson, 1994 p.14) and thus any 
assessment on the extent of change just five years after 2010 could 
only aspire to cautious and interim judgments.  However, at the outset 
of this research there seemed to be merit in attempting such an 
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analysis, especially given the likelihood (now proved correct) that 
austerity would continue to set the policy context beyond the 2010-2015 
Parliament.  Hall’s (1993) paradigms of first, second and third order 
change offered a useful framework to shape the research and fitted well 
with a philosophical approach which sought to combine analysis of the 
effects of austerity on values (or in Hall’s terms, ‘goals’) as well as 
institutions.  
In summary, these three emerging areas for enquiry; focusing on the 
(apparent) maintenance of service delivery; the effects of austerity on 
partnerships for service  delivery and community leadership roles; and 
the type and extent of change, suggested the importance of 
understanding the local effects of austerity policies ‘in the round’.  This 
research was therefore designed to take account not just of the 
services provided by local authorities, but of their wider roles and 
responsibilities in the governance of localities.   
In order to make the research manageable within the resource 
constraints and timescale of a PhD, a decision was taken to focus 
empirical work on a single case study of a council and its service 
delivery partners.  The case was an English unitary local authority area 
which had been relatively severely impacted by the recession and 
subsequent cuts.  England was chosen because it was the country in 
which the Coalition’s austerity policies had made the most direct 
financial impact (spending cuts to local authorities in Scotland and 
Wales were conducted in a different context, given higher per-capita 
funding settlements historically provided to these regions, and 
mediation by the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly) (Crawford & 
Johnson, 2015; Keep, 2015).  A single case provided the opportunity 
for in-depth exploratory and revelatory study which could examine the 
combinative effects of austerity from multi-dimensional perspective.  It 
also allowed this author to work collaboratively with local service 
providers, in this case Nottingham City Council and a number of partner 
organisations, through an action research approach.   The research 
adopted as its time frame the period from the introduction of the 
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Coalition government’s emergency budget, in June 2010, to the close 
of the current Comprehensive Spending Review period, in March 2015. 
Limitations of this research included scope, timescale and the capacity 
for generalisation.  In regard to scope, the study focussed mainly on 
institutional level responses rather than population impacts and in this 
sense presents only part of a wider story about the effects of austerity 
policies.  However, this was a pragmatic choice; institutional responses 
were chosen as the focus because they were subject to a shorter time-
lag and fewer intervening variables than population effects.  Kennett, 
Jones, Meegan, and Croft (2015) have also started the important work 
of linking austerity to population effects in urban areas. 
Regarding timescale, this study inevitably offers a snapshot of a 
dynamic situation, and therefore risks misjudging the cumulative effects 
of austerity policies, due to a lack of historical distance.  However as we 
are on the cusp of a further five years of austerity (HM Treasury, 2015c) 
an attempted assessment of the consequences for institutions and their 
underpinning values is timely.   
On the issue of generalisation, the foregoing analysis has already 
highlighted that impacts of austerity are highly localised and subject to 
a range of spatial and historical factors.  In this sense, local context is 
an important variable for this study which has potential to be obscured 
by a larger ‘n’ analysis.  In addition, this study sought to create a novel 
perspective by moving beyond the comparison of services or functions 
to seek a more holistic understanding of austerity as it impacted in a 
single locality.   Although this case cannot be generalised to a 
population, it can be generalised to theory via the substantiation or 
modification of theoretically informed propositions (Yin, 1994) and this 
is the approach adopted within this research. 
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1.1 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 sets the context for this thesis, examining the role of English 
local government under the ‘new’ Labour administrations, with 
reference to service delivery and governance responsibilities.  It 
describes how an emerging identity for councils as ‘convenors’ of 
partnerships for service delivery (Lyons, 2007 p.3) and ‘community 
leaders’ (Sullivan, 2007) was impacted by spending cuts and legislation 
from June 2010 onwards, and explores the tensions created by those 
changes, demonstrating how they gave rise to the three core research 
questions.  
Chapter 3 begins by discussing the ontological and epistemological 
issues associated with studying austerity.  The chapter makes a case 
for combining theories on stability and change, drawn from new 
institutionalist approaches, with interpretive analysis exploring the local 
and situated meaning of change.  Insights from new institutionalist and 
interpretive studies of local governance are subsequently linked with 
the research questions to create six theoretically-informed propositions 
(see box 1.1 below). 
Chapter 4 introduces the research design, which was novel in 
attempting to combine a collaborative action-research approach with 
elements of appreciative inquiry (Gaya Wicks, Reason, & Bradbury, 
2008; Ludema & Fry, 2008).  It gives a reflexive account of the non-
linear nature of this research ‘journey’, explaining how the analysis in 
this thesis developed over time.  It also explains how the propositions 
introduced in chapter 3 were used to create a framework of detailed 
research questions which informed the initial document review, 
interviews and workshops.  Data was then analysed with reference to 
the propositions, and emerging conclusions triangulated using three or 
more data sources.  The description of the research methodology is 
followed by Chapter 5, a short chapter introducing the case study of 
Nottingham, providing essential background information to the following 
chapters analysing responses to austerity.  
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Box 1.1: Propositions 
P1) The range and quality of services available to the public has been 
maintained during the period 2010-2015 
 
P2) The Council’s institutional rules, practices and narratives have been 
maintained during the period 2010-2015 
 
P3) Partnerships for service delivery between the Council and other 
statutory, business and voluntary partners have been maintained in the 
period 2010-2015 
 
P4) Local political representatives continue to exercise community 
leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles 
 
P5) The change processes instigated in response to austerity have so 
far been characterised by incremental change rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ 
 
P6) Austerity policies have so far been delivered with minimal (first 
order) change to local governance and systems 
 
Chapter 6 addresses propositions P1 and P2, considering the extent to 
which local services and their underlying institutions have been 
sustained between 2010 and 2015.  With regard to P1, it argues that – 
in line with expectations guided by a historical institutionalist analysis - 
the range of services provided by the council appears to have been 
maintained in Nottingham (though there was insufficient evidence to 
make a judgement on service quality).  However analysis of the ‘rules, 
practices and narratives’ underlying service delivery in relation to P2 
suggests that although the council maintained its outward ‘rules’ in the 
face of austerity, subtle changes were occurring to practices, and there 
were also contesting narratives about the best approaches to 
24 
 
addressing the budget gap.  However a purely institutional analysis 
could not offer answers as to whether such changes mattered.   
Chapter 7 picks up this issue in relation to proposition P3, examining 
the effects of austerity on Nottingham’s role in leading partnership 
arrangements to deliver local services.  In this case, from a structural 
perspective, the institutional ‘rules, practices and narratives’ of strategic 
partnership work appeared to have been maintained, or even 
strengthened since 2010.  However some partnerships for service 
delivery, particularly with the voluntary and community sector, appeared 
to be under strain.  Tensions were rooted in changing practices, as the 
council moved from a ‘gift’ to a ‘contract’ based relationship with the 
sector through the introduction of new commissioning processes.  
Analysed using Bevir and Rhodes’ concept of government traditions 
(Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 2006, 2010), these changes showed a shift in 
local ‘traditions’ of partnership work, which sat at odds with the historic 
position of the council.  
Chapter 8 considers proposition P4, looking at whether austerity had 
affected community leadership and ‘place shaping’ functions.  Helen 
Sullivan’s four interpretations of community leadership as an enabling 
role, community voice, a symbolic act, and an expedient device 
(Sullivan, 2007) provide a useful framework to analyse the council’s 
chosen strategies of leadership.  In Nottingham’s case, the gradual 
withdrawal of the council from community-facing roles raises important 
questions about its ability to influence and express ‘community voice’, 
with wider potential implications for local democratic engagement and 
legitimacy. 
Chapter 9 takes an overview of the final two propositions which 
examine the process and extent of change in local government.  In 
relation to proposition P5 it argues that despite an apparent punctuation 
in finance at national level, Nottingham City Council had been able to 
mitigate the external shock of austerity into incremental changes at the 
front line.  However analysis also suggested that sources of institutional 
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resilience were being steadily eroded, and that individual agency 
focussed on the defence and maintenance of existing institutions was 
increasingly being challenged by revisionist proposals from ‘symbionts’ 
and ‘opportunists’ (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).  The mitigating actions 
deployed to date appeared likely to be temporary in their effects, and 
there was potential for radical institutional change in the future. 
In regard to proposition P6, Hall’s concept of paradigmatic policy 
change was applied to make a cautious and interim assessment of how 
far institutional reform had progressed.  In Nottingham the research 
identified clear evidence for ‘first order’ change to the ‘settings’ of local 
government and some ‘second-order’ change to policy instruments.  
There was also some evidence that financial pressure was 
compromising the ‘third-order’ goals of the organisation.   
Chapter 10 draws together the conclusions, revising the propositions in 
the light of research findings.  It sets the work in context with other 
recently published studies, and outlines its distinctive contribution in 
empirical, methodological and theoretical terms.  The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the policy implications arising from the 
investigation, and outlining an agenda for future study.  Ongoing 
scrutiny of the ramifications of spending cuts for services and 
governance systems will remain an important and controversial topic of 
enquiry, given the 2015 Conservative government’s stated intention to 
continue austerity policies and entrench spending reductions using a 
new ‘fiscal charter’ (Osborne, 2015a). 
  
26 
 
  
27 
 
Chapter 2: Local government, 
governance and austerity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The 2008 banking crisis, and the subsequent ‘Great Recession’, 
resulted in the largest UK budget deficit since 1945 (Taylor-Gooby & 
Stoker, 2011).  Although overall levels of national debt were 
comparable with that of other European partners at 50-60% of GDP 
(Bailey, Bramley, & Hastings, 2015), the UK’s annual budget deficit had 
risen sharply, partly due to the urgent recapitalisation of several major 
UK banks (Brown, 2011).  The resulting rapid growth in debt, against 
the background of an international sovereign debt crisis, undermined 
the UK’s credit rating and raised a spectre of unsustainable government 
borrowing. 
For the Coalition government elected in 2010, the solution lay in a 
radical programme of public spending cuts, originally aimed at clearing 
the deficit in a single parliament.  The pace of these cuts was amongst 
the fastest of all industrialised nations: only Iceland and Ireland cut 
public spending faster (Bailey et al., 2015).  Between 2010 and 2015 
the UK’s Coalition government reduced public expenditure by 2.9 per 
cent, and spending as a share of national income fell from 44.8 per cent 
of GDP in 2009/10 to 40.7 per cent in 2014/15 (IFS, 2015).  These 
figures masked substantial variations across different government 
departments, with expenditure on areas such as healthcare and 
pensions rising, whilst unprecedented cuts were applied to 
‘unprotected’ government departments1.  The most severe cuts were 
made to local government spending, with the Department for 
                                                             
1 Areas of public spending which were relatively protected in 2010 included health, 
education, international development and defence (HM Treasury, 2010b).  Pensions were 
protected through George Osborne’s ‘triple lock’ guarantee to uprate the state pension by 
earnings growth, price inflation or 2.5%, whichever was the highest (Lupton et al., 2015). 
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Communities and Local Government offering savings amounting to 51 
per cent of its budget (HM Treasury, 2010b p.10) and local authorities 
subject to a 37 per cent real terms cut in central funding (IFS, 2015; 
NAO, 2013 p.4) leading to an estimated 32 per cent real terms 
reduction in per capita funding (Municipal Journal, 2015a). 
Yet the way in which austerity was implemented meant that the 
implications for local services were far from clear.  Whilst the Local 
Government Association had initially warned of a £16.5 bn funding gap 
in public expenditure by 2020 (LGA, 2012 p.8) (a projection which 
subsequently became known as the ‘graph of doom’), Audit 
Commission and National Audit Office reports consistently reported that 
most councils were coping financially, albeit with some signs of stress 
(Audit Commission, 2012, 2013; NAO, 2013).  During the whole of the 
2010-2015 spending review period no council attempted to set an 
unbalanced budget (NAO, 2014a).  In addition, surveys in the early part 
of the spending review period suggested that the general public had 
limited awareness of reductions to services with two-thirds of 
respondents agreeing that they had not noticed any changes to 
services provided by their council (Easton, 2013; Ipsos MORI, 2013b)2.  
In 2013 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, was even 
suggesting that services had improved:  
‘We were told by the scaremongerers that savings in local 
government would decimate local services. Instead, public 
satisfaction with local council services has gone up.  That’s 
because with our reforms, communities have more control over 
their own destiny’ (Osborne 2013). 
This PhD research began in the autumn of 2012 with a research 
puzzle, how were local services provided by local authorities and their 
partners responding to the unprecedented financial pressure of 
austerity?  This chapter summarises the academic, policy and practice 
literature which shaped the study.  It begins by putting the austerity 
                                                             
2
 Variants on this narrative persisted, with Mori reporting in 2015 that three quarters of 
survey respondents considered that government savings had not affected them ‘very much’ 
(39%) or ‘at all’ (37%) (Duffy, 2015) 
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reforms in context, reviewing the role and status of local government in 
years running up to 2010, with reference to the sector’s service delivery 
and governance responsibilities under Labour administrations from 
1997-2010. It goes on to examine the detail of the spending cuts and 
processes of implementation, together with reasons why the experience 
of cuts varied between localities.  It then considers the evidence 
available (at the initiation of this study) on responses to spending cuts, 
highlighting three core areas which required further investigation. 
 
2.2 Local government and governance prior 
to 2010 
The period from 1997 to 2010 was characterised by sustained growth in 
public spending, and in some ways also represented an era of 
increasing confidence for local government, after the legislative and 
financial strictures imposed by the preceding Conservative 
administration.  Although the ‘new’ Labour leadership, conscious of 
maintaining its electability, was ‘suspicious’ of its own local government 
activists (Laffin, 2008 p.110), early interchanges between the 1997-
2001 Labour administration and local government showed signs of 
improving central-local relations.  One of the incoming government’s 
first acts was to sign the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’, 
and they quickly jettisoned the controversial policy of compulsory 
competitive tendering of local authority services (CCT), in favour of an 
ambitious programme of modernisation and a policy of seeking ‘best 
value’ (Cabinet Office, 1999; DETR, 1999).  There was an initiative to 
recruit local government officers to central government departments3, 
and the Department of Environment Transport and Regions (DETR) 
                                                             
3 This author was seconded from Nottingham City Council to the Department for 
Environment, Transport and Regions in 2001.  Other higher profile individuals also moved 
into central government roles during this period, including Peter Housden, Chief Executive of 
Nottinghamshire County Council, who later became permanent secretary at the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister.  Also Lucy de Groot, Chief Executive of Bristol City Council, who took 
up a post at the Treasury; and Lin Homer, Chief Executive of Birmingham City Council, who 
joined the Home Office and later HMRC. 
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also established a ‘central local partnership’ to help create a more 
constructive dialogue between central and local government. 
However, some academic accounts of English local government during 
this period represent local authorities as a much-weakened partner to 
central government.  For Sullivan, local authorities were fundamentally 
compromised by accepting increasing service responsibilities as part of 
the expansion of the welfare state after the end of the second world 
war; exchanging new areas of responsibility for ever-extending 
strictures of central government control (2011 p.182-3).  Stoker has 
argued that too much of local government’s ‘hard power’ was ceded 
during this period for the less tangible benefits of ‘community 
governance’ (2011) whilst Laffin suggests that Labour’s modernisation 
agenda constituted a ‘case study of central government’s capacity to 
manage change at a local level’ (2008 p.110).  Lowndes (2002) also 
argued that central-local dialogue was rapidly supplanted by 
individualised relationships between central departments and councils, 
via increasingly sophisticated technologies of performance 
management. 
Taking a different stance, this chapter will argue that although central 
government retained dominance in the central-local relationship during 
the ‘new’ Labour years, many councils created a distinctive identity and 
sense of purpose between 1997 and 2010, based around their 
continuing powers as a service provider, emerging role as convenors of 
partnerships for service delivery, and adoption of community leadership 
or ‘place shaping’ responsibilities.  Furthermore councils performed a 
valuable service for central government at this time, in terms of 
providing accountability for the implementation of national policies in an 
increasingly complex governance landscape, a role which provided a 
source of local legitimacy and influence over other local partners.  This 
reading of central-local relations takes a similar view to that of Griggs 
and Sullivan, who argue that state-centric accounts of the ‘New Labour’ 
period as top-down managerialism, or as a type of ‘disciplined 
pluralism’, are built on a ‘thin’ understanding of the agency of local 
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actors, which neglects the capacity for local interpretations of legislation 
and regulation (Griggs & Sullivan, 2014).  
For example, in relation to service provision local authorities retained 
substantial powers.  In 2012 they were still accountable for around a 
quarter of public spending with a total of 1,335 statutory duties (NAO, 
2013 p.5).  Critics of the ‘new’ Labour era argue that local authorities’ 
power was limited by a burgeoning apparatus of monitoring and control, 
including the use of tightly specified ring-fenced grants; increased 
monitoring, inspection and regulation; and control of the public sector 
unions (Laffin, 2008).  Yet although the modernisation agenda has 
been described as a ‘high water mark’ for technocratic ‘new public 
management’ techniques, (Martin, 2002 p.129) local government 
retained considerable influence over policies that were implemented.   
Peter John describes a tradition of government simply reproducing what 
local authorities are already doing (John, 2012 p.43), and this process 
was evident throughout the Labour government’s modernisation 
programme.  The flagship policy for improving local government 
performance, ‘Best Value’, was extensively consulted upon before its 
introduction4.  Its successor, the ‘Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment’, was welcomed by senior officers because it highlighted 
the importance (and value) of effective strategic management (Laffin, 
2008 p.115).  Both ‘Local Strategic Partnerships’5 and the concept of 
                                                             
4 ‘Best Value’ was introduced under the Local Government Act 1999, requiring authorities to 
secure ‘continuous improvement’ through exercising ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’.  
It replaced universal rate-capping for local authorities, although the Secretary of State 
retained powers to cap individual authorities, and to intervene in instances of poor 
performance. 
5 Local strategic partnerships were multi-agency collaborative bodies which emerged from 
the LGA-led ‘New Commitment to Regeneration’ initiative in the late 1990s, as a strategy for 
bending mainstream funds to broad regeneration objectives.  They were given momentum by 
a requirement on local authorities to produce community strategies in the Local Government 
Act 2000, and by the introduction of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund for the 88 most 
deprived local authority areas, in which the receipt of funding was contingent on having a 
local strategic partnership. 
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‘Local Area Agreements’6 arose from policies which originated within 
localities, developed and supported by the LGA. 
In addition, performance monitoring provided an important mechanism 
for demonstrating local government’s strengths.  The Local Government 
Association used the sector’s apparent improvement under the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment regime to reinforce a 
discourse that local government was the most efficient and best-
managed aspect of the public sector (Cameron 2009; Laffin, 2008 
p.115) making an (ultimately successful) lobbying pitch for the return of 
public health budgets to local authorities, and for a new regime of 
‘sector led improvement’.  Thus, whilst the tools of the modernisation 
agenda could appear coercive, some parts of local government were 
able to shape the effects of modernisation to their advantage. 
Many local authorities were also cultivating an increasingly significant 
role as co-ordinators of ‘local governance’ during this period, both 
through the important function of drawing together partnerships for 
service delivery, and through their adoption of the ‘community 
leadership’ role.  The term ‘governance’ related to the increased 
complexity of government engendered by the reforms of the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s and early 1990s.  In an effort 
to privatise public services and circumvent local government, policy-
makers had created a ‘congested state’ of statutory bodies, quangos7, 
‘next steps’ agencies, regulators and private and voluntary sector 
providers (Skelcher, 2000 p.3). In this context, local governance 
articulated a distinctive role for local government in governing localities 
in a multi-organisational and multi-actor context, characterised by an 
inclusive approach to policy-making, extensive use of networks and 
                                                             
6Local Area Agreements were introduced in 2007.  They provided for councils to act as lead 
negotiators on agreements between central government and local partners to deliver specific 
policy objectives in return for additional funding and powers.  They built on an earlier policy 
known as local public service agreements (LPSAs) which had not been rolled out as 
extensively. 
7 ‘Quango’ is a colloquial term standing for quasi non-governmental organisation, referring to 
centrally funded government agencies which have some level of structural independence 
from the Civil Service, for example the Audit Commission or Planning Inspectorate.  Quangos 
are also often formally referred to as ‘non-departmental public bodies’. 
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partnerships, indirect or blurred accountability arrangements, and a 
focus on outputs and outcomes which transcended traditional 
institutional boundaries (Wilson & Game, 2006 p,142) 
Partnership activity was core to delivering services in a governance 
context, administering services through a variety of formal and informal 
relationships with other local service providers in the public, private and 
voluntary sectors.  Meanwhile ‘community leadership’ drew on a long 
history of civic and municipal innovation (Sullivan, 2007) to assert that 
the function of councils in an increasingly fragmented public sector was 
‘not just to deliver certain services well but to steer a community to 
meet the full range of its needs’ (Stoker, 2011 p.17). 
The association of local government with a coordinating role for local 
governance was not immediate or automatic.  Newman notes that 
although early versions of the concept embodied ‘normative’ hopes for 
a move beyond the dislocating market reforms of the 1980s (2001 
p.17), central government responses to the challenges of governance 
often resulted in contradictory processes of ‘centralisation and 
dispersal, enabling and controlling, loosening and tightening’ as the 
incoming Labour government sought to gain authority over service 
delivery in an increasingly confusing landscape (p.163).   
However, despite a persistent paternalistic discourse throughout the 
1997-2010 Labour administrations, which emphasised a need for 
councils to win ‘earned autonomy’ (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 p.37) 
local authorities were able to exercise some choice in the way that local 
governance developed. 
One area of contest was over the definition and practice of local 
authorities ‘enabling’ role.  Sullivan (2011 p.184-5) highlights that in the 
1980s Conservative minister Nicolas Ridley envisaged enabling as a 
challenge to producer interests a means to ‘keep politics at bay’.  
Alternatively ‘enabling’ was also used in connection with the community 
leadership function, encompassing both community empowerment, and 
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a ‘search for consent’ to tackle big issues (Clarke & Stewart, 1994; 
Stoker, 1996). 
Although compulsory competitive tendering was abolished in 1998, 
local authorities and other public agencies were nonetheless 
encouraged to continue ‘market testing’ their services against private 
sector providers, with the Audit Commission’s ‘Best Value Inspectorate’ 
present in the background as a not-so-subtle challenge for those who 
failed to subject their services to sufficiently rigorous review (DETR, 
1998 paragraph 7.28).  The government’s mantra was ‘what matters is 
what works’ (DETR, 1999 p.5).  Private sector outsourcing providers 
such as BT, Capita and Serco flourished; ‘joint ventures’ were 
pioneered between local authorities and the private sector to 
‘modernise’ services,8 and there was also increased engagement with 
charities as service providers (Laffin, 2008 p.123).  Major public 
infrastructure projects were also required to pursue private finance 
initiative funding, with the (then Junior) Health Minister Alan Milburn 
declaring in 1997 that, ‘when there is a limited amount of public sector 
capital available, as there is, it’s PFI or bust’ (Monbiot, 2009). 
However, despite the rising diversity in service providers, it was 
(usually) possible for authorities to maintain a level of choice in the way 
they managed and contracted services.  ‘Best Value’ provided the 
opportunity to contract on the basis of quality as well as cost, which 
could provide authorities with sufficient justification for retention of 
services in-house, where they wished.9  Later, local authorities obtained 
the power of ‘wellbeing’ which partially circumvented their inability to act 
‘ultra vires’ without specific powers, together with limited powers to 
trade (HM Government, 2000; ODPM, 2004). Although Griggs and 
Sullivan (2014) have shown that wellbeing powers were utilised with 
                                                             
8 Examples of joint ventures included ‘Liverpool Direct’ formed between Liverpool City 
Council and BT, which ran from 2001-2014, or the Local Government Association’s strategic 
partnership with Liberata, which operated from 2008-2015. 
9 The 2007 Audit Commission report Healthy Competition showed that non-employee costs 
(an indicator for the amount of services contracted) fell after the introduction of “Best 
Value”, though it rose again during the period of the Labour administration reaching CCT 
levels by 2007 (p.9). 
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varying degrees of enthusiasm, some local authorities used them to 
provide novel services on behalf of their communities, which had 
previously been completely outside service delivery confines.  For 
instance Essex County Council explored support for rural post offices, 
to prevent them from closure (Essex County Council, 2008).  Whilst the 
process of opening up to the challenges – and opportunities - of 
enabling undoubtedly unleashed change in processes of delivery, local 
authorities’ responsibilities remained relatively stable.  Even in 2013, 
after two years of austerity, the National Audit Office noted that they 
remained responsible for a quarter of public spending, with 1,335 
statutory duties (2013 pp.4-5). 
Meanwhile opportunities to develop ‘community leadership’ 
responsibilities were created through successive initiatives including the 
Local Government Act 2000; ‘Neighbourhood Renewal’ funding for 88 
councils to initiate local strategic partnerships (LSPs); and from 2007 
onwards Local Area Agreements, which positioned councils as leading 
negotiators with Whitehall departments on behalf of their locality 
(DCLG, 2011b p.23).  Although there were tight limits on the autonomy 
available to local authorities during this period, many local authority 
officers and members welcomed community leadership as an 
opportunity to go beyond the provision of statutory services, and 
facilitate a response to social, economic and environmental problems, 
which had previously been beyond the scope of their tightly constrained 
powers (Leach & Roberts, 2011 pp.113-114). 
Some criticisms of community leadership arose from the policy’s failure 
to address issues of democratic deficit inherent in the modernisation 
agenda.  It was originally seen as part of the solution to the need for 
democratic renewal, and Clarke and Stewart promoted its potential as a 
means to deliver community well-being and enable ‘collective choice’ 
(Clarke & Stewart, 1994 quoted in Sullivan 2007 p.144).  However, in 
practice the rise of quangos, partnerships and networks accompanying 
governance also created a democratic deficit at local level.  Elected 
members were given limited opportunities to influence local strategic 
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partnerships, unless they possessed executive power (Sullivan, 2008). 
Some statutory partnerships also required members to sit alongside 
officers, which subverted traditional hierarchies and further emphasised 
the ascendancy of managerial power and expert power in comparison 
to political power (Skelcher, 2000 p.17).  Stoker later came to question 
whether a ‘network coordinator’ role was a sufficient basis for local 
authorities to claim legitimacy and power (Stoker, 2011 p.29); whilst 
Sullivan suggested that community leadership could be interpreted as 
an expedient device: ‘a sleight of hand employed by government to 
divert local authorities attention from the fact that their influence is 
waning as central government exercises greater control and service 
delivery is undertaken by a proliferation of other agencies’  (Sullivan, 
2011 p.154). 
However, whilst there were elements of truth in the these perspectives, 
they did not fully reflect local authorities’ growing confidence in their 
community leadership role (Sullivan, 2008), nor central government’s 
increasing reliance on local government and local strategic partnerships 
to deliver cross-cutting policy objectives.  The acceptance of local 
authorities’ community leadership responsibilities was further 
emphasised by the publication of the Lyons Enquiry in 2007.  Sir 
Michael Lyons was initially commissioned to conduct a review of local 
government finance, but expanded his remit to encompass the purpose 
and role of local government.  His enquiry defined a role for local 
government which he termed ‘place shaping’.  This encompassed 
building and shaping local identity; representing the community; 
regulating harmful behaviours; maintaining community cohesiveness 
and ensuring smaller voices are heard; helping to resolve 
disagreements; working to make the economy more successful; 
understanding local needs and preferences; and responding to 
disasters and emergencies (Lyons, 2007 p.3).  Whilst not all of his 
recommendations were embraced by central government, particularly 
around the politically difficult issues of local government finance, the 
place shaping role was anticipated and acknowledged in the white 
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paper ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities” and has since become an 
established part of the local government lexicon10 (DCLG, 2006 p.10).  
In 2007 this role was further reinforced by a ‘Central-Local Concordat’ 
which – though mainly rhetorical in its value - affirmed a partnership 
between central and local level and the importance of local authorities 
in promoting ‘the prosperity and well-being of all citizens in their area 
and the overall cohesion of the community’ (Headlam, 2008 p.11). 
Thus by 2007 the Labour administration had effectively acknowledged 
that local government had a local leadership role over and above its 
service responsibilities, as well as providing an important lever for 
delivering central objectives at a local level.  These were incentivised 
using a variety of carrot-and-stick approaches.  For example, the 
‘comprehensive performance assessment’ celebrated those councils 
achieving high standards against centralised performance targets, 
(whilst also ‘naming and shaming’ poor performers); and local area 
agreements allowed councils and their partners to earn additional funds 
in return for rapid improvement against negotiated areas of multi-
agency delivery.  Although central-local relations undoubtedly remained 
unequal, there was a degree of symbiosis in the local governance 
solutions which community leadership and its associated structures and 
policies provided.  Some councils were able to utilise their powers as a 
service provider, commissioner and place shaper to develop their local 
power and capacity to act during this period (Sullivan, 2008).  Councils 
also performed a valuable role for central government in terms of co-
ordinating and providing local accountability for the implementation of 
national policies. 
Local Government’s long phase of growth ended in June 2010 with the 
incoming Coalition government’s ‘emergency’ budget (HM Treasury, 
2010a).  The subsequent Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 
saw much of the architecture for local co-ordination and monitoring 
abolished as a result of austerity and ‘localism’ agendas.  Regulators, 
                                                             
10 For example a search of Municipal Journal’s online database on 30th June 2013 found 206 
matches for the term ‘place shaping.’ 
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performance management regimes, regional government offices, 
statutory requirements for local area agreements, capacity building 
bodies and funding for partnerships were all cut in the first two years of 
the Coalition government.  The next part of this chapter will explore in 
more detail how the Coalition applied spending cuts, and outline the 
implications for local government’s institutions.  
 
2.3 The 2010 Comprehensive Spending 
Review  
The 2007-8 financial crisis may have been rooted in the excesses of 
the global banking and mortgage lending industries, but for the 
purposes of the June 2010 ‘emergency’ budget, public expenditure had 
become the national malaise.  The maxim that ‘reducing the deficit is a 
necessary precondition for sustained economic growth’ (HM Treasury, 
2010 p.1) was presented as a self-evident truth, picked up in the 
presentation in October 2010 of the Comprehensive Spending Review 
as the Coalition’s ‘unavoidable deficit reduction plan’.  This review 
argued that the economy had become unbalanced due to 
‘unsustainable public spending and rising levels of public debt’. (HM 
Treasury, 2010b p.6)  Whilst spending cuts were presented as 
essential, the Coalition protected funding for the NHS, education, and 
overseas aid.  The emphasis fell instead on reducing welfare costs and 
‘wasteful spending’, with an underlying objective of ‘changing the role of 
the state and how services are provided’ (HM Treasury, 2010b p.32).  
For some commentators this could be interpreted as ‘politics as usual’ 
from the Conservatives, as the senior partners in the Coalition, bearing 
out the maxim ‘never waste a good crisis’ (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 
2011 p.12).   
The implications for ‘unprotected’11 government departments were 
profound, with local government being affected from three different 
                                                             
11 See note section 2.1 
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angles, through direct cuts to its funding, through the implications of 
welfare reform, and through the Coalition government’s ‘bonfire of the 
quangos’ (Buser, 2013 p.6). 
The Communities and Local Government department took the highest 
direct cut of any government department, 51 per cent over the spending 
review period, with a 27 per cent cut in central grant funding for local 
government (HM Treasury, 2010b p.10).  Cuts were “front-loaded” into 
the first two years of the spending review period.  Capital funding for 
local government from all departments was set to fall by 45 per cent by 
2015 (HM Treasury, 2010b p.50).  Smaller cuts from other departments 
such as transport added to the local authority share of the burden, for 
instance transport resource grant was cut by 28 per cent, and bus 
subsidy cut by 20 per cent (HM Treasury, 2010b p.46).  Fire and police 
resource grants were also cut by 13 per cent and 14 per cent 
respectively (HM Treasury, 2010b p.48, 54). 
There were some mitigating factors.  Central government funding 
represented only about a quarter of total funding available to local 
government, although councils in areas of high deprivation (with lower 
Council Tax receipts) were more dependent on central grants (Goodwin 
et al., 2012 p.128).  The Coalition argued that on average councils 
would face a cut of 14 per cent of their ‘revenue spending power’ when 
transitional measures and other sources of income were taken into 
account, (HM Treasury, 2010b p.50) although this was strongly 
disputed by some of the most deprived council areas, who later argued 
that they had been hit much harder by a combination of cuts and 
formula grant changes (Anderson, 2012).  Some funding protection was 
provided for schools  and social care, (HM Treasury, 2010b p.6-8) 
although local authority influence over schools, (already severely limited 
by Labour policies on ‘pass-porting’12 schools funding) was further 
undermined by the Coalition’s policy of promoting free schools and 
academies, which were funded centrally (HM Treasury, 2010b p.42). 
                                                             
12 ‘Pass-porting’ is the practice of directly transferring funds, or spending cuts, to a particular 
department or body, without any form of alteration.  
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In a move to increase the freedom of action available to local 
authorities, the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 announced 
the removal of restrictive ‘ring fences’ from all grants excepting public 
health and education, and core grant funding for local government was 
simplified from more than 90 streams down to just 10.  There was also 
commitment to 16 ‘Community Budget’ pilots, a partial successor to 
Local Area Agreements, which provided place-based funding pooled 
between a range of local agencies to focus on families with complex 
needs (HM Treasury, 2010b p.32).  This later became known as the 
‘troubled families’ programme. 
Local government was also subject to a national two-year public sector 
pay freeze (which was subsequently followed by a pay offer of one per 
cent) (HM Treasury, 2010a p.2; Press Association, 2013).  Councils 
that wished to freeze their Council Tax were offered a specific grant for 
each year of stabilised Council Tax (HM Treasury, 2010a p.3), although 
local authorities taking up the offer were limited in their leeway to 
recover the resulting gap in the tax base in subsequent years (an issue 
discussed further below in relation to localism).  Finally, local authorities 
were offered hints of the government’s willingness to explore ‘options 
for business rates and council tax incentives’ to ‘reinvest the benefits of 
growth’ (HM Treasury, 2010a p.31).  Business rate localisation was 
progressed by increments throughout the period under study13. 
Whilst the impacts of welfare reform policies announced in the 
Comprehensive Spending Review were less immediate (with most 
implementation being delayed until 2013) they were equally significant 
for organisations involved in the delivery of public services.  An array of 
policy changes included the localisation of Council Tax Benefit with a 
10 per cent cut in funding, passed directly to local authorities who were 
                                                             
13 In April 2013 the Coalition introduced a system of business rates retention, whereby local 
authorities could keep up to half of any local growth in business rates.  Enhanced business 
rates ‘earn back’ was offered to Manchester in 2014 as part of negotiations over combined 
authorities and local elected mayors.  George Osborne subsequently stated his intention to 
extend powers to lower business rates to all localities in his party conference speech of 
October 2015 (Osborne, 2015b) although (a limited) power to raise rates was only offered to 
those with directly elected mayors.   
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left to absorb the costs or transfer them on to working-age households 
in the form of increased Council Tax contributions.  There were also 
changes to housing benefit, including the controversial Housing Benefit 
under-occupation charges (‘bedroom tax’) which applied only to tenants 
with spare bedrooms in social housing, not those in the private rented 
sector.   There was a cap on benefits which stipulated that no workless 
family should receive more than the median income after tax for 
working households (HM Treasury, 2010b p.28) and a time limit on 
Employment Support Allowance (the replacement for Incapacity 
Benefit).  The biggest proposed change was the introduction of 
Universal Credit, which aimed to amalgamate a range of means-tested 
benefits in a single flexible monthly payment which could be more 
flexibly linked to incentives for work.  This was scheduled for 2013-14, 
but in practice was still awaiting completion of roll-out in 2015 (HM 
Treasury, 2010b p.68-69). 
Most of these changes affected local service providers directly.  For 
instance, councils were free to choose how they absorbed the 
localisation of Council Tax Benefit, leading to multiple local 
consultations, and extensive variation across England (Barry-Born, 
Bushe, & Macinnes, 2015).  Social housing providers expressed 
concern at the ramifications of the ‘bedroom tax’, and in some cases, 
set about gaming the system, for instance re-designating spare 
bedrooms as living space, in order to protect their tenants from 
reductions in Housing Benefit payments (Municipal Journal, 2013).  
There was also evidence of a rapid growth in crisis support facilities 
such as food banks, with up to half of referrals being attributed to 
benefit payment delays and sanctions (Cooper & Dumpleton, 2013 p.3, 
5).  Research by Beatty and Fothergill (2013) mapping the cumulative 
impact of welfare reform, in terms of the money extracted from local 
economies, demonstrated that the cuts were ‘hitting the poorest areas 
hardest’. 
Meanwhile the initiative which became known as the ‘bonfire of the 
quangos’ involved a commitment to radically reduce the number of 
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arms-length bodies across government (HM Treasury, 2010b p.37).  
However, there was some debate on the gap between rhetoric and 
reality.  Flinders and Skelcher highlighted in 2012 that ‘the reforms will 
reduce the number of small or inactive bodies but the vast majority of  
large and powerful quangos have not been affected’ (2012 p.331).  
Nonetheless, there were some significant changes affecting local 
governance, particularly in relation to partnership working between 
statutory agencies.  These included the (lingering) abolition of Audit 
Commission and its extensive inspection and regulatory responsibilities 
over local government and governance partners.14 Regional  
Government Offices (GOs) and Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) were further ‘fuel’ to the bonfire, and specific grants distributed 
by these bodies were abolished, such as the Local Area Agreement 
‘reward grants’, which had been used to incentivise multi-agency 
partnership work at a local level.  The removal of the agreements and 
grants left Local Strategic Partnerships, in particular, in an uncertain 
position regarding their role and responsibilities.  In place of the RDAs, 
a new (sub-regional) partnership vehicle was announced by the 
spending review in the form of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), 
designed to provide ‘strategic leadership in their areas to set out local 
economic priorities, and play a pivotal role in helping rebalance the 
economy towards the private sector’ (HM Treasury, 2010b p.23).  
However these partnerships were typically poorly resourced compared 
to RDAs, with a business-dominated board membership and minimal 
core staff (Rossiter & Price, 2013 p.855). 
Finally in relation to the bonfire of the quangos, the cut in central 
funding to local government was accompanied by a proportional cut in 
‘top-slice’ funding to the Local Government Association, and dissolution 
of associated arms-length bodies, such as the Improvement and 
Development agency (IDeA).  Whilst these bodies had limited direct 
impact on taxpayers, they performed a role in assisting councils and 
                                                             
14 The abolition of the Audit Commission was announced in 2010 but not completed until the 
end of March 2015. 
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their partners to transfer learning, adapt and change in response to 
external pressures.  In the abolition of the IDeA and steady erosion of 
the LGA, councils lost resources for national-level advocacy and 
assistance in adapting their services to an increasingly hostile financial 
environment.   
These were the main policies announced in the 2010 budget and 
Comprehensive Spending Review as mechanisms to cut spending and 
respond to austerity.  However there were other important legislative 
changes in the Coalition’s programme which also impacted on local 
governance, particularly the 2011 Localism Act, public health reform, 
and the introduction of police and crime commissioners. 
The Government’s 2011 Localism Act provided a long sought-after 
general power of competence for local government, which essentially 
granted councils the power to do anything an individual could do that 
was not already proscribed in law (DCLG, 2011a p.4). This went 
beyond the ‘wellbeing’ powers granted in the Local Government Act 
2000, providing in particular new powers to trade and transfer services. 
(Local Government Association, 2012 p.9).  Further flexibilities in 
service delivery included the simplification of planning consents (DCLG, 
2011a p.11), and greater discretion over the levy and retention of 
business rates (p.6) and the allocation of social housing and tenure 
(p.15). 
Reforms to political processes included the abolition of a national 
standards board for councillors, with local authorities becoming 
responsible for designing their own codes of conduct (although to 
prevent corruption it also became a criminal offence for councillors to 
misrepresent a financial interest) (DCLG, 2011a p.5). The Act removed 
some constraints on governance set by the Local Government Act 
2000, providing the opportunity for councils to return to the traditional 
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committee system, if they wished (p.7)15. The 2011 Localism Act also 
allowed the government to devolve its own powers to local authorities 
or partnerships, (p.6) a mechanism which was initially used as part of 
locally negotiated ‘city deals’, and presaged later commitments to 
devolution. 
The Localism Act also offered significant powers to local communities, 
including a community right to challenge council decisions, the right to 
bid for assets, and a requirement for local authorities to hold a 
referendum on Council Tax rises over 2 per cent, a significant 
disincentive to above-inflation Council Tax rises (DCLG, 2011a pp.8-9.).  
The government’s declared intention in regard to these powers was to 
rebalance accountability away from centralised regulation towards local 
communities, in line with David Cameron’s ideal of a ‘Big Society’ 
(Cameron, 2010; Levitas, 2012), but in practice, the new powers 
appeared to place communities in a more antagonistic zero-sum 
relationship with the local state (Lowndes & McCaughie, 2013 p.541). 
Public health reform represented a further significant change for local 
government, representing the return of statutory responsibility for 
commissioning a range of public health duties which had been removed 
from local authorities to the NHS in 1974.  However, the Health and 
Social Care Bill also proved controversial, abolishing primary care 
trusts, which had largely been co-terminus with local authority 
boundaries, and replacing them with ‘clinical commissioning groups’ 
(CCGs) run by General Practitioners, who had little prior experience of 
working co-operatively with local government.  The change created 
tensions: staff within the NHS were concerned that local health needs 
would be subordinated to local political priorities (Timmins, 2012 p.85).  
Opponents to the policy argued that it created wasteful instability within 
the system, created ambiguous accountability structures (both between 
CCGs and Councillor dominated ‘Local Health and Wellbeing Boards’ 
                                                             
15
 In hindsight this policy subsequently appeared at odds with the practice which emerged in 
connection with ‘devolution’ deals from 2014 onwards, that combined authorities should 
accept directly elected mayors in return for devolution.   
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and upwards to new national quangos, Public Health England and the 
NHS Commissioning Board), and that it placed the vast majority of 
funding for primary care within the private sector, covered by a patina of 
localism (Timmins, 2012 p.78). The £2.66bn of public health funding 
eventually allocated to local authorities for administration by local health 
and wellbeing boards from 2013 onwards (Local Government 
Association, 2013a) was relatively ‘small beer’ compared to more than 
£62bn resting within the remit of CCGs (NHS Commissioning Board, 
2013). 
Lastly, the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act replaced 
police authorities, (which had previously been appointed by councils) 
with a single directly elected police and crime commissioner (PCC), 
whose duty was to secure efficient and effective policing within their 
police areas.  The principal impact for local government, apart from 
their loss of influence over policing through police authorities, was that 
funding which had previously been passed to community safety 
partnerships (involving the local authority, police and other service 
providers) was now passed to the PCC for allocation.  Whilst the PCC 
and community safety partnership had a duty to work together, the PCC 
was also able to withhold funding (LGG, 2011 p.2, 5). This legislation 
had the effect of rebalancing power from unelected partnerships back 
to more formal political control, but was weakened by the extremely low 
turnout for inaugural PCC elections, which averaged just 14.7 per cent 
(Berman, Coleman, & Taylor, 2012), and by potential for conflict 
between PCCs and local authorities, particularly if they held different 
political sympathies to local councils. 
In summary, despite the tensions inherent within Coalition, the reforms 
instigated by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats from 2010 
onwards had radical implications for local government and governance, 
with ramifications for the funding and stability of key service delivery 
organisations, shifts in the power balance and objectives within local 
partnerships, changes in the focus of accountability to national bodies 
and communities, and increased financial challenges, particularly for 
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the poorest communities.   The next part of this chapter will look in 
detail at what these changes meant for local government and its 
governance role, focussing on the implications for council-controlled 
services, for partnerships focussed on service delivery, for community 
leadership, and for the type and extent of change occurring in local 
government and governance.  A summary of the reforms and their key 
implications is provided below in table 2.1. 
 
2.4 Implications for service delivery 
As noted at the start of this chapter, the link between the 
implementation of the 2010 comprehensive spending review cuts at a 
national level, and their impacts at a local level, was far from clear.  
Although the cuts were being made to local government budgets at a 
national level, local councils did not immediately show signs of financial 
stress, and the general public did not instantly observe a difference in 
services.  There were several reasons why this was the case. 
First, the cuts did not fall equally on every local authority.  Although the 
core local government grant was cut by a standard percentage (subject 
initially to ‘floor targets’ protecting the most deprived councils) some 
councils were far more dependent on government grants than others, 
with dependency on grants ranging from 27.9 per cent of income in the 
least deprived borough to 86.4 per cent in the most deprived borough in 
2009/10 (Innes & Tetlow, 2015b).  Henceforth a cut of (for example) 
eight per cent in a deprived borough constituted significantly more, in 
cash terms, than the same size cut in a better off locality. 
  
47 
 
Table 2.1: Coalition policies, and their implications for local government and governance. Source: Author’s analysis 
 Implications for local government and governance 
Government policy Council-controlled services Partnerships for Service 
Delivery and ‘Community 
Leadership’ 
Type and extent of change  
Spending cuts to central grant 
funding (27 percent for local 
government, ‘front loaded’) 
Cuts impact variably across 
localities, further mediated by 
local political choices and 
circumstances 
Cuts to area-based funds and 
partnership funding.  
Commissioning impacts, 
particularly for VCS partners 
Link between deprivation and 
funding eroded.  Speculation 
about the future of LG grant. 
Spending cuts to partners (e.g. 
Fire 13%, Police 14%) 
Impacts for jointly delivered 
services 
Increases impetus to seek 
partnership solutions 
Impetus for institutional 
integration. 
Removal of ‘ringfences’ from 
grants  
De-ringfencing combined with 
cuts caused local confusion 
over funding levels for specific 
programmes e.g. ‘Supporting 
People’ 
Some increased tensions with 
partners over funding 
allocations 
Greater discretion over use of 
some resources for LG 
Community Budgets / 
‘Troubled Families’ initiative 
Resources / focus for 
‘prevention’ and  early 
intervention initiatives 
New focus / funding for some 
partnership work 
Impetus to further multi-agency 
integration. 
Pay freeze for public sector 
staff 
Diminishing pay for existing 
staff 
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 Implications for local government and governance 
Government policy Council-controlled services Partnerships for Service 
Delivery and ‘Community 
Leadership’ 
Type and extent of change  
Council tax freeze grant Short-term funding provided by 
government to plug gaps 
 Depressed council tax base for 
councils accepting freeze. 
 
New homes bonus Increased income for some 
councils 
 Widens gap between stronger 
economic areas and those 
without housing demand. 
 
Business rates reform Increased income for some 
councils 
Increased engagement with 
business community 
Increased autonomy for LG but 
longer-term potential to erode 
principle of redistributing 
business rates 
 
Welfare reform measures Some cuts associated with 
‘localisation’ of benefits.  
Potential for increased demand 
on some services, e.g. welfare 
rights 
 
Multiple implications for 
partners, especially social 
housing.  Increase in crisis 
support services. 
In poorest areas, significant 
cumulative implications for 
local economy 
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 Implications for local government and governance 
Government policy Council-controlled services Partnerships for Service 
Delivery and ‘Community 
Leadership’ 
Type and extent of change  
‘Bonfire of the quangos’ Fewer targets, inspections.  
Reduced ‘capacity-building’ 
work and national advocacy 
LEPs replace RDAs leading 
sub-regional economic 
development. 
Abolition of local area 
agreements: reductions in 
funding for LSPs. 
More potential for variation in 
local service standards. 
 
Partnership activity focussed at 
sub-regional level 
Localism Act 2011 Increased flexibility on trading / 
commercial activities, planning, 
housing, governance. 
Increased ‘community rights’, 
but few roles for backbench 
members. 
Greater discretion via power of 
general competence, but 
limited financial autonomy. 
Health and Social Care Act 
2012 
Public health responsibilities 
moved to local authorities. 
Closer working between LG 
and health. 
Potential for further 
rationalisation / integration of 
services. 
Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 
Reduced influence over 
policing. 
Funding straight to PCCs 
rather than community safety 
partnerships. 
Tensions with ‘localist’ reforms. 
 
50 
 
Second, authorities in deprived areas also lost a range of dedicated 
area-based funding streams focussed on worklessness, housing, 
regeneration and urban renewal, which were either stopped altogether 
or rolled into the main formula grant.  Where funding was continued, the 
amalgamation of specialist grants within each council’s formula 
allocation was far from transparent, and the LGA told councils in 2010 
that some grants had gone ‘missing in action’ (One Nottingham, 
2011b).   
Third, authorities in deprived areas were also unable to raise money as 
effectively as those in less deprived areas, due to the lower value of 
local housing stock.  In an affluent area a rise in Council Tax delivered 
higher returns, due to having more valuable properties, than an area 
where housing was mostly in lower Council Tax bands (Innes & Tetlow, 
2015 p.306).  The ‘Council Tax freeze grant’ was also more generous 
for affluent areas, due to their higher Council Tax base (Hastings et al., 
2012 p.19).  Proposals introduced later in the spending review period, 
including the policy allowing councils to keep a proportion of business 
rates uplift, and the ‘new homes bonus’ for housebuilding also 
disproportionately benefitted those areas with a buoyant local economy.  
Accordingly, at the time this research was initiated, several comparative 
studies had examined the impact of spending cuts on services in the 
spending years 2010-11 and 2011-12 and conclusively demonstrated 
that the impact of cuts varied considerably between localities, with 
areas that were more highly dependent on grant funding losing higher 
amounts of funding, in both relative and absolute terms (Crawford & 
Phillips, 2012 p.124; Hastings, Bramley, Bailey, & Watkins, 2012 p.15; 
The Audit Commission, 2012 p.15).  In practice authorities with greatest 
levels of relative deprivation appeared to be experiencing the largest 
proportional cuts.  This meant that although the real terms cumulative 
reduction in spending averaged 9.4 per cent over the first two years of 
the spending cuts, 26 per cent of councils had already experienced 
reductions in net current service spending of 15 per cent or more. 
(Crawford & Phillips, 2012 p.132-133).  However councils with higher 
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levels of funding were also starting from a much higher per-capita 
funding base, with spending on average £1,328 in the most deprived 
fifth of areas compared to £782 among the least deprived fifth (Innes & 
Tetlow, 2015 p.316). 
Reflecting this variation and complexity, Hastings, Bramley, Bailey and 
Watkins (2012) found that of 25 local authorities surveyed, six indicated 
that initial cuts had no impact on actual service provision.  In a further 
nine, impact was small scale, involving scaling back or cancelling 
projects before they went live.  In ten authorities there had been a 
significant impact, defined as projects and services withdrawn, job 
losses, and the re-shaping of services (p.29).  Additionally most welfare 
reform measures did not take effect until April 2013, delaying the direct 
effects of austerity-related cuts for those in receipt of benefits.  Such 
variation partly explained why national surveys initially failed to reflect 
the impact of cuts on council services. 
It was also difficult to pin down effects of austerity in relation to where 
the cuts were falling.  In terms of reductions to service budgets, 
research from the Institute for Fiscal Studies found that the greatest 
cuts were initially made to planning and development, regulation and 
safety, housing, and transport (Crawford & Phillips, 2012).  Yet these 
cuts also needed to be seen in the context of rapid service growth 
between 2001/02 and 2009/10, for instance, housing expenditure rose 
at average annual rate of 14.1 per cent in real terms in that period, and 
the initial cuts reversed only 30 per cent of that increase.  Transport 
spending had also grown by 8.3 per cent per year in real terms 
between 2002 and 2010, and the initial cuts undid half of this growth 
(Crawford & Phillips, 2012 p.139).   
Hastings, Bramley, Bailey and Watkins drew on different survey 
evidence to suggest that cuts to services were principally falling on 
youth services, early years, libraries and culture, sport, leisure and 
parks, with a pronounced tendency for cuts to adversely affect young 
people.  Central services, young people, libraries and early years were 
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taking ‘disproportionate’ cuts as a percentage of their budgets (2012, 
p.51).  They also attempted to trace patterns in the types of cuts that 
were made, finding a somewhat progressive picture in terms of higher 
cuts to services which were pro-rich, as opposed to pro-poor (2012, 
p.48). However, their interpretation involved some subjective 
judgements over which services fitted into pro-rich or poor categories, 
and might also have reflected other explanations, for example that 
planning or central services were easier to cut because they were 
relatively easy to stop and start, less needed in a recession, or 
politically less sensitive. 
A further limitation of these early studies was that although they showed 
which service budgets were being impacted by spending reductions, 
budget cuts did not translate directly into service reductions due to the 
myriad possibilities available for changes in staffing, delivery 
mechanisms or adjustments in service quality.  Such variables became 
an important factor in what Gardner and Lowndes (2015) later termed 
the ‘austerity puzzle’, describing the apparent capacity for even the 
worst affected councils to maintain services.  Some research on these 
issues emerged at the end of 2013, which highlighted the trend of 
councils cutting ‘back office’ posts and questioned local authorities’ 
ability to sustain the pace of spending cuts (Hastings et al., 2013; The 
Audit Commission, 2013).  However, performance management 
frameworks associated with Local Area Agreements and the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment had been withdrawn in 2010, 
(DCLG, 2010a, 2010b) resulting in a considerable reduction in audited 
comparable performance information.  This made adjustments to 
service quality difficult to discern, although by 2014 it was clear that 
service volumes in areas such as adult social care were being reduced 
(NAO, 2014b p.35).  Questions therefore remained about the impact of 
local political choices and other institutional processes on cuts at the 
front-line. 
Another factor affecting responses to austerity was authorities’ actions 
to capitalise on the opportunities offered by the localism and health and 
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social care acts, coupled with local strengths and assets.  The potential 
for creative responses to austerity was highlighted by Lowndes and 
McCaughie (2013) as they described how local authorities were 
‘weathering the perfect storm’ through processes of institutional 
remembering, sharing and boundary-crossing, driven by a pragmatic 
‘politics of the present’.   As core budgets contracted, income 
generation opportunities were dynamically expanding.  There was 
growing emphasis on ‘commercialisation’ of services, with the general 
power of competence providing new opportunities around trading and 
charging for services (Local Government Association, 2012 p.4)  Local 
authorities historic role as powerful land and property owners meant 
that each locality possessed a unique legacy of assets which could be 
used to generate income.  There were also opportunities for 
rationalisation of services across agencies, particularly resulting from 
the integration of public health provision with local government services 
in 2013. 
To summarise, in 2012-13 there was a growing body of evidence 
looking at the extent of service cuts in a comparative context.  It was 
clear that the financial impact of cuts would vary in every locality and be 
cumulative, building up over time. However, there was limited 
information on how cuts were interacting on the ground with local 
political choices, institutional systems and assets.  The nature and 
processes of those choices and their outcomes was a topic meriting 
further critical attention.   
 
2.5 Implications for partnerships, and 
‘community leadership’ 
In relation to local government’s ‘convening’ role, co-ordinating local 
service provision through external organisations (Lyons, 2007 p.3), 
evidence for increased use of out-sourcing was inconclusive.  The 
National Audit Office found that councils with smaller funding reductions 
were tending to decrease staffing costs, which possibly indicated 
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increased outsourcing by these authorities; yet councils with larger 
funding reductions were decreasing running costs, potentially by 
drawing services back in-house (NAO, 2014b p.23).  Again local 
political choices appeared to be an important variable.   
However there was some national evidence for strain on relationships 
with voluntary sector providers.  A report from the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations quoted findings that 50 per cent of local 
authorities had ‘disproportionately’ cut voluntary sector grant funding in 
2011/12 (Heywood & Bhati, 2013 p.4).  Although the figures were 
contested, such findings reflected disputes about allocations of ‘de-
ringfenced’ grants, which had been rolled into local authority funding16. 
They also suggested an emerging tendency for local authorities to 
offset cuts through more extensive and tighter contract management, 
raising a question as to whether ‘partnerships’ were being exchanged 
for more formal contractual relationships as local authorities sought 
ever greater value for their spending.  
On local government’s role as community leaders, it was difficult to see 
in 2012 whether the extent of partnership working had waned or merely 
transferred its focus to new objectives.  For instance, Local Area 
Agreements had been abolished and many local strategic partnerships 
(though not all) had foundered (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 p.29).  At 
the same time fresh partnership initiatives had been introduced in their 
place.  The ‘Community Budgets’ programme provided a  framework for 
multi-level and multi-agency working in sixteen areas, with a focus on 
sharing resources to fund ‘preventative’ services which could save 
money over the longer term.  Health and Wellbeing Boards, which were 
introduced to provide oversight for public health from April 2013 knitted 
local authority and NHS structures together more closely than at any 
time since 1974.  Local Enterprise Partnerships were creating new 
opportunities for local political leaders to influence economic drivers at 
                                                             
16
 In Nottingham a Housing Association took the council to judicial review in 2011 regarding 
disputed allocations from the de-ringfenced ‘Supporting People’ funding stream; see section 
6.2 for further details. 
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a sub-regional level, backed by structural funding and Michael 
Hestletine’s report “No Stone Unturned” (Heseltine, 2012).  As one 
anonymous practitioner put it, “Partnership – its time has come!” 
(quoted in Lowndes & Squires, 2012 p.402).  Therefore, whilst the 
mechanisms for motivating partnership activity had changed, it seemed 
that local government was in some senses continuing to act as a 
‘convenor’ for multi-agency action at a local and sub-regional level, with 
increased incentives for rationalisation and potentially further 
integration. 
However, the role of non-executive councillors in partnership 
arrangements continued to be problematic.  Police and Crime 
Commissioners had replaced police authorities, so there were fewer 
leadership roles available for councillors to fill.  Sub-regional LEPs and 
local Health and Wellbeing Boards had limited spaces for elected 
politicians, tending to draw their membership from executive 
councillors.  There was emphasis within the Localism Act on the 
‘community rights’ to challenge, bid, build, and veto Council Tax rises, 
but it was not clear how far councillors were supposed to act as a 
conduit for the expression of those rights, or if alternatively they were 
expected to move out of the way (DCLG, 2011a). Lowndes and 
Pratchett also suggested that Coalition ideology privileged individual 
interests, expressed through the ballot box, over a search for collective 
identity within communities, (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 p.29) thereby 
undermining a further role that local councillors might have facilitated.  
In this way lack of clarity about roles for ‘backbench’ councillors, started 
under new Labour, was perpetuated by the Coalition government 
In summary, there remained important questions as to how funding 
pressures and changes to legislation were impacting on local authority 
partnerships and collaboration.  Regarding partnerships for service 
delivery, further investigation was merited into how power relations 
between partners had been affected by the cuts.  In respect of 
community leadership, there were questions about the potential 
democratic deficit associated with the community leadership role and 
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the scope for local government to express a form of community 
leadership which Sullivan termed ‘citizen voice’ (Sullivan, 2007). 
 
2.6 Implications for the type and extent of 
change in local government and governance 
Meanwhile, the rhetoric of the Coalition, and apparent resilience of local 
authorities to the spending cuts, embodied mixed messages about the 
nature and extent of change occurring within local government and 
local governance in response to austerity.  There were contradictions 
between the scale and speed of the spending cuts and a ‘business as 
usual’ message from the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, which implied that the cuts could be achieved through 
‘sensible savings’ (DCLG, 2012). 
In some ways local government had been empowered by the 
Coalition’s policies.  The abolition of ring-fences on most central grants 
provided much-needed flexibility and greater local discretion in 
spending.  The slow demise of the Audit Commission, and more rapid 
abolition of the performance management framework which had 
dominated local government under Labour, increased the freedom of 
local politicians and managers to vary levels of service delivery and 
quality without fear of external scrutiny or criticism.  The ‘power of 
general competence’, increasing flexibility over business rates, return of 
public health responsibilities and (towards the end of the spending 
review period) commitments to further devolution, all represented long-
sought freedoms.  There was also increasing speculation during the 
spending review period about the capacity for councils to become self-
sufficient, fuelled partly by the aspiration of some cities to become 
independent of central grant funding (Core Cities, 2013b). 
However, this increase in local autonomy needed to be viewed against 
the longer term diminution in local government’s resources, given the 
financial constraints of austerity.  In particular the Coalition’s reforms 
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brought some fundamental challenges to the historical basis by which 
local government was funded, including a steady erosion of the link 
between deprivation and additional grant funding (Hastings, Bailey, 
Bramley, Gannon, & Watkins, 2015 p.17).  Coalition policies which 
conferred additional revenues, such as Council Tax freeze grant, 
business rates retention, or the ‘New Homes Bonus’ (which incentivised 
development), also tended to benefit areas with buoyant local 
economies.  Whilst the 2011 Localism Act delivered some powers to 
assist with raising revenue, particularly in relation to commercial 
activities, flexibility over local tax-raising remained tightly constrained.  
Local authorities were required to hold a referendum on any Council 
Tax increases above an arbitrary limit set annually by the Secretary of 
State (set at 2% for most of the spending review period).  When 
combined with the legal requirement to set a balanced budget, this 
created a political imperative for local politicians to appear to be ‘coping’ 
with the cuts, regardless of the financial pressure.   
In 2013, academic argument was split on the possible longer term 
implications of austerity.  On the one hand John (2014) emphasised the 
persistence and resilience of local authorities over time, arguing that 
local authorities represented an extreme case of ‘path dependency’.  
Lowndes and McCaughie (2013) also emphasised local actors’ capacity 
for creativity, describing ‘a ‘present centred’ and ‘non-prophetic’ politics 
that proceeds by ‘small steps’, focussing on ‘what can’’ (T.J Clarke 
quoted in Lowndes & McCaughie, 2012 p.17).  On the other hand, 
critical perspectives argued that austerity policies represented a 
calculated ideological project to restructure the welfare state and 
embed neo-liberal approaches to social policy (Grimshaw & Rubery, 
2012; Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012).  Reviewing the type and extent 
of change occurring within the institutions of local government and local 
governance was therefore an important area of enquiry, to determine 
whether local government was indeed retaining its resilience, or 
alternatively being reordered through the convenient ‘crisis’ of austerity.  
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However, further theoretical tools were required to examine this issue, 
and these will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the Coalition’s austerity policies, placing 
them in the context of the preceding administration’s approach to local 
government and local governance.  It examined how austerity was 
enacted at a national level, and the emerging evidence for responses at 
a local level.   
Three broad questions emerged to guide enquiry into local public 
services were responding to austerity.  First, were austerity policies 
genuinely being delivered with minimal consequences for local 
services, and if so, how was this being achieved?  Second, had 
austerity policies affected local government’s role in delivering services 
through partnership, or as a community leader? Third, how quickly, and 
to what extent, was local government, (and local governance) changing 
in response to austerity? 
The argument outlined here has emphasised that any study of 
responses to austerity within local public services must address the 
implications for local governance as well as local government, as the 
practice of governance was central to local government’s identity and 
purpose, as well as the basis of a wide range of services and functions. 
This chapter has also underlined the differential impacts of austerity, 
emphasising that generalisation is difficult, and the outcomes in each 
local area are unique.  Even within a single locality, the responses of 
different types of service are likely to vary  (for instance, education and 
social services will be relatively less affected than transport and 
planning, due to their differing levels of political and financial 
protection).  However unless we consider specific examples, we risk 
never understanding how cuts are enacted in practice.  Laffin has made 
an argument for the value of studying local politics ‘in the round’ 
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especially in relation to the impact of socio-economic factors on local 
policy outcomes (Laffin, 2008 p.122).  Whilst empirical generalisations 
cannot be drawn from such cases, this type of approach can in some 
senses tell a story of austerity which is being played out in every 
locality; issues of power, politics and place colliding with exogenous 
factors to produce variation, and possibly longer-term change. 
Finally, the study of retrenchment requires a long time frame (Pierson, 
1994 p.14).  This doctoral research was limited in scope to the period of 
the 2010-2015 Comprehensive Spending Review, and due to the lack 
of historical distance can only make provisional suggestions regarding 
the long term implications of austerity for local governance institutions.  
However, it is important to make that attempt, especially given the 
proposed extension of austerity policies under the Conservative 
administration elected in 2015.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical 
approaches to understanding 
responses to austerity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed a range of academic, policy and 
practice literature relating to the development and implementation of 
the UK Coalition government’s austerity policies.  The review 
highlighted three areas of enquiry in relation to how local authorities are 
responding to austerity.  First, were austerity-related savings genuinely 
being delivered with minimal consequences for local councils’ frontline 
services, and if so, how was this being achieved?  Second, had 
austerity affected local government’s capacity to deliver services in 
partnership and act as a community leader? Third, what was the type 
and extent of change to local government?  Had change to date been 
incremental, or alternatively characterised by more radical shifts, and 
was austerity likely to result in marginal differences, or be 
transformative in its effects? 
This chapter starts by examining the ontological and epistemological 
challenges of studying austerity.  It then takes each of the above 
debates in turn and explores new institutionalist and interpretive 
theories which can shed light on these areas of enquiry, highlighting 
key theoretical insights, debates and areas for further exploration.  It 
concludes by outlining six theroretically-informed propositions which 
were used to operationalise the research. 
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3.2 Studying austerity 
The term ‘austerity’ is a loaded construct, with a long semantic and 
intellectual history.  Pilkington highlights that the term arises from the 
Latin term ‘austerus’ and Greek ‘austeros’ meaning dry, harsh and bitter 
(2013 p.148).  Since 2008, ‘austerity’ has been used as a shorthand for 
‘a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the 
reduction of wages, prices and public spending’ (Blyth, 2013 p.2) or 
more colourfully (and encapsulating involuntary aspects of austerity), ‘a 
set of painful economic conditions imposed upon a country’ (Pilkington 
2013 p.148).  
The economic roots of austerity policies have been traced by Blyth back 
to the 17th century, (Blyth, 2013) but in the UK, prior to the 2008 
financial crisis, the term was mainly associated with ‘the promise of 
hardship and the memory of post-war collective solidarities’ (Clarke & 
Newman, 2012 p.307). Appelbaum has focussed on austerity’s wider 
social and cultural connotations, showing that during the post-war 
period ‘austerity’ carried suggestions of hope as well as constraint, 
empowerment and social action as well as social control (2014 p.77).   
David Cameron’s evocation of ‘an age of austerity’ to frame policies for 
the post 2010 spending cuts (Summers, 2009) was a deliberate political 
device, drawing on collective cultural memory of the 1940s and 1950s 
to justify a substantial retrenchment in public spending, as part of the 
government’s ‘unavoidable deficit reduction plan’ (HM Treasury, 2010 
p.5).  This interpretation of austerity ‘moves uncomfortably between the 
economic necessity claim and a more moral and social vocabulary of 
responsibility and interdependence’ (Clarke & Newman, 2012 p.303) 
packaged with “comrade-in-arms” reassurance that ‘we are all in this 
together’ (Cameron, 2009).  In this sense austerity was not just a 
specific set of policies, but a means of signalling a substantive change 
in the political environment and governing ethos, which would inform a 
wide range of political choices and decisions.  As Appelbaum points 
out, when politicians choose to frame situations using such concepts, 
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they do so ‘with the weight and ambiguity of the concept in mind’ 
(Appelbaum, 2014 p.77). 
‘Austerity’ is therefore a social construct rather than a brute fact; an 
idea which has been created to help explain and justify the 
consequences of adherence to a particular political and economic 
strategy.  Within the scope of this thesis there is a need to acknowledge 
that although politicians, public sector workers, and service users 
understand and use the term ‘austerity’, and perceive real and every-
day effects, ‘facts’ about austerity are frequently disputed, and 
responses may be ambiguous, conflicting and mediated by multiple 
intervening factors.  At the same time there is an ongoing need to 
assert that powerful social, political and cultural processes accompany 
austerity policies, and that these impact on the conditions of “real” life, 
although their manifestations may vary. 
This research does not deny the material effects of austerity policies, 
but draws on a constructivist epistemology, arguing that knowledge 
concerning austerity will be ‘structured by the meanings that particular 
groups of people develop to interpret and organise their relationships, 
and environment’ (Parsons, 2010 p.80).  However, it also takes the 
position that, whilst ‘realities’ associated with austerity will be localised 
and specific (Furlong & Marsh, 2010 p.190; Peck, 2012 p.647), there is 
an interplay between material effects and meaning, creating a 
‘structured context’ within which ‘political and bureaucratic actors 
interpret their agency’ (Gains, 2009 p.53, 2011). 
Building on this epistemological stance, the theories chosen to underpin 
this research needed to address issues of structure to acknowledge 
austerity’s material effects.  They also had to encompass explanations 
for agency, to explore the choices available to actors and institutions in 
response to austerity. Finally theories were also needed to explore 
meaning, to understand the motivations behind those choices and the 
significance of decisions.  The following discussion henceforth uses a 
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combination of new institutionalist and interpretive theories to gain 
traction on the research questions associated with the ‘austerity puzzle’. 
 
3.3 New institutionalist perspectives on 
austerity and service delivery 
New institutionalist theory provides useful insights for the first area for 
enquiry, concerning how local authorities had managed to maintain 
frontline service provision, between 2010 and 2015, whilst absorbing a 
37 per cent real-terms funding cut (NAO, 2014a).  However there are 
multiple varieties of new institutionalism, with differing ontological and 
epistemological roots (Lowndes, 2010) and this research found some 
varieties to be more readily applicable to this study than others. 
Historical institutionalism is a varied body of research which explores 
historical aspects of the functioning of political institutions. According to 
Lowndes and Roberts, (2013) a characteristic historical institutionalist 
definition of an institution would include ‘formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions’ (Hall, 1986 quoted in 
Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.32).  Historical institutionalists argue that 
institutions are constrained in their development (or contraction) by 
previous policy decisions.  Such decisions create reinforcing cycles 
which result in ‘path dependencies’, where the costs of a change in 
institutional direction become too high.  Additionally, ‘policy feedback’ 
from powerful interest groups may ‘lock in’ particular paths of policy 
development (Pierson, 1996 p.153).   The best known application of 
this theory to public administration is Paul Pierson’s Dismantling the 
Welfare State (1994).   Pierson took the view that powerful groups 
surrounding social programmes make welfare state institutions less 
dependent on the political parties, social movements and labour 
organisations that originally created them, thereby contributing to the 
‘relative stability of the welfare state’, (1996 p.174) and rendering 
‘retrenchment’ of welfare ‘a distinctive and difficult political enterprise’ 
(Pierson 1994 p.1). 
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Drawing on this perspective, Peter John has used historical 
institutionalist arguments to account for local government’s resilience in 
the face of austerity policies, commenting that ‘path dependence 
describes the history of local government in turbulent times’ (John, 
2014 p.699).  In John’s view this stability derives from a strong political 
and bureaucratic core within local authorities, and (in his terms) 
‘negative' feedback which ensured that, ‘because local government is 
efficient at what it does, other proposals for reform and possible 
alternative models were not fully considered’ (p.699). 
Historical institutionalism therefore provides one potential explanation 
for stability under external financial pressure.  However, a potential 
criticism of this type of historical institutionalist analysis is that a focus 
on apparent path dependence, feedback and stability in institutions may 
negate emerging discursive and ideational shifts with the capacity to 
undermine those structures.  Indeed in a study of the changes to 
political management structures following the Local Government Act 
2000, Gains John and Stoker (2005) pointed out that ‘small changes 
can build up’ and given a tipping point, (such as, in the case of their 
study, national-level political intervention,) become ‘a force behind 
further change’ (p.29).  In the context of the austerity puzzle, too much 
emphasis on the (lack of) change in a material sense could neglect 
important debates in ideas and discourse about public services.  Such 
issues may be more effectively highlighted through constructivist or 
discursive approaches to institutionalism. 
Colin Hay made the case for institutions as internalised constructs 
founded on ideas (2006, p.66) arguing that ‘ideational change invariably 
precedes institutional change’.  In Hay’s view, constructivist 
institutionalism has a particular strength in its ‘ability to interrogate and 
open up the often acknowledged and yet rarely explored question of 
institutional dynamics under disequilibrium conditions’ (p.72) making it 
especially-well suited for examining institutions subject to the ‘shock’ of 
austerity.  Hay contends that path-shaping institutional change occurs 
through ‘ideational contestation unleashed in the moment of crisis’ 
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(p.68) with new ideas being of particular significance.  Path 
dependency can also occur as ideas solidify into ‘cognitive filters’ (p.65) 
and Hay recognises that crisis will not always prompt contestation, but 
sometimes ‘the vehement reassertion, expression and articulation of 
prior conceptions of self-interest’ (p.69). 
However, he also expresses uncertainty in relating this predominantly 
ideational model to material factors, commenting that ‘the extent to 
which constructivist institutionalism entails the substitution of material 
by ideational explanations, the development of explanations which 
dissolve the dualistic distinction between the two, or merely the addition 
of ideational variables to pre-existing material accounts remains 
unclear’  (p.72). 
A partial solution to this problem is provided by Vivien Schmidt in her 
work on discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). For Schmidt, 
institutions are ‘real’ ‘in the sense that they constitute interests and 
cause things to happen’, but not material in a ‘put your hand on it and 
rest your eyes on it’ sense (Schmidt, 2008 p.318).  They represent 
‘simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of 
meaning, which are internal to ‘sentient’ (thinking and speaking) agents’ 
(Schmidt, 2010 p.4). 
Schmidt’s approach is helpful because she challenges dualistic 
divisions between material and ideational explanations of institutional 
change, showing how a concept such as ‘money’ can exist in both 
realms (Schmidt, 2008 p.318).  She also suggests that discursive 
institutionalism complements other types of institutionalism by providing 
a means to understand (often unexpected) change against the 
structural and material background factors provided by older forms of 
institutional analysis (Schmidt, 2008 p.314).  However, a fundamental 
point of debate exists around whether institutions are internally 
conceived or external to actors.  Schmidt herself acknowledges the 
need for balance, emphasising that discursive institutionalism must also 
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make room for issues of power and structure, acknowledging that not 
everything can be attributed to discourse (Schmidt, 2010 p.21). 
In an alternative combinative approach Lowndes and Roberts (2013 
p.129 - 136) draw on a wide range of new institutionalist approaches to 
suggest that institutional change can be examined in a cross-cutting 
way by considering institutions as systems of rules, practices and 
narratives.  They explain that ‘regulative, normative and discursive 
mechanisms work together to shape behaviour’ (Lowndes & Roberts, 
2013 p.50).  Rules are suggested to be formally constructed and 
recorded, for instance, law or policy documents; practices express 
norms or informal rules of the game, ‘the way we do things around 
here’.  Meanwhile, in defining narratives, Lowndes and Roberts 
highlight ‘familiar stories’ and ‘shared understandings’ which reinforce 
‘taken for granted’ assumptions (p.52/3).  They also draw on Schmidt’s 
idea that discourse can be ‘co-ordinative’ (focussing on policy 
construction) or ‘communicative’, referring to the means by which 
political actors engage publics in debate about the necessity and 
appropriateness of policies (Schmidt, 2008 p.310).  
This model neatly sidesteps the question of whether institutions are 
external or internal modes of constraint, combining elements of both 
approaches.  It also balances the role of institutions and agency, 
making it clear that institutions are dependent on actors for their 
‘maintenance, defence, revision and discovery’ (Streeck, cited in 
Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.136), and that actors can also ‘mobilize 
purposefully to change or resist existing constraints, taking advantage 
of gaps and contradictions’ (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.130), 
particularly when ‘dissonance’ appears between institutions, their 
environment and the willingness of actors to maintain the status-quo.  
From this perspective institutions are works in progress:  
‘the product of human agency and the outcome of political 
struggles.  Institutional change emerges out of the interstices 
between rules, practices and narratives; just as stability arises 
from their alignment.  Indeed, in all institutions (at some time and 
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in some places) rules are broken, practices are ignored, and 
counter-narratives gain voice.’ (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 pp.73-
4)  
The attraction of Lowndes and Roberts framework is that it combines 
the structural and normative insights of historical and sociological 
institutionalism with an emphasis on the role of agency.  Although it is 
sympathetic to the historical institutionalism of Streeck and Thelen 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005a), with their emphasis on micro-level 
endogenous (rather than exogenous) change, the focus on narrative 
admits a constructivist element which assists us conceptually in dealing 
with the ‘institutional dynamics under disequilibrium conditions’ (Hay, 
2006 p.72) likely to be a feature of austerity.  Being strongly based in 
empirical study, the framework of rules, practices and narratives also 
provides an easily-operationalized basis for field-based research, 
rendering it a conceptually broad theoretical tool for unpicking the 
‘austerity puzzle’. 
To summarise, these different perspectives suggest that institutions 
exist in both a material and ideational sense, and evidence for change 
and transformation should be sought at both levels.  They also indicate 
that actors play a critical role in sustaining or changing institutions, even 
as they are constrained by them: a point which has been illustrated in 
relation to public administration by Lipsky’s work on the discretion of 
‘street level’ bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010).  Lowndes and Roberts 
conception of institutions as systems of ‘rules, practices and narratives’ 
provides an inclusive and practical means to operationalise an 
institutional analysis which can explore these insights in greater detail.  
Where new institutionalist theoretical approaches currently fall short, 
however, is on theory to deal with the meaning of institutional change; 
the ‘so what?’ question.  Why might it matter if institutions change, and 
in what circumstances do institutional changes become significant to 
actors?  These questions are particularly relevant to local authorities 
‘convening’ work (Lyons, 2007 p.3), which is embedded in relational 
power dynamics between different actors and organisations.  In order to 
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explore this issue in more detail, this analysis will draw on the 
interpretive approach of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006, 2010). 
 
3.4 Interpretive perspectives on austerity and 
partnerships. 
The extent to which austerity has affected the convening role of local 
government, as a co-ordinator of partnership-based approaches to 
service delivery, and in its community leadership function, forms the 
second key area of enquiry for this research.  At one level, new 
institutionalist theory has insights which can be applied to this problem.  
Convening partnerships for service delivery and community leadership 
involves extensive collaborative activity, at strategic and operational 
levels, and Chapter 2.2 showed how this type of partnership work was 
institutionalised under the 1997-2010 Labour governments.  Lowndes 
and Roberts’ (2013) framework of rules, practices and narratives 
therefore remains useful as a conceptual framework to identify potential 
areas of stability and change. 
Partnerships are, however, more than institutionalised structures, as 
their dynamics are continuously reshaped through the agency of 
individual actors (Sullivan, Williams, & Jeffares, 2012).  Gains (2009 
p.52) argues that whilst institutional arrangements are important to the 
context in which local bureaucratic actors act, local bureaucrats are not 
only informed by the ‘formal legalistic and operational ‘rules of the 
game’, but also by ‘internalised and informal perceptions by actors of 
appropriate role behaviour and how to operate’, in other words ‘actors 
interpret how to act’. 
Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003, 2006, 2010) concept of governance 
‘traditions’ provides another means to explore the context within which 
policymakers and practitioners make sense of their options. Traditions 
are defined as ‘a set of inherited beliefs about the institutions and 
history of government’ (Rhodes, 2015 p.6).  Within this context, actors 
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have the capacity to adopt different beliefs and actions, and can - in 
turn - transform traditions in an iterative way. Traditions may provide a 
source of ideas and creativity, but can also act as a constraint on 
thought and action. 
The concept of traditions thus has a strong affinity with discursive and 
constructivist concepts of institutions, being ideational, and 
emphasising the constrained ‘situated agency’ exercised by actors 
embedded within their local historical and social context.  Hay highlights 
that although Bevir and Rhodes disavow the concept of structure, 
traditions have structural qualities.  He describes how they exert 
influence ‘as if’ they were material (Hay, 2011 p.177) in a discussion 
which recalls Schmidt’s description of the way in which the ‘social fact’ 
of discursive institutions (such as money) still embody power and 
influence (Schmidt, 2008 p.318).   However, unlike discursive 
institutionalism, there is also a sense in which traditions exist 
independently, beyond Schmidt’s concept of internalised structures 
reproduced by ‘sentient agents’.  Hay describes how the philosophy of 
interpretivism is based on a ‘conditional, fluid and sociological 
understanding of knowledge itself – not as the accumulation of 
objective truths, but as the process of developing and revising an inter-
subjective consensus on empirical matters amongst members of a 
community’ (2011 p.171). 
This concept of accumulated knowledge and consensus also underpins 
traditions, which constitute the ‘ideational background’ against which 
individuals adopt an intersubjective ‘web of beliefs’.  These ‘webs’ form 
the basis within which individuals exercise reason and interpret their 
experience.  They are influenced - but not determined - by traditions, 
but also dynamic, in that new beliefs can challenge or change a web 
(Hay, 2011 p.178).     
How then can these concepts assist in understanding the effects of 
austerity within local governance?  First, traditions have particular 
resonance for local governance, in that they embody factors of locality, 
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history, place and politics.  Although predominantly ideational, reflecting 
the accumulated beliefs of actors (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010 p.78) they 
also appear to transcend individuals. 
Second, Hay highlights that traditions can be useful in providing 
resources for institutional design and revision, with particular 
significance for explaining institutional change in a context of stress 
such as the 2007/8 financial crisis (Hay, 2011 p.179).  He suggests that 
institutional failure can be a source of ‘dilemmas’ forcing the 
reconsideration of beliefs and practices inherent within traditions.  
According to Rhodes (2011 p.8), dilemmas arise when a new idea 
stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices and forces a 
reconsideration of those beliefs and any associated traditions.  Hay 
suggests that such dilemmas are likely to give rise to ideational conflict, 
wherein traditions are challenged and changed.  In turn, the influence of 
new or different traditions may have an impact on the revision of 
institutions (2011 p.180).  Gains (2009 p.53) makes a similar point from 
the perspective of individual actors, (particularly relevant to the 
Lowndes and Roberts’ (2013) conceptualisation of institutions) 
suggesting that changed material circumstances in the ‘situated 
context’ in which strategic actors operate may also require changed 
practices, or create differing narratives. 
Gardner and Lowndes (2015) have developed this theme by identifying 
five local government traditions (see table 3.1, below) and exploring 
how they are being deployed at local level to negotiate a path through 
austerity.  The traditions identified are not mutually exclusive or 
exhaustive, indeed some traditions may be seen as opposites on a 
continuum, and it is acknowledged that elements of two or more 
traditions may be observed in councils at any given time.  Using case 
study evidence Gardner and Lowndes show that financial pressure 
arising from austerity can lead to actors questioning dominant 
traditions, and mining others for new solutions, sometimes with 
resulting ideational conflict.  
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Table 3.1: Traditions of Local Government 
Tradition Characteristics 
CIVIC 
 
Collaborative city leadership (political, 
business, civil society elites); city identity; 
large-scale, multi-purpose services; 
economic development focus 
COLLECTIVIST 
 
Comprehensive local services; good 
employer; class and community (of 
interest) identities; anti-poverty/equality 
focus; new ways of living/working 
PROFESSIONAL 
 
Specialist (social and technical) services; 
public service ethos; public as clients; 
standardisation; bureaucratic orientation; 
councillor/officer joint elite 
ENABLING 
 
Minimalist state; new public management 
(efficiency/marketization); public as 
customers; councillors as board members 
who let contracts 
COMMUNITARIAN 
 
Small state with devolution to 
neighbourhoods; community identities 
(geographical/faith); self-help and co-
production of services; local variety 
 
Source: Gardner & Lowndes, 2015 
Sullivan (2007) has also used an interpretive approach to suggest links 
between different types of community leadership and underlying local 
government traditions.  The traditions which Sullivan identifies include 
‘adaptive institution’, ‘local self-government’, ‘community 
empowerment’, and ‘agent of centralised control’.  With the benefit of 
hindsight these might now be described as traditions about local 
government rather than ‘of’ local government, which reflect an external 
perspective and the context of the ‘new’ Labour modernisation agenda. 
There is some resonance with the above traditions identified by 
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Gardner and Lowndes (2015) although the fit is not perfect.  In 
particular, Sullivan’s tradition of ‘local self-government’ is close to the 
civic leadership tradition, and ‘community empowerment’ can be 
associated with both collective and communitarian traditions.  ‘Adaptive 
institution’ can be linked to the professional/managerial and ‘enabling’ 
tradition, and ‘agent of centralised control’ could be attached to both 
traditions of collectivism and professional/managerial influence.  The 
point is not to debate which delineations of local government traditions 
are the most accurate, but to recognise that institutionalised policies like 
community leadership are underpinned by longstanding and widely 
shared traditions, and that shifts to those traditions are likely to carry 
commensurate implications for those institutions.  
The addition of interpretive tools to an institutional analysis can 
therefore help us by highlighting how institutional failure resulting from 
austerity may be presenting dilemmas which challenge actors’ beliefs 
and wider local traditions, with a concurrent impact for the way in which 
institutions are reproduced, in the processes of ‘maintenance, defence, 
revision and discovery’ (Streeck, cited in Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 
p.136).  They show that analysis of local governance needs to be alert 
to apparent shifts in the traditions of partnership working, and to the 
ideational contest and institutional change which could accompany 
such differences.  They also help us to understand why some instances 
of institutional change are accepted and others contested (Skelcher, 
2014) as they impact on individual actors’ ‘webs of belief’, shedding 
light on the specific local, historical and political meaning of institutional 
change.  
 
3.5 Understanding the type and extent of 
change 
The final area of inquiry raised by the review of policy and practice 
literature relates to the type and pace of change which is occurring 
(incremental or radical?) and the question of whether the financial 
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pressure of austerity will result in marginal adjustment to the local 
governance landscape or a wider transformation.  Some of the 
historical institutionalist theory we have touched upon already is also 
useful here, but before exploring this research question further, it is 
important to note the wider theoretical discussion on how change 
processes relate to change outcomes.   
Minor adjustments do not always result in minor change.  Drawing on 
Dahl and Lindblom’s theories about incremental policy making, Cope 
(1994) argues that it is possible that a decision made incrementally 
could lead to a large change, and a decision made non-incrementally 
could produce a small change. Incrementalism is defined by its 
processes rather than its outputs; and marginal outcomes are not 
necessarily a defining characteristic (Cope, 1994 p.341).  This position 
is similar to that developed by modern historical institutionalists, who 
also argue that gradual adjustment can be transformative over the 
longer term (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b p.9) and conversely, that policies 
which appear to effect radical change when witnessed at close hand 
may prove to have a relatively limited effect on institutions when 
reviewed with adequate hindsight (Pierson, 1994 p.14).  Therefore, in 
attempting to understand the outcomes of change occurring as a result 
of austerity policies, this study is limited by the recent inception of 
austerity-related approaches, and must be careful to apply appropriate 
caveats to emerging conclusions about outcomes. 
Having acknowledged that limitation, historical institutionalist arguments 
can be used to understand the type of change occurring, although there 
is some theoretical disagreement on the process and timing of change.  
Punctuated equilibrium theory draws on the work of Steven J Gould 
and Niles Eldredge, who theorised that, although evolution generally 
occurs on an incremental basis, rapid evolutionary changes may 
happen in small populations as a response to changes in environmental 
conditions, leaving a ‘punctuation’ in the fossil record (Gould & 
Eldredge, 1993).  Baumgartner and Jones extend this principle to argue 
that although patterns of public spending in the US are generally 
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characterised by incremental change, they also show punctuation 
through instances of major change.  Using the geological metaphor of 
plate tectonics, they introduce the concept of ‘stick / slip friction 
dynamics’ speculating that standard operating procedures, cultural 
norms, human perceptions and increasing institutional costs could 
create ‘a retarding force that interferes with the smooth adjustment of 
political systems to incoming information’ (Jones et al., 2009 p.867). In 
the face of reductions in public expenditure, existing systems and 
policies would therefore ‘stick’ until sufficient friction built up for a 
change, akin to an earthquake.  
One problem with applying this theory to understanding change in local 
governance is that, whilst it supplies some conceptual assistance with 
explaining the apparent service continuity associated with the ‘austerity 
puzzle’ (the ‘stick’), it is difficult to understand whether or not pressure 
for radical change will eventually build to a ‘slip’ resulting in radical 
institutional change.  Even its proponents admit that ‘we understand the 
sticking part of the process better than the slipping part… we 
understand the dynamics of slip only at the vaguest level’  (Jones et al., 
2009 p.867).  Although it would certainly be possible to trace a range 
‘stick’ forces in relation to austerity policies, and plot how ‘tectonic’ 
policy pressure may be building up, predicting if and when radical 
change might occur could be as elusive a goal as predicting a real 
earthquake.  This theoretical approach also implies long periods of 
stasis or ‘equilibrium’, which from some perspectives does not fit well 
with the recent history of local government (Lowndes, 2004 p.230). 
 
A moderated version of punctuated equilibrium is punctuated evolution, 
which implies incremental development along multiple paths, followed 
by success and dominance of a particular policy.  Peter John describes 
evolution as providing a crucial factor of causality for change, ‘a key 
moment when trial and error or recombination allows successful 
replication to take place, which can then expand and take hold and 
challenge an existing policy monopoly’ ( 2012 p.168).  Nonetheless this 
76 
 
idea too lacks predictive power, as it is difficult to predict if, when, and 
how policy innovations might replicate and prove successful, or – if we 
extend the metaphor to local authorities working under conditions of 
austerity – whether evolutionary processes might fail to keep pace with 
exogenous change, leading to decline and potential extinction.  
 
A related but slightly different historical institutionalist approach to 
change is the idea of ‘critical junctures’ (Collier & Collier, 1991).  In this 
instance, changes to the institutional ‘path’ depend on a critical 
combination of external and internal political forces, which may not 
individually be capable of creating significant change, but together lead 
to a significant re-direction.  Although this has been successfully 
applied to case studies of government in Latin America, it is again 
vulnerable to the criticism that critical junctures are only visible with 
hindsight, and has been criticised as ‘unconvincingly contingent, and 
then equally unconvincingly deterministic thereafter’ (Leach & Roberts, 
2011 p.121). 
There is also a danger in placing too much emphasis on the role of path 
dependency and underplaying the role of individual actors.  Responding 
to this argument, Streeck and Thelen have contributed to historical 
institutionalist accounts of change with a model for more gradual 
(though still transformative) endogenous change, through processes of 
displacement, layering, conversion, and drift (Streeck & Thelen, 2005 
p.31 Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.128).  ‘Displacement’ describes the 
act of replacing or subordinating one set of institutional rules with 
another, sometimes with rules that have previously been suppressed.  
‘Layering’ occurs when new rules are superimposed on previous ones, 
leading to the compromise and eventual defeat of the original rules.  
‘Conversion’ involves adapting existing rules and structures to new 
agendas through a process of reinterpretation.  ‘Drift’ describes the 
neglect of rules in response to changes in the environment, leading to 
slippage of practice on the ground. Streeck and Thelen also describe a 
final category of ‘exhaustion’ which is more akin to punctuated 
77 
 
equilibrium, in that it encompasses a situation where the environment 
has changed to the extent that existing institutions are no longer viable 
or appropriate.   
Rather than focussing on moments of profound change, this branch of 
historical institutionalism therefore tends to emphasise incremental 
adjustment.  Thelen argues that ‘even in times of crisis, actors eschew 
experimentation and fall back on familiar formulas resulting in 
institutional reproduction, not change’ (2004 p.292).  Crouch and Keune 
also suggest that when change does occur, actors tend to employ tried 
and trusted templates in the form of institutional materials that were to 
hand (Crouch & Keune, 2005 p.84-5).  Lowndes and Mccaughie have 
also built on this work to show how local government is ‘weathering the 
perfect storm’ of austerity as actors in local government become 
“institutional bricoleurs”, continuously recycling institutional forms to 
create pragmatic solutions (Lowndes & McCaughie, 2012 p.15).  
However, in acknowledging the role of actors in institutional change and 
stability, it is also important to keep in mind varying actor motivations, 
(explored in more detail below) as actors can work to undermine 
institutions as well as defend them. 
A further influence on the process and speed of change is the degree of 
resilience embodied within institutions.  Resilience is a term originally 
derived from materials science which informs a wide variety of 
theoretical approaches (McAslan, 2010), but Shaw has described its 
utility in relation to local government, outlining the strategies which 
actors employ, not just in ‘bouncing back’ (recovering to the original 
position) but in ‘bouncing forward’ or transforming to adjust to a new 
state (Shaw 2012 p.286).  These ideas have more recently been 
applied to analysis of local responses to austerity by Fitzgerald and  
Lupton (2015), who argue that although there is evidence for 
transformation in local governance, there may also be limits to 
resilience.     
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From a new institutionalist perspective, Pierson has identified four 
potential sources of resilience: co-ordination, veto points, asset 
specificity, and positive feedback (2004 p.142).  Pierson describes how 
institutional stability is sometimes attributed to the value of continued 
co-ordination, in that institutions constitute a stable position or 
equilibrium, which is of shared benefit to powerful actors, with strong 
disincentives to explore alternative approaches. Turning next to ‘veto 
points’, Pierson suggests institutions are more resilient if changes or 
challenges need to be agreed in a ‘self-referencing’ way by actors who 
have disincentives to altering the status quo.  Third, Pierson cites ‘asset 
specificity’, suggesting that actors with an interest in assets, such as 
relationships, expectations, and knowledge of procedures, are likely to 
support the continuation of activity wherever those assets are applied 
(p.148).  Meanwhile, ‘positive feedback’, including the support of key 
interest groups, makes the removal of institutions unattractive and their 
replacement increasingly costly.  He suggests that ‘all other things 
being equal, an institution will be more resilient, and any revisions more 
incremental in nature, the longer the institution has been in place’ 
(Pierson, 2004 p.147 emphasis Pierson's own).   
This theory has some resonance for English local government, in 
understanding how institutional resilience may be slowing the pace of 
change resulting from austerity.  For example, Peter John’s portrayal of 
local government as a ‘great survivor’ built around a strong central core 
of members and officers (2014) demonstrates the co-ordinative value 
and asset specificity of local authorities for powerful local elites.   
However, this theory also points towards sources of resilience that are 
not available to local government, or currently being eroded.  In 
particular, though English councils in theory have ‘self-referencing’ 
capacity to determine their own budget and Council Tax, in practice 
they have strong political, legal and financial disincentives to setting an 
unbalanced budget, or triggering the local referendum which is required 
if they raise taxes above the government’s given limit.  It is also striking 
that - although local government as an institution has been around 
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since the 19th century - its physical and staff assets have been steadily 
eroded over the last three decades by public policies such as the ‘right 
to buy’ council housing, the marginalisation of the public sector unions, 
and most recently the financial pressure of austerity.  Although some 
‘positive feedback’ operates at a local level, for instance in helping to 
sustain the system of local political parties, at a national level the 
relative priority given to institutions such as the NHS or defence 
spending in the 2010 and 2015 budgets (HM Treasury, 2010a, 2015c), 
compared to successive cuts in local government funding, 
demonstrates that councils struggle to generate similar institutional 
support.  
In addition, it is important to consider the role of agency in institutional 
resilience.  Mahoney and Thelen describe four different types of change 
agent within institutions, working from very different motivational 
positions; Insurrectionaries, who work against the institution and its 
rules; Subversives, who work against the institution but on the surface 
play by the rules; Symbionts, who wish to preserve the institution, but 
change rules to suit themselves and Opportunists, who seek to follow 
their own agenda (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010 p.23). 
The idea of differentiation in the objectives and motivations of change 
agents is especially useful in a local government context, because it 
takes into account that actors will have differing levels of power and 
divergent motivations or political positions, affecting their desire to 
promote change, or stability, under conditions of austerity.  It also raises 
the possibility of unlikely coalitions, where actors with varying 
motivations can band together for a common purpose.  The capacity 
and motivation to enact or resist change at organisational level is 
therefore likely to be affected by disposition towards change at the level 
of individual actors, and any analysis should take this into account. 
To summarise the theories surveyed in relation to the type of change, 
historical institutionalism provides two broad but contrasting models.  
Punctuated equilibrium suggests periods of stasis or path dependency 
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followed by ‘punctuated’ shifts (Jones et al., 2009).  Alternatively 
theorists like Streeck and Thelen suggest more gradual incremental 
processes which owe as much to actor-centred endogenous change as 
external shock (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b).  It would be illuminating to 
explore in more detail how these differing perspectives play out 
empirically in relation to the change experienced by local governance 
institutions under conditions of austerity.  In addition it is important to 
consider potential sources of institutional and agential resilience, both 
in relation to how these have influenced change to date, and in respect 
to their capacity to influence the pace of change in the future. 
Turning now to the outcomes of change, this discussion starts from the 
premise that both incremental and punctuated forms of change have 
the potential to deliver transformative outcomes.  A useful historical 
institutionalist model for categorising the outcomes of change is 
provided by Hall’s (1993) study of economic policymaking.  Hall outlines 
three types of policy change: 
First order change describes changes in the levels or settings of policy 
instruments, whilst the overall goals and instruments of policy remain 
the same.  In the context of this research, first order change could be 
taken to include budgetary changes, and adjustments to functions and 
service volumes and quality. 
 
Second order change; suggests changes to the techniques or 
instruments used to attain policy goals.  For research focussed on local 
government and governance, second order change would imply a move 
away from existing structures and institutions, to new forms of delivery. 
 
Third order change; argues for changes in all three components of 
policy; instrument settings, the instruments themselves and the 
hierarchy of goals behind the policy.  Hall describes this type of change 
as ‘rare’ with an example being the shift from Keynesian to monetarist 
modes of macroeconomic regulation (1993 pp.278-279).  However, it 
may be useful in this instance to make a link between Hall’s idea of a 
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‘policy paradigm’ and Bevir and Rhodes’ concept of traditions.  Hall 
describes his paradigms as a type of ‘Gestalt’; ‘a framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of 
the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1993 p.279).  Hall 
also suggests that his paradigms can be ‘competing’ or ‘not fully 
elaborated’, (p.291) and that they are expressed mainly in discourse: 
‘organized interests, political parties, and policy experts do not simply 
“exert power”; they acquire power in part by trying to influence the 
political discourse of their day’ (p.290).   This conceptualisation appears 
very close to Bevir and Rhodes’s description of traditions as ‘inherited 
beliefs’, and captures the same sense of a guiding framework within 
which ideas and discourse are framed. 
 
Hall’s model is somewhat limited by its linear nature (for instance, is it 
possible to claim evidence for third order policy change if second order 
change has not yet been observed?)  The categorisation also implies a 
stepped or staged approach, rather than a spectrum of potential 
changes.  However, the advantage of this model is that it provides a 
ready framework within which to understand the extent of change 
enacted in response to austerity, particularly when linked with Bevir and 
Rhodes concept of traditions.  As emphasised above, strong caveats 
must be offered on any tentative judgements, as change-to-date may 
not be a fair reflection of change over a longer time frame. 
 
3.6 Summary and propositions 
How then might it be possible to summarise these theoretical insights 
and link them to a set of operationalisable propositions?  This section 
will review the main observations from the preceding discussion and 
suggest a set of propositions to provide the basis for a theoretically 
informed analysis of how local public services are responding to 
austerity.  A diagram summarising the links between theories and 
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propositions is included below at Figure 3.1.  The propositions are 
worded for application to a single case study, and the rationale for this 
methodological choice will be set out in more detail in section 4.2. 
 
To recap, the three main areas of enquiry drawn from the policy and 
practice review were used as a starting point for engagement with 
relevant areas of theory.  Taking theoretical insights into account, it is 
possible to phrase those areas of enquiry in terms of the following 
research questions: 
 were austerity-related savings really being delivered with minimal 
consequences for local services, and if so, how was this achieved? 
 Had austerity affected local government’s capacity to deliver 
services in partnership and act as a community leader? 
 What was the type and extent of underlying change occurring within 
the institutions of local governance? 
 
Looking first at the issue of frontline services, the new institutionalist 
perspectives reviewed in this chapter suggested that institutional path 
dependency and resilience could form part of an explanation for how 
authorities have apparently been able to ‘cope’ with the external shock 
of austerity.  To examine this theory, it is first necessary to test the 
policy and practice-based suggestions noted in section 2.1 that local 
authorities are coping with austerity, by analysing a range of evidence 
for the maintenance of services throughout the period since the 2010 
spending review.   This leads to the first proposition: 
 
P1: The range and quality of services available to the public has been 
maintained during the period 2010 - 2015 
83 
 
Figure 3.1 Connections between theories and propositions 
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A quantitative framework developed by Hastings, Bailey, Besemer, 
Bramley, Gannon and Watkins (2013) provides a readily available tool 
for analysis, enabling the categorisation of  detailed local budgetary 
information on spending cuts.  This tool has the added advantage of 
having already been tested with authorities in Milton Keynes, Coventry 
and Newcastle.  
 
Following on from this proposition, it would be beneficial to seek a more 
nuanced picture of whether the institutions underpinning local service 
delivery have been maintained at both material and ideational levels.  If 
councils are indeed sustaining services, as suggested in P1, one might 
also expect the underlying institutions to be unchanged.   This topic can 
be explored using Lowndes and Roberts (2013) framework of 
institutional rules, practices and narratives, and therefore explicitly 
references their model: 
 
P2: The Council’s institutional ‘rules, practices and narratives’ have 
been maintained during period 2010-2015. 
Propositions 3 and 4 address the second main area of enquiry, which 
considers local authorities’ role in convening partnerships for service 
delivery and community leadership.  Building on the presupposition in 
P1 and P2 that councils have ‘coped’ with austerity, and will show 
minimal institutional change, Proposition P3 examines whether this also 
holds true for the council’s partnerships focussed on service delivery: 
 
P3: Partnerships for service delivery between the Council and other 
statutory, business and voluntary partners have been maintained in the 
period 2010-2015. 
 
In order to address both the institutional and power-related aspects of 
this proposition the analysis will use both ‘rules, practices and 
narratives’, and interpretive analysis to assess the influence of 
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austerity, in terms of the maintenance or change occurring to structures 
and actors’ perceptions of the meaning of that change. 
 
Following on from this analysis of the local authority’s collaborative 
work for service delivery, the next proposition will look more closely at 
the Council’s community leadership and place-shaping role, to 
understand whether austerity has affected the local authority’s ability to 
choose how it expresses community leadership.  Proposition P4 again 
assumes institutional stability in the community leadership role: 
 
P4: Local political representatives continue to exercise community 
leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles. 
 
This proposition will draw on Sullivan’s (2007) interpretations of 
community leadership as a reference point.  Together, the topics of 
partnerships for service delivery and community leadership provide a 
helpful extension to the analysis of institutional change examined 
through the preceding propositions, moving from a local government 
setting to a local governance context.  Drawing on an interpretive 
approach will also enable an assessment of the significance and 
meaning of any institutional change observed. 
 
Moving to the third research question, investigating the type and extent 
of change which is occurring within local government and governance 
as a result of austerity, this research will draw on theories describing 
change processes (particularly differing conceptualisations of change 
within historical institutionalism) and change outcomes.  Again the 
austerity puzzle and the apparent evidence that local government has 
‘coped’ with the cuts would suggest that any change occurring to date 
has been characterised by incremental processes, hence the fifth 
proposition: 
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P5:  The change processes instigated in response to austerity have so 
far been characterised by incremental change rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’. 
 
Finally, whilst it is difficult to consider the outcomes of austerity given 
the timescale of this project, it is possible to categorise any change 
observed to date by interpreting field observations in the light of Hall’s 
framework and the concept of resilience.  Again, in the light of the 
austerity puzzle we might propose that: 
 
P6 Austerity policies have so far been delivered with minimal (first 
order) change to local governance and systems. 
 
However, analysis will also seek evidence for second and third order 
change.  Any judgment on the extent of change will at this stage be 
both cautious and provisional. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter began by setting out the three areas of enquiry highlighted 
by the review of policy and practice literature, and considering the 
challenges of studying austerity, focussing on the importance of 
theories to address structure, agency and meaning.   It went on to 
explore a wide range of new institutionalist and interpretive 
perspectives which could illuminate the research questions. 
In investigating the effects of austerity on frontline services and their 
underpinning institutions the research committed to analysis which 
could operate at both a material and discursive level, allowing for 
varying motivational positions of different actors.  Lowndes and Roberts 
(2013) conceptualisation of institutions as rules, practices and 
narratives facilitated this approach.  Looking further into agency and 
meaning, Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003, 2006, 2010) interpretive concept of 
‘local government traditions’ enabled consideration of the local 
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significance of institutional change, and appeared helpful in exploring 
changing power relations within a governance context. 
In relation to the speed and extent of change, differing historical 
institutionalist perspectives suggested that responses to the external 
shock of austerity might be rapid, via a process of punctuated 
equilibrium, or more incremental, through gradual endogenous 
adjustment.  Pierson provided some insight into potential sources of 
resilience, which could also slow the process of change, whilst 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory on the motivations of institutional actors 
emphasised that actors could both challenge and defend institutions.  In 
addition Hall’s concept of policy paradigms was identified as a 
framework which could be deployed to form a cautious assessment of 
the extent of change to date.   
These theoretical frameworks were subsequently used to inform six 
propositions which structured the primary research, framed around the 
starting assumption that – if councils are genuinely managing to absorb 
the effects of austerity policies – there will be minimal observable 
change to services, institutions and governance.  The next chapter 
looks at the methodological approach used to operationalise the 
research. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the theoretically-informed propositions 
established in Chapter 3 to describe how they were operationalised and 
tested in an empirical setting.  It goes on to introduce the single case 
study which forms the bedrock of this research. 
In setting out this chapter it is tempting to draw ‘straight lines’ from the 
research questions to the research design, methods, data collection 
and analysis, describing how each informed the next in an orderly and 
logical progression.  However, this would not be a full representation of 
this collaborative research journey, which included points where 
empirical goals were debated and modified, fresh theories introduced 
and applied, and unexpected findings demanded attention.  This 
account will begin by acknowledging how the scope of the research and 
its underpinning theoretical approach evolved over time.  It will go on to 
describe the research design, examining its strengths and weaknesses, 
and reflecting on the relationship between the design and the research 
topic. 
The chapter then presents a rationale for the case selection, and detail 
on how the propositions were operationalised.  A two-stage analysis 
process is described, whereby data was gathered and triangulated to 
create initial fieldwork reports to research partners, and subsequently 
related back to the theoretical propositions for this thesis.  Reflections 
are also given on the methods used to test the validity of these findings.  
In conclusion the chapter reflects on novel areas of the research 
design, as well as its limitations. 
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4.2 Reflecting on the research process 
This project was originally conceived in 2011 as a piece of collaborative 
research between the University of Nottingham and Nottingham City 
Council.  It built on established relationships between academic staff in 
the university’s schools of Politics and International Relations, and 
Sociology and Social Policy, and the council’s policy team.  At that time 
the council was in the midst of dealing with extensive funding 
reductions, demanding a ‘fundamental consideration’ of its services and 
functions (Mills-Evans, 2011a p.3 see also chapter 6.3).  Many posts 
across the council which had been connected with policy and research 
were being deleted (Interview, 2014o).  At the same time the University 
was seeking increased civic engagement and opportunities to 
demonstrate research ‘impact’.   A collaborative PhD studentship, 
principally funded by the University but including a seven per cent 
contribution from the council, was conceived as a cost-effective way for 
the local authority to monitor the effects of austerity, and a means for 
the university to contribute positively to its local community whilst also 
gaining high quality research access.  From its inception the project 
therefore carried an expectation of partnership working, which was 
demonstrated through the council’s involvement in the appointment of 
this author, and shaped by regular engagement between council 
officers and the researcher.  This became an integral factor to the 
research design process, resulting in the use of action-research and 
appreciative inquiry, which are discussed in more detail in section 3.3 
below. 
During the scoping of the project there were a number of key decision 
points.  The first important decision was that the study would focus on 
‘responses’ to austerity, rather than ‘impacts’.  This term was 
deliberately chosen, as the research aimed not just to quantify 
(disputed) material effects, but also consider meanings and significance 
attached to austerity by different participants in the study.  
Pragmatically it also allowed the research to concentrate mainly on the 
2010-2015 Comprehensive Spending Review period, rather than 
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requiring extensive research into the preceding period for the purposes 
of establishing baseline information.  Additionally it was determined that 
the research would focus on ‘local public services’,  with this term 
including both services provided directly by the council, and those 
commissioned from other local providers in accordance with English 
local government’s service delivery and governance role. 
There was also a decision to focus on responses to austerity within 
local institutions rather than in communities and populations.  This 
choice was based on an emergent understanding of the complexity with 
which austerity affected local services.  This complexity was expressed 
(and discussed with project stakeholders at the council and university) 
using a conceptual framework which drew on theoretical insights from 
Pierson’s study of retrenchment within the welfare state (1994) as well 
as a review of policy and practice literature (see figure 4.1 below). 
Figure 4.1 Researching Conceptual Responses to Austerity 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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The top layer of the framework (coloured blue and pink) represented 
the issues affecting local governance from a national perspective.  
These influences were common to all localities, and included austerity 
policies, other major policy changes (for instance around health, 
policing and welfare) and the impacts of the 2007-8 recession 
(acknowledging that the recession affected different parts of the country 
in different ways). 
 
The upper dotted line represented mediating factors that were unique to 
each locality – issues such as politics, history, place, strategies, and 
processes.  These place-related factors were those which determined 
how far the national influences at the top of the framework actually 
created change at a local level.  They represented the plethora of 
details which contributed to ensuring that cuts in the Treasury’s budget 
did not automatically equate to service cuts on the ground.  They also 
included the decisions organisations took on their approach to 
implementing austerity.   
 
The second layer of the framework, (coloured orange) represented the 
types of change this study expected to observe in response to austerity 
policies.  It drew on Pierson’s idea that the student of retrenchment 
should look not just at overall spend, but at programme and systemic 
change. (Pierson, 1994 p.17).  However, it also extended Pierson by 
adding two further areas of potential change: changes to governance, 
particularly work in and through partnerships; and change through 
innovation, to capture instances where organisations found ways of 
doing things wholly differently.   
 
After this layer came a further layer of mediation, represented by a 
second dotted line.  This line signified factors influencing individual and 
community resilience, which would be expected to impact on the 
connection between changes to local services and the extent to which 
those changes affected individuals and communities.   
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The final layer of the framework (coloured in green) included outcome 
measures used to monitor the ‘wellbeing’ of citizens, such as citizen 
and user perceptions, and ‘wellbeing’ indicators, such as health status, 
mental health, the quality of the local environment, and measures of 
community cohesion.  Public sector organisations in the UK regularly 
used such measures to assess the effectiveness of their programmes 
(although the Coalition government of 2010-2015 had reduced statutory 
responsibilities for publishing the results).  The framework recognised 
that factors connected with individual and community resilience were 
likely to influence these outcomes.  In addition there was potential for 
long time-lags between policy interventions (or their cessation) and their 
consequences.  Whilst it was important to observe such measures as a 
proxy for the overall wellbeing of a community in times of austerity, the 
effectiveness or otherwise of public services could not be fully judged 
by these means. 
 
The framework illustrated that the relatively modest resources 
associated with a PhD project would need to be carefully focussed in 
delivering achievable research goals.  It was henceforth agreed with the 
council at an early stage that the research would focus on the top two 
layers of the model (national policies and their institutional effects) 
rather than citizen and community resilience and population effects, as 
the latter area would arguably require a longer research timeframe (to 
take account of time lags) and merit a separate substantial research 
project in its own right.  However, some commentary on ‘outcome’ 
indictors as a proxy for service quality is included in section 6.5.   
A subsequent academic review of the research design led to a further 
agreement not to focus on innovation as a separate area of institutional 
change, given that defining innovation and the effects of austerity on 
that process could (again) merit an organisational-science research 
project by itself. Observations on the development of innovative 
practices have therefore been addressed in this thesis from an 
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institutional and interpretive perspective through commentary on 
service and programme changes.   
The third important decision point concerned the choice of research 
design.  In this respect a decision was taken to examine austerity 
through a single ‘exploratory’ and ‘embedded’ case study, based on a 
number of important factors.  The intention was to provide a different 
perspective to studies of austerity existing at that time (see for example 
Crawford & Phillips, 2012; Hastings, Bramley, Bailey, & Watkins, 2012; 
The Audit Commission, 2012), which largely focussed on comparison 
across services and functions.  By contrast this study sought to 
consider responses to austerity ‘in the round’ across a single locality, 
taking into account both service delivery and governance issues. Using 
this perspective, even a single case contained many different variables 
and perspectives to take into account, necessitating collection of a wide 
range of data from the council and its partner organisations.  
Concentrating on a single case also acknowledged the contingent and 
localised aspects of austerity, including the differential impacts of the 
recession and varying distribution of spending cuts noted in chapter 1, 
alongside the factors of politics and place acknowledged in figure 4.1.  
The local context therefore acted as a core variable, which would have 
potentially been obscured by a larger ‘n’ study.   
 
The case study was ‘exploratory’ in the sense that it aimed to ‘gain 
insight into the structure of a phenomenon, in order to develop 
hypotheses, models or theories’ (Scholz & Tietje, 2002 p.11).  It was 
embedded because it contained more than one unit of analysis, with 
subunits including budget lines from strategic choices documents and 
other service providers (Scholz & Tietje, 2002 p.11).  It drew upon 
mixed methods, with qualitative data including elite interviews and 
collaborative events; and quantitative including data from budgets, 
citizen surveys and performance management systems.  
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Although this choice helped to create a tightly bounded case, focussed 
on a single locality, the main disadvantage related to the accepted 
principle that it would not be possible to generalise from single case to 
a wider population.  Rather, this study adopted Yin’s approach of 
generalizing to theoretical propositions (Yin 1994 p.10).  The full set of 
propositions used in this study has been introduced in section 3.6.   
 
Additionally, although the preceding two chapters have traced close 
links between the empirical puzzles of austerity and the theoretical 
insights informing the propositions, it is important to acknowledge that 
the author’s understanding of those connections has developed 
throughout the full period of this study.  Thus whilst new institutionalist 
analysis informed initial conceptual framework outlined at figure 4.1 
above, and helped to shape the propositions guiding this study, 
originally there were only four guiding propositions, equivalent to those 
expressed in section 3.6 as P1, P3, P4, and P5.  The value of including 
P2 (focussing specifically on the institutional effects of austerity) and P6 
(considering the extent of change) was recognised at a later point in the 
research, as a useful means of exploring the findings that emerged 
from the primary research.  In addition, the relevance of the 
interpretative analytical perspective was recognised at the mid-point of 
the project, and thus informed analysis but not research design.  
Although these twists in the research journey might have been 
concealed to provide an impression of a smooth, deliberate and 
unimpeded progression to the conclusions of the research, they are 
important to understanding how and why the study has developed in 
the way it has.   
 
4.3 Adopting a collaborative approach 
Building on the collaborative work which initiated this study, this 
investigation adopted action research and appreciative enquiry as 
strategic approaches to research design and practice.    
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Action research has been defined by Reason and Bradbury as seeking 
“to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in 
participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of 
pressing concern to people, and more generally, the flourishing of 
individual persons and their communities” (2011 p.4).  
This research strategy has a strong association with practitioner-based 
enquiry (McNiff, 1997 p.xiii; Zuber-Skerritt, 1996 p.3) and the 
empowerment of grass-roots social reform movements (Gaventa & 
Cornwall, 2008 p.180).  As such, it fitted well with the aims of this 
research project, which had arisen from a shared desire on the part of 
individuals at both the university and the council to respond to 
challenges arising from austerity.  In addition the council wished to play 
an active role in the research design, and sought to reflect and act upon 
findings as they emerged.   
In practice, the action research process was developed in iterative way, 
with both the council and researcher contributing to defining goals and 
managing mutual expectations as time progressed.  In the first year of 
the project this researcher spent one day a week at the council’s main 
offices, holding informal conversations with stakeholders and potential 
interviewees, reviewing data sources, undertaking observation and 
agreeing key elements of the research design.  She was issued with a 
staff identity pass, and given a corporate email address which facilitated 
access to the staff intranet and all-staff emails, including weekly blogs 
from the council Chief Executive.  She also commenced participant 
observation of board meetings for the small charity ‘Transforming  Notts 
Together’ (featured in a case study for chapter 6), and agreed research 
access with the local housing organisation, ‘Framework’.   
In the second year of research the researcher typically used the council 
offices several days per week to gather data, arrange and carry-out 
workshops and conduct interviews.  Two workshop reports and two field 
reports were provided to stakeholders at the council (in draft and final 
formats) and findings were discussed with the policy team and senior 
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managers.  A summary of fieldwork was distributed to all research 
participants and mini case-studies shared with contacts at Framework 
and Transforming Notts Together.  During the third year contact 
between the researcher and the council was more intermittent, but 
copies of the thesis chapters and draft papers were shared between the 
researcher and key contacts. 
A benefit of adopting the action-research approach was its adaptable 
nature (Denscombe 2011 p.129).  Given that the council was 
experiencing a high level of financial change, it was important to 
choose a framework which provided the flexibility for a researcher to 
reflect on emerging findings, check their salience with practitioners, and 
explore new sources of evidence as they emerged.  For example, the 
initial document review and participant observation uncovered evidence 
about the impacts of austerity on the local voluntary and community 
sector which had not been anticipated at the research design stage.  
These issues were pursued in further detail  by ensuring that relevant 
interviewees were included within the interview schedules and that 
questions about the sector were encompassed within the framework of 
semi-structured interviews (see below for further information about the 
choice of research methods and questions.)  This was consistent with a 
‘progressive focussing’ approach to producing the case study (Stake 
1995 p.22). 
Action research is also considered particularly suitable for practitioners 
who are participants in the field of study (McNiff 1997 p.1).  Rather than 
requiring researchers to be detached or take on the role of a stranger, it 
values the knowledge of the researcher/practitioner in providing a deep 
and detailed understanding of the field.  Although this researcher was 
no longer a local government employee, she was drawing on fifteen 
years of experience in policy and performance work within local 
government, including experience as a former employee of the 
organisation under study.  This background brought a practical 
understanding of the historical and cultural factors shaping perspectives 
within the ‘epistemic community’ of local government, and conferred 
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some advantages in terms of finding sources of evidence, 
understanding organisational dynamics, and presenting results in ways 
which were accessible to both academic and practice audiences. 
Nonetheless, there were also some disadvantages to the action 
research strategy, over and above the problems with generalising from 
results which are common to all single case studies.  For example, the 
researcher possessed limited control over key issues of relevance to 
the research, because research was conducted alongside the routine 
activity of local services.  This resulted in challenges such as the 
departure of key project sponsors, meaning that the rationale for the 
research needed to be re-negotiated with new stakeholders.    Such 
issues were inevitable in an organisation where staff and policies were 
subject to considerable financial pressure, but since change (or its 
absence) was part of the topic under study in this instance, these 
challenges also became an aspect of the research observations.   
Action research is sometimes also associated with the potential for 
conflict between the researcher and collaborating organisations over 
development and ownership of the research process and products.  
This researcher sometimes found the experience of being neither ‘fully 
independent’ nor ‘fully engaged’ to be an uncomfortable position, 
particularly when trying to negotiate obligations to the council in parallel 
with the longer timescales of academic research.  Potential conflicts 
were mitigated by regularly discussing project development and 
emerging findings (the issue of sponsors leaving the organisation 
necessitated ongoing attention to this practice).  However, maintaining 
dialogue became more challenging in relation to the production of 
academic research products, as busy practitioners have limited time for 
engagement with academic debate.  Principles for using data in 
academic settings were discussed with research participants as part of 
gaining their agreement to participate in the study, but sustaining 
collaboration in building and disseminating research outputs for 
academic consumption remains an aspiration. 
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Furthermore, there is an argument that the engagement required of 
action researchers leads to a lack of impartiality, meaning that results 
are unlikely to be ‘entirely detached or impartial in accord with the 
classic image of science’ (Denscombe 2011 p.134).  However, this 
argument is at odds with the epistemological basis for this research, 
which argues that every participant, including the researcher, is 
engaged in the process of constructing perceptions of austerity, and the 
key is not to deny underlying motivations, but to recognise them.  In this 
context it is not impartiality which is required but reflexivity, 
acknowledging different perceptions, and testing the validity of 
conclusions using multiple data sources (see section 4.6 below).   
Appreciative inquiry was the second principle shaping the research, 
and has been helpful in promoting reflexivity within the research design.  
It is grounded in asset-based theory, which advocates focussing on 
social and community assets (rather than deficits, such as spending 
cuts or deprivation) in formulating public policy interventions (see for 
example Foot & Hopkins, 2010; Rowett & Wooding, 2014; The Health 
Foundation, 2015).  Appreciative enquiry recognises that the questions 
researchers ask can have a dynamic impact on the system they are 
trying to understand.  It considers that ‘people invent and create their 
organisations and communities through conversation about who they 
are (identity) and what they desire (ideals)’ (Ludema & Fry, 2008 
p.291). The aim of adopting an appreciative inquiry approach was to 
ensure that the research process did not impact negatively on an 
organisation that was already experiencing considerable strain as a 
result of the spending cuts.  In practice, it meant that interview 
frameworks and workshops gave space to elucidating the strategies 
that helped services to survive and thrive in delivering services, and 
(whilst acknowledging areas of work that had ceased or deteriorated) 
avoided an excessively negative focus in questioning.   
This approach was welcomed by research participants, who were keen 
to reflect on positive achievements and actions in response to austerity.  
Its main disadvantage lay in the danger of creating an artificially positive 
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bias in the research responses.  This disadvantage was offset by 
ensuring some balance in questionnaires and workshops between 
reflections on ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of austerity, as well as 
triangulating findings with the documentary and data analysis.  
However, the inclusion of this type of balance also represented a 
compromise in the appreciative inquiry method which advocated a 
purist focus on positivity.  Thus whilst there was merit in drawing on this 
theory, it proved difficult to apply authentically within a research (as 
opposed to organisational development) context.    
A further criticism in relation to action research and appreciative inquiry 
was that these research strategies diminished the potential for adopting 
a critical perspective on austerity.  In recording positive responses to 
the spending cuts, and assisting practitioners to focus on practical 
actions, the research arguably sacrificed some of its impact as a 
potential source of challenge to austerity-related policies.  This was a 
particular concern for this author, who had experienced redundancy as 
a direct result of the spending cuts and personally disagreed with many 
aspects of them.  However, acknowledging this frustration also 
demonstrated a benefit of appreciative inquiry, in that the attention to 
balance which it encouraged acted as a restraining force on this 
researcher’s potential bias.  Appreciative inquiry could henceforth be 
seen as encouraging rigour in critical perspective, by facilitating the 
search for alternative constructions of responses to austerity. 
Looking at this issue from a slightly different perspective, it might be 
argued that appreciative inquiry also helps to address the gap 
sometimes evident in literature between critical academic perspectives 
(which tend to focus on history, and concentrate on what is being lost) 
and practitioner perspectives, which instead focus on pragmatic 
approaches to moving forward with available resources.  A combination 
of action-research and appreciative enquiry arguably provides some 
tools to close this gap by both acknowledging the local problems 
created by austerity, and enhancing understanding of how they were 
being addressed.   
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Both action research and appreciative enquiry were also helpful in 
establishing an ethos for research ethics, with an emphasis on 
collaboration in all aspects of the research design, so that research was 
done ‘with, rather than to’ participating organisations.  They 
emphasised transparency in research objectives and the importance of 
communication, together with the value of validating research findings 
by reflecting on them alongside participants.  In practice, this was 
achieved by the regular mechanisms of communication set out above, 
providing all potential participants with information about the research 
and ensuring that participants gave signed consent to their participation 
(see appendix 1 and 2).  A briefing note was also shared with all 
research participants in 2014 setting out the key findings from fieldwork 
(Appendix 3).  To avoid breaking confidences granted through access 
to the intranet and other internal documents, this author also undertook 
to quote solely from documents which were in the public domain.   All 
these practices were in line with the commitments made under a formal 
ethical review of the research undertaken in 2012 and 2013, and 
approved by the ethical review committee of the School of Politics and 
International Relations. 
 
4.4 Why Nottingham? Selection of the 
research case 
Having determined that the research was to be bounded as a single 
exploratory and embedded case study, the selection of Nottingham 
local authority area as the ‘case’ was made for a number of reasons.  
The most obvious was the council’s role as joint-originators, sponsors 
and participants in the work.  The second was the researcher’s 
experience of living and working in the locality, which brought local 
knowledge and connections important to understanding issues of 
history, politics and place.  This experience also facilitated access to a 
wide range of participants who could assist with the research.   
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Third, Nottingham was interesting in that it was relatively vulnerable to 
recession and the subsequent spending cuts, due to pre-existing 
deprivation and heavy reliance on financial and public sector 
employment (see case profile, section 5.3).  In this sense it formed a 
useful ‘revelatory’ exemplar of how one of the areas most deeply 
affected by austerity was responding to financial pressure (Yin 1994 
p.40) and an excellent test of the ‘austerity puzzle’.  
Fourth, although the locality was unique, it also possessed some 
features which facilitated contextualisation with a wide range of other 
areas.  In terms of its functions, the council was a Labour-led, unitary 
authority with service responsibilities substantially similar not just to 
other unitaries, but also metropolitan districts and London boroughs.  It 
is also one of a small group of ‘core cities’ recognised by the Coalition 
government as key drivers of economic growth, which provides a 
further natural comparative group (Core Cities 2013). 
The two mini-case studies of partner organisations which contribute to 
evidence in chapter 8 were also subject to a selection process.  Within 
the analysis as a whole there was a need to focus qualitative data 
collection on a limited number of service areas, in order to effectively 
manage constraints on time and resources.  A decision to focus on 
homelessness and advice services was taken, as these were areas 
where one might have expected to observe early indications of strain 
from austerity-related policies (and thus either confirm or challenge the 
apparent service continuity underpinning the ‘austerity puzzle’) due to 
their focus on the most vulnerable members of society, and mix of 
statutory and (more financially vulnerable) non-statutory functions.  
Accordingly, the partnerships chosen as ‘mini-cases’ also focussed on 
homelessness and advice. 
These two mini-cases were included to explore how the voluntary 
sector was acting in local governance systems to address perceived 
needs arising from austerity, and to understand whether relationships 
were changing as a result of financial pressures on statutory service 
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providers.  The two partners were selected to provide a contrast using a 
‘most different systems’ approach, with one being an established 
housing agency, with a longstanding contractual relationship with the 
local authority, and the other a new charity, albeit with strong local 
authority connections via its board of directors, seeking to increase the 
capacity of church congregations to provide volunteers and funding into 
homelessness and advice services. 
 
4.5 Operationalising the propositions 
Having selected the case (and sub-cases) the next stage was to 
operationalise the propositions.  This was achieved by developing a 
framework of detailed questions which underpinned each of the four 
original propositions, and could guide the collection of data (see 
Appendix 4).  The framework included case-level questions, potential 
sources of evidence, detailed questions, and initial ideas about whether 
these related mostly to rules, practices or narratives (Lowndes & 
Roberts, 2013 p.129-136) (see section 3.3).  In line with the 
collaborative approach these questions reflected the appreciative 
inquiry ethos and were reviewed and agreed by key stakeholders at 
both the council and university.  The choice of data collection methods 
also flowed from these research questions and available sources of 
evidence.  They included document review, semi structured interviews, 
and collaborative workshops, underpinned by informal participant 
observation.  This chapter will now consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of these approaches in greater detail. 
Document review formed an initial stage of data collection, focussing on 
documents and committee papers produced for the council’s executive 
committee and the board of the local stategic partnership, ‘One 
Nottingham’, from the summer of 2010 onwards.   All the papers for 
these two committees which had been published between June 2010 
and December 2013  were reviewed for measures to address financial 
pressure in both government and governance contexts.  The papers 
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included detailed financial information, in the form of budget 
consultations and annual financial plans and strategies.  Additional 
financial and performance reports were also gathered throughout 2014 
as they became available. Extra supporting statistics were collected 
from data sources including NOMIS, ‘Nottingham Insight’ and GOV.UK. 
These documents provided official information for the public record, but 
despite their official status, did not contain indisputible facts.  Reports 
and strategic plans, such as the Nottingham Growth Plan (Nottingham 
City Council, 2012c) often aimed to pesent a positive image of the City 
as well as conveying raw information.  Statistics were politically 
sensitive and liable to continuous reinterpretation.  Meanwhile, 
committee papers tended to obscure the underlying ideologies and 
beliefs which may have informed decision-making.  Reports were 
prepared by council officers seeking to convey advice with professional 
political neutrality, whilst minutes were designed for public consumption 
and historical record and generally conveyed a heavily edited summary 
of richer debate. 
Despite these limitations, however, it was possible to gain from these 
documents a valuable contextual understanding both of how the council 
and strategic partnership understood and interpreted the cuts, and of 
the actions they recorded in response.  Extracts from the documents 
which related to the detailed case questions were collected to create an 
emergent body of evidence in relation to each proposition.  This in turn 
provided a useful seam of evidence to both inform the collection of 
evidence from interviews and collaborative events, and compare with 
those findings.  
In addition a detailed analysis was carried out of financial information 
published by the council as ‘strategic choices’ in annual budget 
consultations.  This analysis was completed using a framework 
developed by Hastings et al. (2013) and described in more detail in 
section 4.4., providing a core of quantitative evidence for proposition 1. 
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The second part of the methodological design involved creating a semi-
structured framework for interviews and selecting interviewees.  Elite 
interviews are sometimes viewed as being in tension with an action 
research approach.  This is because they are often associated with a 
requirement for the interviewer to assume objective neutrality, or an 
assumption that organisational power play (generally to the 
interviewer’s disadvantage) leads to a perceived requirement for 
researchers to develop controlling strategies for the interview in pursuit 
of ‘truth’ (Slote Morris, 2009 p.209).  However, this perspective stems 
from a positivist epistemological stance.  In contrast, Silverman 
highlights that a constructivist perspective positions interviewers and 
interviewees as actively and mutually engaged in constructing meaning.  
In this interpretation the interviewee is not a passive ‘vessel waiting to 
be tapped’ (Gubrium and Holstein quoted in Silverman p.164), but a co-
creator of truth in the context of the questions that are asked.  This 
interpretation of the interview process provided flexibility for this 
researcher to draw on shared experience and knowledge in the practice 
of co-creating meaning, without needing to feign detachment from the 
issues under discussion.  In accepting the inevitability of some 
subjectivity in interviewing, opportunities emerged for ‘reframing the 
interview as a collaborative process’, (Slote Morris, 2009; p.215 
Silverman, 2011 p.164) though in practice whilst some interviewees 
entered into that collaboration, others remained reserved. 
In choosing who should be interviewed, a framework was drawn up 
(see table 4.1 below) to ensure that qualitative data was drawn from 
multiple layers within the arrangements for government and 
governance.  Council sponsors of the research assisted with names of 
suitable people to approach, and sometimes facilitated introductions.  
All interviewees were sent information about the research process 
(appendix 1) and asked for signed consent (appendix 2).  To preserve 
confidentiality the final list of interviewees was not shared with the 
council but was reviewed (considering a balance of positions and 
perspectives) with this author’s PhD supervisors.  Table 4.1 provides an 
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overview of the data sources (also including the collaborative 
workshops, which are discussed in more detail below).  Interviewees 
were free to suggest a time and convenient venue, although council 
offices were also used, if the interviewee was comfortable with that 
venue.  All interviews were recorded as digital files using a dictophone, 
and written up as summary reports (the researcher returned to the 
audio file when transcribing exact quotations).  In total 46 people were 
approached, and a total of 34 interviews were carried out with 37 
people participating.  The numbers of participants from each segment 
of the framework are included below.  
To provide a basis for the semi-structured format, a set of interview 
topic guides were drawn up, which were based on the detailed research 
questions and also attempted to balance critical appreciation of more 
negative effects of austerity with appreciative inquiry.  In the first 
instance there were three slightly different topic guides, reflecting the 
different perspectives of politicians, officers and partners.  Occasionally 
additional questions were added to the framework (or questions from 
two or more topic guides were combined) to probe on an area raised by 
new data, or to draw on a particular perspective that was distinctive to 
the interviewee.  Examples of the three basic types of proforma are at 
appendix 5a, 5b and 5c.  
Whilst this format of interviewing provided some structure and helped to 
ensure that evidence could be related back to the propositions, it had 
limitations.  Despite piloting the framework, some interviews over-ran or 
did not cover all the questions in the time available.  Some interviewees 
appeared less interested in co-creating a dialogue than promoting an 
agenda, and did not leave much space for the question framework.  
Others were reserved in their answers, and it was clear that they chose 
their words carefully.  
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Table 4.1 Overview of sources for interviews / workshops 
Role of 
Interviewees 
Inter-agency 
partnerships  
Local Authority 
(directly 
delivered 
services) 
 
Commissioned 
Services 
Strategic 8 strategic 
partners (One 
Nottingham 
Board plus other 
major agencies)  
7 elected 
members and 
senior 
managers  
4 strategic 
partners (senior 
level, but not on 
One Nottingham 
board)  
Co-
ordinative 
Neighbourhood 
Action Teams  
(2 collaborative 
workshops with 
inter-agency 
teams, inner-city 
and outer-estate) 
8 middle 
managers, 
commissioning 
and  policy staff  
 
4 partner policy 
managers  
 
Operational 4 frontline staff 
(focus on advice 
services) 
2 partner frontline 
staff  
 
Yet at the same time, this conscious construction of the interview 
content could be viewed as compatible with the concept of interviews 
as a collaborative process, and could hold benefits for both interviewer 
and interviewee.  For instance, some senior partners and managers 
seemed to view the interview process as a unique opportunity to 
communicate certain messages, using the mediation of the research to 
speak more frankly than they would face to face, knowing it would 
reach a range of stakeholders at the council.  Some comments, for 
instance about the pace of public sector re-organisation, or appreciation 
for certain elected members, were shared with a candour that would 
perhaps have been inappropriate in a public meeting or awkward in a 
one-to-one conversation.  The high turnover of personnel also assisted 
with gathering data.  Senior managers who were either recent ex-
employees, or about to move on, were generous in both their time and 
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personal opinions, and open about policy successes and failures, 
(perhaps more than they would have been had they been remaining 
with their employer).  In these cases the interview became a means of 
making a final impact, by recording lessons from their experience.  A 
further interviewee brought his own life experience to the interview 
process, explaining that as he had interviewed many people for his own 
PhD, he now felt it was his duty to extend the same generosity to 
aspiring researchers approaching him.  In this way the aspiration of 
collaborative interviewing was achieved. 
Whilst interviews were progressing two collaborative workshops were 
initiated with inter-agency teams of frontline staff known as 
neighbourhood action teams.  The selection of neighbourhoods was 
contingent on the willingness of teams to participate in the process, but 
a geographical balance of perspectives was achieved, in that one team 
was based in the inner city and the other on an outer estate.  Again the 
workshops aimed to marry critical inquiry with an appreciative 
perspective, and the format of the event was agreed with team leaders, 
with an added objective of providing material which could feed usefully 
into their development and review processes, as well as the research.  
A workshop outline can be found at Appendix 6.  Each workshop was 
jointly facilitated and recorded by this author and her research 
supervisor, Professor Vivien Lowndes. 
The advantages of the workshop process included the opportunity to 
access a range of frontline staff and team leaders from a variety of 
agencies, and appreciate their partnership dynamic in a way which 
would be difficult to achieve from individual interviews.  It was 
successful both in eliciting a range of challenges at a local level and 
providing examples of partnership-led initiatives to mitigate those 
problems.  It also provided an effective mechanism for expressing 
shared emotions, such as pride in the local area, or frustration at the 
requirements of performance management systems.  The appreciative 
inquiry element helped to inject positive energy into a conversation that 
could otherwise sometimes depress group dynamics; for example there 
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was a palpable change of atmosphere in the second workshop between 
discussing issues of ‘control, influence and concern’, and issues that 
positively influenced the local area. 
In practice, however, the design presented some dilemmas.  The strain 
between appreciative inquiry and a critical perspective on austerity has 
already been noted, but there was also a further tension in this 
workshop between creating a device which could meet both 
organisational development aims (informing future team and area 
planning) and research aims (understanding from a political perspective 
how local partnerships were experiencing and responding to austerity).     
The two objectives were not mutually exclusive, but neither was the 
design totally successful in producing outputs which satisfied both 
purposes.  For example, the groups would have needed to reflect 
further on workshop findings to use them as an input to future 
strategies. 
One of the practical challenges of the workshop method was effectively 
recording comments.  Combining facilitation with capturing the nuanced 
responses of participants proved difficult, even with two researchers 
present.  Although both workshops produced a number of flip-charted 
responses (summarised in an overview report, circulated back to each 
team) subsequent reflection showed that these responses carried much 
greater impact when accompanied by verbatim quotations from 
participants.  These had been captured to some extent in detailed notes 
taken at the first workshop, but a dictophone was used in order to 
ensure such detail was captured consistently at the second meeting.  It 
was also beneficial to have two researchers recording the event, from 
the perspective of being able to triangulate observations and note non-
verbal interactions.   
A second challenge of the workshop method was the 90-minute time 
frame which was rather constraining (although it was the maximum time 
team leaders were able to spend on the exercise).  Whilst there was 
some limited flexibility to stretch some parts of the feedback (and 
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constrain others) it would have been beneficial to explore some issues 
in greater detail.  For example, the first workshop provided many more 
issues of control, influence and concern than we were able to examine 
in depth with participants. 
Another issue associated with the workshop method was that although 
it enabled the expression of shared values, it may also have 
constrained opinions that participants did not wish to share widely.  We 
noted that in the second (outer estate) workshop, staff appeared more 
relaxed than they had in the inner-city session, and wondered whether 
this was related to the absence of elected members, who had been 
present at the first session.  At the inner-city workshop, plenary 
sessions had felt awkward at times, with some participants needing to 
be encouraged to contribute.  By contrast in the second session, the 
plenary discussions had higher levels of energy and were noticeably 
open and good-humoured.  It was possible that the first team had been 
conscious of maintaining their professional personae in front of 
councillors, whereas, because the second team consisted largely of 
peers from frontline services who had clearly established a high level of 
trust and confidence, participants had been more forthcoming and 
candid.  Ultimately it was difficult to draw conclusions from a single 
comparison, but the observation suggested that a workshop context 
might act as a constraint on conversation, as well as an enabler.   
The final method touched on in this study, albeit in a much less formal 
way than other methods, was participant observation.  The very 
process of action-research resulted in some background knowledge 
being gleaned through observation, as the researcher spent long 
periods of time alongside research subjects, and occasionally 
contributing to their work.17  During that period the researcher absorbed 
the atmosphere of buildings and meetings, observed hierarchies and 
group dynamics, and picked up multiple pieces of soft intelligence 
                                                             
17
 For example, the researcher occasionally helped with work at the council, such as providing 
feedback on in-house research designs.  The researcher also contributed various items of 
information to meetings of Transforming Notts Together (see mini-case study section 8.5). 
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which provided important background context to data being gathered 
through other research methods.  However that knowledge has not 
been explicitly drawn upon in analysis, and findings have instead been 
evidenced through the other three research methods.  This is because, 
although notes of meetings, events and some records of personal 
impressions were taken in the field, fully-documented observation had 
not originally been envisaged as one of the data-collection methods for 
this study, and observations were henceforth recorded in relatively 
unstructured way, lacking the rigour, reflection and analysis required to 
be counted as part of the evidence base.  On reflection this was an 
important learning point for this researcher; as given the action 
research approach, it would have been more helpful to research and 
plan protocols for recording participant observation at the beginning of 
the study.  In the absence of such protocols, the informal information 
gathered through observation at the council has provided helpful 
background context, but not usable evidence. 
To summarise, this was a mixed-methods research design centred on 
principles of action research and appreciative inquiry, which drew on a 
range of methods compatible with a collaborative and constructivist 
approach.  Together these methods provided a rich variety of 
qualitative and quantitative information relating to the four (later six) 
propositions.  The process of analysing the data against these 
propositions will now be examined in greater detail. 
 
4.6 Analysing the data 
Building on the documentary analysis, deductive analysis of the 
interview and workshop data was carried out using the theoretically 
informed propositions (and their underpinning case and detailed 
questions) as the basis for organising data. 
Interview and workshop records were initially examined for their 
relevance to the propositions.  Quotations and passages with relevance 
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to the propositions (whether supporting or disagreeing) were drawn into 
a summary document, with notes of their sources.  Where necessary 
the researcher returned to audio files to ensure that quotations were 
transcribed accurately.  Patterns were sought and key themes from the 
evidence identified through a process of data triangulation, where three 
or more sources of evidence were required to justify each theme.  All 
document, interview and workshop reports were also uploaded into a 
Mendelay reference system, which provided an automated keyword 
search facility that assisted with compiling and evidencing themes.  In 
accordance with the constructivist approach to triangulation, any highly 
divergent opinions were also noted, as well as ‘surprises’ in the 
research. 
Interpretation of the findings was then carried out in two stages.  The 
first stage involved presenting several iterations of findings from 
fieldwork to stakeholders at the council.  An initial set of bullet points 
outlining emerging themes was shared with key stakeholders in early 
March 2014.   At this point the findings (though gathered against the 
theoretical propositions) were not explicitly linked back to theory.  The 
response to these themes was positive, in that contacts at the council 
found them resonant, and encouraged the researcher to provide 
greater detail.  Following this, an interim fieldwork report on 
perspectives from the council’s partners was produced in Spring 2014, 
which summarised emerging themes from Neighbourhood Action 
Teams, the One Nottingham Board, and the voluntary and community 
sector.  This report was provided to two contacts in the policy team and 
One Nottingham.  Although this document attracted minimal comment, 
practical actions were taken to address some of the findings in relation 
to working practices of the One Nottingham Board. 
 
Using a similar format, a final fieldwork report covering all the evidence 
gathered by document review, interviews and workshops was submitted 
to stakeholders at the council in the autumn of 2014 and finalised in 
December 2014.  This was accompanied by a presentation to the policy 
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team and a further presentation to the (new) director and senior 
manager of the policy team, as well as members of the press and 
communications team.  This report was arranged in a way that more 
closely reflected the propositions, focussing on organisational 
responses to austerity, partnership responses, and the council’s 
community leadership role.  It was summarised in a short briefing note 
shared with all research participants (see appendix 3).  Meanwhile case 
studies of Transforming Notts Together (TNT) and Framework were 
shared with these organisations in Spring 2015, with a presentation 
provided on request to the board of TNT.  
 
Although comments were again minimal, feedback from original 
sponsors of the research was that findings were insightful and timely.  
However, by the point that the final fieldwork report was completed, 
three layers of management that had originally sponsored the project at 
the council had moved on.  This led to some challenge to findings about 
the impact of commissioning mechanisms from new managers, who 
had not been involved in sponsoring this research, but had been 
involved in overseeing commissioning processes.  They emphasised 
the justification for commissioning processes and steps taken to 
minimise their impact.  Nonetheless, given the weight of evidence in 
relation to this area, the theme was left to stand in the final report.   
 
Finally the second stage of analysis involved relating the evidence 
more explicitly to theory, by testing the theoretically informed 
propositions against the themes identified in empirical evidence. This 
process was carried out during 2015, and it was at this point that two 
additional propositions were added to help with the analysis of findings, 
P2 focussing on different levels of institutional response to austerity, 
and P6 which helped to differentiate discussion on the process and 
pace of change (examined in P5) from the extent of change.  
 
On reflection, this approach to coding and analysis might have 
benefitted from the employment of an appropriate software package, 
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such as N-Vivo.  However, it did create a very flexible means to analyse 
the data which was simple and quick to deploy, an important 
consideration in relation to the action-research approach which sought 
rapid and on-going feedback. 
 
In addition the validity of this analysis can be demonstrated in a variety 
of ways.  Construct validity has been strengthened through the 
application of multiple theoretical perspectives and research methods to 
the research question. Potential researcher bias has been mitigated 
through the action-research and appreciative inquiry strategies, which 
harnessed the benefits of reflexive subjectivity whilst requiring a 
stakeholder-reviewed collaborative approach to research design, and 
attention to balance in the interviews and workshops.  Face validity has 
been established through the maintenance of dialogue with research 
subjects and the distribution and discussion of findings.  Data 
triangulation has been enhanced by methodological triangulation, and 
in the case of workshops, observer triangulation.     Whilst no research 
design is perfect, and this researcher has certainly learnt valuable 
research lessons from this non-linear research journey, evidence has 
been presented above to show that this research process was robust. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to provide a reflexive account of the journey 
underpinning the research, including research design, case selection, 
operationalisation of propositions, and analysis of data.  In recording 
that journey, it has attempted to convey some of the non-linear 
elements of progress; the challenges inherent in experimenting with 
novel approaches to design and data collection; and some areas of 
learning for this researcher, which would be approached differently in 
future.   Whilst it might have been possible to iron-out some of these 
process-wrinkles in the production of this thesis, they are an essential 
aspect of the reflexivity core to action research, and thus important to 
acknowledge. 
115 
 
Overall, the action-research philosophy fitted well with the constructivist 
stance informing this thesis, accepting that the ‘realities’ of austerity 
were subjective, but also paying attention to its felt material and 
ideational effects.  Developing this research methodology proved 
challenging and time consuming for this researcher, but from an 
empirical perspective it created the opportunity to provide a new way of 
understanding how austerity was experienced, as a ‘compound’ 
process with multiple short and longer-term effects across the local 
governance system.  From an ethical perspective it also facilitated a 
way of working which focussed on benefits to the research subject, as 
well as the researcher, which was crucial in this period of financial 
pressure and constrained resources. 
Perhaps one area where this research design could have made greater 
impact, given its engaged stance, was in its ‘catalytic validity’ or the 
‘degree to which the research process re-orients, focusses and 
energises participants…. knowing reality in order to better transform it’ 
(Lather, 2003 p.191).   
However, this may also have been a somewhat unrealistic aspiration, 
particularly as this study focusses on an institutional environment, 
where participants are always partially constrained, and transformation 
often proceeds incrementally (as demonstrated in chapter 9 of this 
thesis).  Instead its catalytic value was evident in the small gestures, 
including the many interviewees who thanked this researcher for the 
opportunity to reflect on recent history, as well as their hopes and fears 
for the future; the team leader who said how much their team had 
enjoyed a workshop; the policy officer who insisted that findings were 
important, and ensured they were conveyed to senior officials, even 
when she anticipated that some messages would be difficult for the 
individuals concerned to hear.  This value is continuing to accrue as the 
research reaches a wider audience through the publication of academic 
articles, and further benefits may become apparent in the future. 
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The next chapter will look in greater detail at the case study of 
Nottingham, setting the context for a further four analysis chapters 
addressing the theoretical propositions.  
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Chapter 5: Introduction to the 
case 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This short chapter aims to provide an overview of Nottingham, the case 
study locality. 
Nottingham is situated in the East Midlands region of England, one of 
the eight largest city economies outside London, with a travel to work 
area population of 755, 800 (Nottingham City Council, 2012 p.11).  The 
city has a strong identity, intimately connected with some of the most 
potent English legends and episodes of history, including the myth of 
Robin Hood; the birthplace of the English civil war; popular dissent 
during the passage of the Great Reform Bill in 1831; and as an 
international centre for lace production during the industrial revolution. 
Positioned near the centre of England (see Figure 5.1), the city is 
surrounded by countryside including the Vale of Belvoir, the Peak 
District and Sherwood Forest.   90 per cent of the English population is 
within two hours travel, via national road and rail links (Nottingham City 
Council, 2012a). 
Modern day Nottingham draws 35 million visitors a year to its 
businesses, leisure, retail and nightlife.  The city hosts more than fifty 
regional and national business headquarters, including Boots, Experian 
and Speedo, as well as two successful universities attracting over 
55,000 students.  It has a history of biotech and pharmaceutical 
innovations, including the invention of Ibruprofen at the Boots company, 
and pioneering work on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) led by Sir 
Peter Mansfield at the University of Nottingham. 
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Figure 5.1: Map of England showing location of Nottingham and 
England’s other ‘core cities’ (see section 5.6) 
 
 
Source: author’s own image 
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Culturally, twentieth century images of the city have been shaped by 
gritty working class dramas ‘Saturday Night and Sunday Morning’ 
(1960) by Alan Sillitoe, and ‘This is England’ (2006) by Shane 
Meadows.  However, in a new millennium, advocates for the city are 
keen to emphasise its modern, creative and sporting attributes.  In 2015 
the tourism body ‘Visit England’ named Nottingham as England’s official 
‘home of sport’.  Nottingham has also worked to establish itself as a 
centre for computer gaming, being the global headquarters for Games 
Workshop and boasting the National Videogame Arcade; the UK’s first 
museum dedicated to the art of gaming. 
 
5.2 Demography 
Despite the size of the greater Nottingham area, the boundaries of the 
Nottingham City local authority are drawn tightly, with a resident 
population of 308,700, excluding the wealthier suburbs of the city (see 
figure 5.2)  The population is growing quickly, rising by 5000 since 2011 
(Nottingham City Council, 2014 p.2).  Most of this growth is attributable 
to international migration, increased numbers of students and a local 
excess of births over deaths.   
Nottingham is also a young city – 28 percent of the population are aged 
18-29, and full time university students make up one in eight of the 
city’s population.  By contrast, other age groups are under-represented 
as families and older residents tend to move out of the city to the 
surrounding districts (see figure 5.3).  Because of this youthful 
population, the city is less likely than other areas to follow the national 
trend of large increases in the numbers of people over retirement age, 
although the number aged 85 plus is projected to increase. (Nottingham 
City Council, 2014 p.8). The population is becoming more diverse in 
terms of ethnicity; 2011 Census data shows 35 per cent of the 
population are from BME groups, (compared to 20 per cent for 
England) an increase from 19 per cent in 2001 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2014 p.3; One Nottingham, 2012). 
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Source: Nottinghamshire Insight Mapping 2015 
In 2012 Nottingham also had an estimated 2000 short term migrants 
staying between three and twelve months, of whom 1500 were thought 
to be students (Nottingham City Council, 2014a p.4).  There is a high 
population turnover with 17 per cent of people changing address in the 
121 
 
year before 2001 (excluding students in halls of residence) (Nottingham 
City Council, 2014b p.3). 
Figure 5.3: Age Structure of Nottingham and England 
 
Source: ONS 2013 in Nottingham City Council, 2014c p.3 
 
5.3 Challenges for the city 
The exclusion of the wealthier suburbs from Nottingham’s local 
authority area mean that the city has relatively high levels of poverty 
and deprivation, being ranked the 20th most deprived district in 
England out of 326 on the average score measure of the index of 
multiple deprivation.  There are also some particularly deprived areas; 
45 of the city’s 176 ‘lower super output’ areas rank amongst the ten per 
cent most deprived in the country.  However, the city has grown in 
prosperity during the past decade and the overall Index of Multiple 
Deprivation ranking is more favourable than Nottingham’s position in 
2004, when it was considered to be the ninth most deprived local 
authority area in England (One Nottingham, 2011a). 
Nonetheless, residents of the city have some of the lowest wages in 
England, with average median annual earnings currently at £22,332 in 
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Nottingham compared to an average of £26,289 for all English Unitary 
authorities (see Figure 5.4 below) possibly partially related to the city’s 
relatively young demographic profile.  Gross Disposable Household 
Income (GDHI) is also lower in Nottingham than many other 
comparable cities (Economic Strategy Research Bureau, 2012 p.2).  
Nottingham has a significant overrepresentation of residents employed 
in the lowest skilled group, ‘Elementary Occupations’, at 17.2 per cent, 
compared to a UK average of 11.1 per cent (p.40).  Highly skilled 
workers tend to live outside the City boundary, travelling into 
Nottingham from neighbouring districts such as Rushcliffe and 
Broxtowe (p.2).  
 Figure 5.4: Wages in Nottingham
 
Source: LG Inform, 2014 
In terms of the economic landscape, Nottingham has a relatively high 
dependency on services and the public sector.  In 2010 Business 
Services accounted for almost 23 per cent of total full time equivalent 
(FTE) employment and 19 per cent of GVA18 in the city. The share of 
employment in business services was significantly higher than other 
nearby cities such as Derby and Leicester (both around 17 per cent) 
and the national average of 15.7 per cent (Economic Strategy 
                                                             
18 GVA (gross value added) measures the contribution of individuals to the economy.  It is 
used in the estimation of gross domestic product or GDP. 
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Research Bureau, 2012 p.22).  In addition, research in 2010 showed 
that 1 in 3 jobs were in the public sector (One Nottingham, 2010a p.4).  
Public Administration, Defence, Education and Health accounted for 31 
per cent of FTE employment and 27 per cent of total GVA in 
Nottingham (Economic Strategy Research Bureau, 2012 p.22).  The 
percentage of the local population in public sector employment 
continues to remain above the average for English Unitaries (see figure 
5.5).  
Figure 5.5: Public Sector Employment in Nottingham 
 
Source: LG Inform, 2014 
 
This dual emphasis on services and the public sector meant that 
Nottingham suffered more than comparable cities from the 2008/09 
recession (Economic Strategy Research Bureau, 2012 p.39) although 
this effect may have been exaggerated by Nottingham’s tight city 
boundaries, which did not include the economic performance of the 
more affluent suburbs.  International Labour Organisation 
unemployment rates show growth in unemployment over time was 
higher than the UK’s other comparable ‘core cities’19 (p.36).  By the 
period April 2010-March 2011, the unemployment rate (according to the 
                                                             
19 For more information on ‘core cities’ see section 5.6 
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International Labour Organisation definition) had increased to 14.1 per 
cent in Nottingham, almost double the national average.   
 
2014 marked an improvement in the local economy, prompting Mark 
Carney, in his first speech as Governor of the Bank of England to 
describe Nottingham as a ‘bellwether’ city for the UK (Murray Brown, 
2014).  Although unemployment has decreased since its peak in 2011 
there remains a persistent gap between Nottingham and the England 
average.  However, the difference between the city and national 
claimant rates has narrowed considerably over the last two years from 
3.7 to 2.1 percentage points. This is still higher than the pre-recession 
level, but suggests claimant numbers may be returning slowly to a pre-
recession level (see figure 5.6), although Nottingham may now have a 
larger proportion of Jobseekers Allowance claimants who (prior to 
welfare reform) were formerly claiming alternative benefits and are now 
experiencing greater barriers to finding work (Oxendale, 2014).  
 
Figure 5.6: Nottingham and England JSA claimant rates 
(September 2012-September 2014) 
 
 
Source: ONS Claimant Counts from NOMIS (Oxendale, 2014) 
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Nottingham’s economy is also affected by the cumulative economic 
impacts of the Coalition government’s welfare reform programme.  
Figures published by the Local Government Association and Centre for 
Social Inclusion in 2013 suggested that 57,428 households in 
Nottingham claimed working-age benefits or tax credits (about 57 per 
cent).  Of those households approximately 22,000 have someone in 
work, and were predicted to lose on average £2116 per year due to 
welfare reform.  35,226 had no one in work, losing an average of £1058 
per annum (Local Government Association, 2013b).  This represented a 
significant amount of money lost to the local economy.  A separate 
study, ‘Hitting the Poorest Areas Hardest’ estimated Nottingham’s total 
annual loss due to welfare reforms at £120m per year (Beatty & 
Fothergill, 2013b).   
A report by the Money Advice Service (Money Advice Service 2013) 
found that 41.2 per cent of the population in Nottingham were over-
indebted (more than three months behind claiming bills or describing 
debts as a ‘heavy burden’).  This was the second highest rate of over-
indebtedness in the UK, with only Kingston upon Hull having a higher 
proportion of over-indebted people (Money Advice Service, 2013 p.3).   
However, it is possible that this finding partly reflects perceptions of the 
high proportion of students living in the city.  The rate of total individual 
insolvencies in 2012 was only 22.6 per 10,000 people, compared to an 
England average of 24.2 per 10,000.  Bankruptcy orders also 
decreased from 439 in 2009 to 143 in 2012, though debt relief orders 
increased by almost a third, from 125 in 2010 to 184 in 2012.  The level 
of individual voluntary arrangements has been relatively stable, at 225 
in 2009, and 229 in 2012 (LG Inform, 2014). 
The city has relatively high levels of child poverty, with 34 per cent 
(21,200 children) living in households claiming workless benefits and 
poverty compared to 20 per cent nationally (Nottingham City Council, 
2013 p.4).  GCSE results, though improving, remain well below the 
national average, and the gap between the educational achievement of 
children in Nottingham compared to other areas is widening 
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(Nottingham City Council, 2014b p.6). Only 21 per cent of pupils from 
maintained schools in Nottingham progress to Higher Education by the 
age of 19, 12 percentage points lower than the national average in 
2009/10 (Economic Strategy Research Bureau, 2012 p.5).  Nottingham 
also continues to have a high – albeit reducing - rate of entrants to the 
youth justice system (Nottingham City Council, 2014b p.6).  
Despite the relatively young population, unhealthy lifestyle behaviours 
and long term conditions mean that adults living in the city are living 
with relatively high levels of ill-health.  Premature mortality rates for the 
four ‘big killers’ (cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory disease and 
liver disease) are worse than 75 per cent of upper tier authorities, with 
Nottingham residents living shorter lives, and with fewer years of good 
health than the England average.  Life expectancy also varies within 
the city, for instance a man born in Wollaton West ward can expect to 
live 11.8 years longer than a man born in the Arboretum.  Emergency 
admissions to hospital for lung disease are among the highest in 
England and levels of preventable sight loss due to diabetes are twice 
the national average (Nottingham City Council, 2014b pp.5-7).  
 
5.4 Developments 
The city is currently benefitting from some major infrastructure renewal 
programmes and accompanying regeneration.   
In 2012 Nottingham City Council was amongst a vanguard of local 
authorities negotiating  a ‘city deal’ with central government with the 
local aim of enabling a ‘structural shift’ in Nottingham’s economy 
through facilitating the sustainable growth of life sciences, green 
technology and digital enterprise.   The city deal provided for the 
accelerated development of Nottingham’s Lace Market area as a 
‘creative quarter’ for arts and science businesses, alongside 
accompanying investment in apprenticeships and skills, as well as 
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energy, communications and transport infrastructure (Nottingham City 
Council, 2012a).   
Significant construction projects which have come to fruition in the last 
ten years include two new tram lines to join Nottingham Express Transit 
line one, creation of a new transport hub at Nottingham Station, 
programmed improvements to the outer ring road and A453 trunk road, 
and urban regeneration schemes connected to the expansion of both 
universities.   
The city has also invested in sports, arts and culture over the past 
decade, including the development of Nottingham Contemporary Art 
Gallery, the New Art Exchange at Hyson Green, construction of 
Nottingham’s Ice Arena, creation of a new leisure centre at Harvey 
Hadden and contributing to development at the Trent Bridge cricket 
ground.  The city narrowly beat Manchester to be declared England’s 
first ‘City of Football’ in 2014, with an accompanying £1.6m grant for the 
development of grass-roots sport from the National Lottery.  A further 
£12.4m has recently been secured from the Heritage Lottery Fund to 
redevelop Nottingham Castle as a ‘world class’ visitor attraction.   
 
5.5 The City Council 
Nottingham City Council has been a unitary authority since local 
government reorganisation in 1998, responsible for all local authority 
services in its area, including planning, transportation and highways; 
waste management; social services; leisure and libraries; strategic 
housing and education (although the authority has very limited control 
over an increasing number of academies and free schools).  Social 
housing is managed through an arms-length organisation, Nottingham 
City Homes, though all housing stock remains the property of the 
council.  The council also assumed responsibility for public health in 
2013 in line with the wider re-organisation of the NHS. 
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Politically the council has been governed by a solid Labour majority 
since the 1980s.  There are 20 council wards, with a total of 55 
councillors of whom 49 represented Labour, 4 Conservative and 2 
independents in October 2014.  The Executive Board has been 
relatively stable with the Leader and Deputy Leader having occupied 
those positions for most of the past decade, and the council has a 
reputation for strong political leadership.  Senior members are involved 
in providing ‘peer support’ to other local authorities and occupy 
prominent positions on local, regional and national bodies associated 
with local government. 
By comparison there has been an extensive rationalisation of officer 
management structures over the past decade and a high turnover in 
senior management positions which has been continued throughout the 
period of the current Comprehensive Spending Review.   The current 
Chief Executive, appointed in late 2012, inherited a corporate 
management team of four corporate directors in charge of cross-cutting 
portfolios for Children and Families, Communities, Development and 
Resources.  This structure contrasted with the service-based power 
dynamics and silos of a decade earlier, when a former Chief Executive 
worked with ten departmental directors.  None of the directors in place 
during 2004 remain in 2014. 
In line with its Labour values, the council has a tradition of providing 
services ‘in house’ despite sustained pressure from successive 
governments to introduce outsourcing and marketization.  In practice 
this tradition has been married creatively with financial and legal 
imperatives.  For instance, the city continues to hold a majority stake in 
the Nottingham City Transport bus company, despite its ‘privatisation’ in 
1986 (Nottingham City Transport, 2013).  In another example, human 
resources and payroll functions are now provided by East Midlands 
Shared Services, a public sector partnership established by Nottingham 
City working with Leicestershire County Council. 
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In response to budget pressures the local authority has recently been 
developing a programme of ‘commercialisation’ introducing more 
widespread application of business practices and making use of trading 
powers arising from the 2011 Localism Act to generate income through 
‘municipal enterprise’.  Services trading for profit include contract 
building cleaning, vehicle maintenance, waste management, energy 
consultancy and Robin Hood Energy, launched in 2015.  Nottingham 
City Council is helped in establishing such businesses by having 
historically retained services in-house.  This decision now means that it 
benefits from both the capital assets and pool of trained staff essential 
to running competitive business operations. 
Commissioning is also a core approach to service delivery, monitored 
by a dedicated sub-committee of the Executive Board, and chaired by 
the Leader of the council.  For example in 2010/11 the Council planned 
to spend more than £67 million on commissioning services from the 
voluntary and community sector (VCS) (Gilby, 2010) although total 
spending on commissioned services from the VCS has substantially 
reduced during the Comprehensive Spending Review period. 
 
5.6 Strategic objectives 
Nottingham has a long tradition of multi-agency partnership liaison both 
within its own boundaries and across the greater Nottingham area, pre-
dating requirements in the Local Government Act 2000 to create local 
strategic partnerships (LSPs).  The partnership, ‘One Nottingham’, has 
to date survived the spending cuts – albeit with much reduced 
resources – and continues to provide a locus for inter-agency and 
cross-sector partnership working through a strategic board, a range of 
themed and area-based sub-partnerships, and regular ‘forum’ meetings 
involving a wide range of partner organisations.  Through ‘One 
Nottingham’, the council led the development of a single strategic plan 
- the ‘Nottingham Plan’ - for the local authority area.  This was compiled 
following a review of quantitative and qualitative evidence and after 
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widespread consultation with partner organisations.  The plan has the 
following long term objectives, looking ahead to Nottingham in 2030:  
 
 Being one of Europe’s top ten cities for science and innovation, 
sport and culture 
 Making every neighbourhood a great place to live 
 Giving the best start in life to all of our children and young people 
 Making poverty history 
(One Nottingham, 2009 p.6-7) 
 
A range of key performance indicators spanning the period 2014 to 
2020 are monitored and reported upon annually by the One Nottingham 
board and the council’s Executive Board, with targets set with reference 
to similar local authority areas.  In the draft 2014 annual report 19 of 37 
indicators were viewed as ‘green’ i.e. meeting or exceeding expected 
levels, including  indicators measuring Gross Value Added and new 
business start-ups, reductions in youth crime and teenage pregnancy 
and environmental indicators such as use of low carbon energy and 
public transport.   There were four amber indicators (performing slightly 
below target) including targets focussing on the employment rate and 
employment in the ‘knowledge economy’.  Ten areas remained red, 
including the percentage of children achieving five or more GCSEs at 
A* to C, alcohol-related admissions to Accident and Emergency, fuel 
poverty and a commitment to halving the number of children in child 
poverty.   The remaining four targets had no available comparative data 
(Catchpole & Jones, 2014). 
 
In the shorter term the council and their partners have their own plans, 
guided by the Nottingham Plan, but also reflecting shorter term political 
and organisational priorities, including the adopted Labour manifesto.    
The 2012-2015 Council Plan had the following objectives: 
 
1. To cut unemployment by a quarter 
2. To continue to cut crime and halve anti-social behaviour 
3. To ensure that more school leavers get a job, training or further 
education than any other city 
4. To keep your neighbourhood as clean as the city centre 
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5. To help you keep your energy bills down 
(Nottingham City Council, 2012b) 
 
Examination of the detailed manifesto pledges underpinning these 
promises reveal that of the 60 commitments mentioned 33 involve 
partnership working, or 55 per cent.  This means that effective 
partnership working is essential to the delivery of the council plan and 
fulfilment of the Labour group manifesto. The council also played a 
leading role in establishing ‘D2N2’ the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire 
Local Enterprise Partnership, which covers both counties. 
 
Looking more widely, the City Council is also a member of the 
influential Core Cities group of Local Authorities (also shown on the 
map at figure 5.1), which in 2013 published a nine-point plan setting out 
a shared ambition on behalf of the eight largest cities outside London to 
out-perform the national economy by 2028 and become financially 
independent of central government (Core Cities, 2013b).  Core Cities – 
and particularly Manchester - have been in the vanguard of recent 
experiments in devolution including ‘city deals’, establishing combined 
authorities and the devolution of further powers with the aim of creating 
what George Osborne termed a ‘northern powerhouse’ (Osborne, 
2014).  Nottingham was in the first round of authorities creating a City 
Deal, but was slower to move beyond preliminary discussions regarding 
combined authorities although (in common with many other areas) it 
submitted an expression of interest, based on the D2N2 area, in 
advance of the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review. 
 
5.7 Comparative performance 
In its last comprehensive performance assessment in 2008 Nottingham 
City Council was found to be a two star (fair) authority which was 
‘improving well’.  A subsequent Comprehensive Area Assessment in 
December 2009 found that the city had no ‘red flags’ (areas for urgent 
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improvement) and identified a particular strength in its strategy for 
public transport. 
The abolition of the Comprehensive Area Assessment programme in 
2011 and subsequent demise of the Audit Commission, has contributed 
to a reduction in high quality comparative data on local authority 
performance.  However some un-audited comparative information is 
available through the Local Government Association-funded ‘LG Inform’ 
system.   
Areas of relatively low performance in comparison to other unitary 
authorities frequently echo the areas of challenge identified earlier and 
priorities in the Nottingham Plan.  These include the percentage of 
students achieving five or more A*-C GCSE’s, where - despite 
improving overall results - the gap between Nottingham and the rest of 
the country is widening (although there is a smaller gap in the results of 
pupils whose first language is not English).  There is also lowest 
quartile performance on the percentage of children becoming the 
subject of a child protection plan for a second or subsequent time, time 
taken to process Housing Benefit and Council Tax support claims and 
changes, and the percentage of household waste sent for re-use 
recycling and composting.   
By contrast high performance areas include access to employment by 
public transport, the processing of planning applications.  Upper-
quartile performance is also found in the percentage of child protection 
cases reviewed within required timescales, and care leavers placed in 
suitable accommodation.  
It is also notable that spending per head of population on highways and 
transport, children’s services planning, housing and environmental 
services is relatively high in comparison to other unitary local authority 
areas.  This partially reflects the higher grant base of an intensely 
urban area, but may also reflect recent political priorities, particularly 
regarding public transport and the importance of maintaining a high 
quality urban environment. 
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Recent national awards for the City Council include a 2013 award for 
improvements to bus services; Local Government Chronicle’s 2014 
award for energy efficiency; the Association of Public Service 
Excellence 2014 awards for best employment and equality initiative and 
the best service team for parks, grounds and horticulture; and macro 
employer of the year at the National Apprenticeship Awards 2014. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of key contextual factors 
shaping Nottingham’s experiences of austerity in the years 2010-2015.  
In doing so, it draws out some highly specific aspects of identity, 
culture, demography, infrastructure and politics, which are essential to 
understanding both the challenges posed by austerity policies, and the 
basis of local institutions and governance traditions which mediated 
responses to those challenges. 
Although these factors are combined in a locally-unique way, there are 
elements of the case that could facilitate comparison with other 
localities; indeed Mark Carney’s description of the city as a ‘bellwether’ 
for the wider economy (see section 5.3) shows that there is much in the 
city which resonates with other places and contexts.  In particular, 
Nottingham’s status as a ‘core’ city provides a natural comparator 
group, and its experience as a unitary authority, with strengths in some 
service areas and recurrent challenges in others, is not unique.  Thus 
this single case can be helpful to illuminate other contexts, if analysis is 
combined with the discipline of generalising to theory (Yin, 1994 p.10). 
There are also aspects of this case which make it an effective exemplar 
for a test of the ‘austerity puzzle’, including the relative severity of the 
local recession, and Nottingham’s high level of deprivation, which 
positioned it amongst those localities experiencing the greatest 
cumulative spending cuts (see section 2.4).  The next chapters will look 
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in more detail at Nottingham’s experience of the cuts, and at individual 
and institutional responses to the ‘dilemmas’ that were created. 
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Chapter 6: Austerity, public 
services, and institutional 
effects in Nottingham 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings and analysis relating to the first area of 
enquiry underpinning the ‘austerity puzzle’: were austerity-related 
savings really being delivered with minimal consequences for frontline 
services, and if so, how was this being achieved?  It also examines 
whether institutional resilience and creativity forms part of the 
explanation for how Nottingham was apparently able to cope with the 
external shock of austerity.  In order to explore these issues, it was first 
necessary to examine whether Nottingham’s case supported the 
suggestion that local authorities were coping with austerity, analysing a 
range of evidence for the maintenance of services throughout the 
period since the 2010 spending review.  This led to proposition 1: the 
range and quality of services available to the public has been 
maintained during the period 2010 to 2015. This case formed an 
important test of the ‘austerity puzzle’ because, as noted in section 5.3, 
Nottingham was relatively severely impacted by the recession and 
subsequent spending cuts, and was thus arguably a ‘critical case’.  If 
Nottingham had managed to maintain its services then it would provide 
an excellent example of the paradox in action.  
Having tested the extent to which Nottingham’s case conforms to the 
‘austerity puzzle’ concept, this chapter goes on to build a nuanced 
picture of whether the institutions underpinning local service delivery 
have been maintained at both material and ideational levels.  It works 
from the assumption that, if services are being sustained as suggested 
in P1, one might also expect the underlying institutions to be 
unchanged.  Lowndes and Roberts (2013) framework of institutional 
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rules, practices and narratives underpinned this proposition as it 
combined the structural insights of historical institutionalism with 
discursive institutionalism’s focus on ideas and discourse as an 
important aspect of institutional maintenance and stability, as well as a 
medium for change.  The second proposition therefore suggested that 
the council’s institutional rules, practices and narratives have been 
maintained during the period 2010-2015. 
To examine these two propositions, a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data was drawn from public records of committee reports to 
the Executive Board and the city’s strategic partnership, ‘One 
Nottingham’.  Detail on where and how savings had been achieved was 
taken from Nottingham City Council’s medium term financial plans and 
budget documentation, particularly appendices focussing on ‘strategic 
choices’ and ‘big ticket’ transformation projects.  An analysis framework 
devised by Hastings, Bailey, Besemer, Bramley, Gannon and Watkins 
(2013 p.20-21) was utilised to help understand and contextualise the 
findings, and emerging conclusions drawn by triangulating findings with 
comments made during interviews and frontline staff workshops. 
In relation to P1, the research findings indicated that the range of 
services which the council provided to the public had indeed been 
largely maintained, although there had been reductions in service 
volumes and eligibility.  It was not possible to adequately assess the 
maintenance of service quality, but outcomes data from the Nottingham 
Plan and citizen satisfaction data indicated that key priorities were 
being progressed, whilst citizen satisfaction appeared to be increasing. 
Yet despite the apparent stability in the range of services provided 
(alongside progress against priority targets), analysis of evidence in 
relation to P2 suggested that although Nottingham appeared to 
maintain an outward adherence to its published policy ‘rules’, there 
were subtle changes to practices, as well as challenges to dominant 
narratives.  Findings suggest that in the ‘dissonance’ created by the 
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demands of austerity, practices were starting to draw upon different 
values to those formerly referenced by the council. 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the extent of spending cuts in cash 
terms, and provide an overview of the mechanisms used to identify 
savings.  It will then examine evidence for the maintenance of services, 
presenting analysis of Nottingham City Council’s ‘strategic choices’ as 
well as relevant performance information.  The discussion will 
subsequently address the changes occurring to institutional practices 
and narratives, and explore links between discursive and material 
shifts, drawing on Streeck and Thelen’s theories of gradual institutional 
change (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b).  In conclusion it examines the 
significance of these shifts in relation to propositions P1 and P2, and 
points to the need for further analysis which looks more deeply at the 
values underlying institutional change. 
 
6.2 The extent of spending cuts. 
Cuts to Nottingham City Council’s grant funding over the period of the 
2010 – 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review were phased and 
impacted at different points through the period under study.  Funding 
reductions can be separated into several categories: 
 The ‘emergency budget’ ‘in-year’ cuts from June 2010, particularly 
to area-based grants and the Working Neighbourhoods Fund20.  
These cuts were unexpected and necessitated rapid and radical 
action. 
 The Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010, resulting in 
annual formula grant cuts from 2011 onwards.  These cuts had been 
modelled and anticipated in scenario planning. 
 Changes to funding provision, such as the localisation of Council 
Tax Benefit with a ten per cent cut, or the rolling of multiple funding 
                                                             
20 The Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) was introduced by Communities and Local 
Government (CLG) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in April 2008. WNF, 
which replaced Neighbourhood Renewal Funding (NRF), provided resources to 65 local 
authorities to tackle worklessness and low levels of skills and enterprise in their most 
deprived areas. 
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streams into a single early-intervention grant, with ‘hidden’ cuts.  
These types of cuts introduced great uncertainty and difficult budget 
choices between different spending commitments. 
 Additional reductions to specific budgets in the years after 2010. 
 
Figures provided for the purposes of setting the budget in Nottingham’s 
successive medium term financial plans from 2011-2014 show a 22 per 
cent drop in cash terms in ‘revenue spending power’21 over the period 
from their re-based 2010/11 budget (after the emergency budget of 
June 2010) to the (modelled) position in 2015/16 (Figure 6.1).  
However, analysis undertaken by Nottingham City Council suggests 
that in real terms they experienced a 50 per cent cut in Government 
funding (Chapman, 2015).  This discrepancy (aside from the difference 
between cash and real terms impact) is partly explained by the fact that, 
although revenue spending power offers a broadly comparable 
overview of the resources available to councils, it presents an 
incomplete picture.  It excludes certain area-based funds which have 
been abolished since 2010 but were particularly important for local 
authorities with high levels of deprivation, and includes other specific 
grants which local authorities have little discretion in spending.  It is not 
strictly comparable year on year, due to the way in which service 
responsibilities and specific grants are constantly transferred in and out 
of local authority control.  For example in figure 6.1, the analysis 
excluded the contribution of the public health grant (introduced in April 
2013) because although it represented a substantial additional budget 
of £27m, (DOH, 2013) the grant was already largely committed, and 
thus did not provide ‘additional’ resources (although it did present 
opportunities for rationalisation).   
                                                             
21 Revenue spending power is the government’s estimate of the amount of funding available 
to each authority to spend on their core services. It is made up of estimated Council Tax and 
business rate income, Revenue Support Grant and New Homes Bonus plus a number of 
government grants excluding those for education and policing. 
139 
 
 
Source: NCC Medium Term Financial Plans, 2011-2014 
The National Audit Office has recommended in 2014 that DCLG needs 
to create a more reliable year-on-year comparison of how council 
funding is affected by the cuts (NAO, 2014 p.10), but has concluded 
that, in the absence of such time-series information, revenue spending 
power is currently the best means of achieving comparison between 
authorities in a given year (p.24). 
There were many other interpretations of the severity of Nottingham’s 
cuts.  For example, research by the Strategic Interest Group of 
Metropolitan Authorities (SIGOMA) suggested that in relation to the 
spending cuts outlined in 2010 Nottingham was initially the 21st hardest 
hit and 12th most financially disadvantaged area in England (One 
Nottingham, 2011b).  However, using the revenue spending power 
calculation the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) did not find Nottingham eligible for any ‘transition grant’ funding 
for the 2011-12 financial year and the City was required to contribute 
towards the ‘damping’ fund to protect more severely affected authorities 
from the worst impacts of cuts (Mills-Evans, 2011a p.4).   
Having acknowledged the difficulty of pinning down precise figures for 
budget reductions, it is important to emphasise that local authority 
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‘budget gaps’ extended beyond the cash value of central grant funding 
cuts, to include a range of pressures which created additional operating 
expenses and increased financial uncertainty (Hastings et al., 2013 
p.15). 
For example, the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review introduced a 
significant rebalancing of the way the councils received their income, 
with a dramatic reduction in specific grants which were theoretically 
rolled into the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) in a process called ‘de-
ringfencing’.  The government claimed that this approach would create 
increased flexibility for local government, but a report to the One 
Nottingham board in January 2010 noted that a number of grants had 
gone “missing in action”, whilst major funding streams such as 
‘Supporting People’22 were subject to heavy cuts (in Nottingham’s case 
from £22m to £10m in a single year) (One Nottingham, 2011b p.3). 
There were also cuts to funding within a range of other public services 
in the city.  A report by ‘One Nottingham’ in January 2011 noted that 
further education colleges had been hit by a £1m reduction in funding 
and abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance.  The police 
were facing ‘significant’ reductions totalling about £10m per year, which 
were expected to lead to redundancies and compulsory retirements.  In 
addition, Nottingham City Homes was reducing capital expenditure and 
Fire and Rescue faced a 25 per cent reduction in funding, totalling £8m 
over four years (One Nottingham, 2011b).  In designing responses to 
austerity, public services therefore had to take into account the 
cumulative effects of cuts on partner organisations, as well as their 
own. 
Other factors creating uncertainty in spending included constraint on 
Council Tax, due to a legislative requirement in the 2011 Localism Act 
that councils exceeding (first) a 3.5 per cent limit and then a 2 per cent 
limit should carry out a public referendum (DCLG, 2011a).  Demand for 
                                                             
22 The Supporting People programme was launched by the Labour government in 2003 to 
improve the funding, planning and monitoring of housing-related support. 
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some services was also increasing, with Nottinghamshire Homeless 
Watch observing a 26 per cent increase in the numbers of people 
presenting as homeless in Nottingham City between survey periods in 
2012 and 2013, alongside a rise in the number of applicants with 
children (HLG, 2013).  Meanwhile potential income generators, such as 
control over business rates uplift, and the New Homes Bonus, carried 
limited benefits for Nottingham, which was suffering economically from 
recession (see case description Chapter 5.3) and possessed limited 
space for development.  The introduction of the ‘general power of 
competence’ also increased the rights for councils to charge for 
services, but income from charges was difficult to guarantee. 
In addition, the complexity of the local government finance system 
meant it often took time for the full impact of spending reductions to be 
clarified.  For example, the 2013 spending round announcement, of a 
2.3 per cent reduction in spending for local government, translated into 
a 10 per cent cut in departmental expenditure limits at the Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and then a 14.6 per 
cent real terms cut announcement in the corresponding DCLG local 
government finance consultation (Werran, 2013a).  At the level of 
individual local authorities, such uncertainties meant that actors were 
often making financial decisions on the basis of heavily bounded 
rationality. 
 
6.3 Identifying savings and meeting the 
budget gap 
Strategies for meeting the budget gap increased in their sophistication 
and complexity throughout the period under review.   
In 2010, the unexpected in-year reductions in Area Based Grant 
funding streams which arose from the June ‘emergency budget’ were 
initially ‘pass-ported’ straight through to the council departments and 
partners benefitting from the funding, with the exception of education, 
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which had a £2.666m reduction in comparison with a £2.778m grant 
reduction.  The Council’s guidance for implementing the cuts included: 
‘Cuts to be made in grant areas that the Government has 
informed the City Council they are cutting. 
 Front line service projects are protected wherever possible. 
 Savings should be made wherever possible in areas 
without contractual commitments. 
 Priority areas of the One Nottingham Working 
Neighbourhoods Fund Programme – the Nottingham Jobs 
Plan and Early Intervention - to be protected. 
 Savings to come from infrastructure, consultation and ‘back 
office’ in as many areas as possible. 
 Underspends and savings to be used for meeting the cuts 
target wherever possible’  (Cooke & Kirkham, 2010 p.3). 
 
An addendum to the report gave a recommendation that programmes 
financed by Area Based Grant should offer savings of at least 20 per 
cent.  In summary, this approach formed a well-recognised approach to 
delivering urgent spending cuts – a combination of ‘salami slicing’ (the 
20 per cent contributions) with use of underspends, savings and cuts to 
the ‘back office’, away from council and city priorities. 
By contrast the main body of 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review 
cuts were anticipated, and the final funding position of an initial 8.43 per 
cent  reduction in ‘spending power’, with a net grant reduction of 14.53 
per cent had been one of a range of budget scenarios played out in 
March 2010 (Mills-Evans, 2011b p.56).  A report to One Nottingham in 
January 2011 suggested that over five years the council was expecting 
a cumulative impact of a 33 per cent cut on its budget (One 
Nottingham, 2011b p.2).  In the same month, the council’s Executive 
Board were told that ‘the scale of the challenge requires, alongside 
ongoing cost reductions and income increases, a fundamental 
consideration of the nature of the council’s activity and service delivery’ 
(Mills-Evans, 2011a p.3). 
This process of ‘fundamental consideration’ was initially carried out 
through financial and service planning mechanisms already in place 
following previous re-organisations (Mills-Evans, 2011b p.3).  These 
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involved establishing a medium term financial strategy (MTFS) for a 
three year period, drafting a medium term financial plan (MTFP), and 
carrying out service and performance planning.  The whole cycle 
included briefing and budget preparation; establishing ‘strategic 
choices’ (detailed options for spending cuts at service level) followed by 
peer challenge from a panel of senior officers and public consultation.  ( 
(Mills-Evans, 2011b p.6) In these processes the council tried to 
emphasise continuity rather than change, linking changes to the 
forerunning transformation programme; ‘the council continues on its 
ambitious transformation journey’ (Mills-Evans, 2012a p.4).   
In practice, earlier statements of financial strategy showed a focus on 
rationalising back-office systems: 
‘Local affordability has been the primary driver given the scale of 
the funding reductions and has been applied to every area of the 
council business.  However, the council has sought to protect 
front line services by first examining back office and corporate or 
cross-cutting budgets.  Many of the efficiency proposals have an 
internal focus; examples include £6.027m from proposed 
changes to staff terms and conditions, £0.950m from a corporate 
transport review; £0.400m from consolidation of 
telecommunication budgets; and £0.400m from increasing the 
council’s level of self-insurance…’ (Mills-Evans, 2011d pp.7-8). 
 
Towards the end of 2011, however, the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy started to reflect the need to find larger-scale savings whilst 
addressing external pressures, including the impact of welfare reform, 
demographic pressures on adult social care, the implications of slow 
local growth, and the need for service redesign (Mills-Evans, 2011 p.2 
and p.23).  This was to be achieved through a ‘big ticket’ programme of 
ambitious reviews, tackling core expenditure in areas such as 
prevention and safeguarding services for children; adult social care; 
‘commercialisation’; strategic asset management; community provision 
in neighbourhoods; and workforce initiatives (Mills-Evans, 2012b pp.9-
10).  Unlike the forensic ‘coal-face’ search for savings through strategic 
choices, ‘big ticket’ was top-down, overseen by the Deputy Chief 
Executive and designed to engineer fundamental change, rather than 
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find savings within the existing delivery model. 
Therefore the document review shows some evidence of an increasing 
pace to the search for savings, with incremental approaches being 
shifted to more radical responses.  However, the documentary review 
and interviews noted relatively few examples of aspects of frontline 
service delivery which had completely ceased.  This analysis will now 
look in detail at the strategies which were observed by the research. 
 
6.4 Analysing organisational responses to 
austerity 
Nottingham’s ‘strategic choices’ and ‘big ticket’ spending reductions 
were analysed using a framework presented in the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation publication Coping with the Cuts? (Hastings et al., 2013 
pp.20-21).  This framework defined three headline strategies for 
managing austerity: 
 Efficiency: reducing costs without changing service levels (as far 
as the public are concerned). 
 Investment: reducing the need for council services or future cost 
of services. 
 Retrenchment: reducing the council’s role. 
 
Each of these strategies also had a set of more detailed sub-categories 
to assist with allocating spending proposals: for instance ‘efficiency’ 
included reducing ‘back office’ and fixed costs; as well as income 
generation or loss reduction; seeking savings from external providers, 
and redesigning frontline services.  The framework’s definition of 
retrenchment included increased contributions from other agencies and 
citizens, decreasing the range and level of services, and the 
introduction of selective targeting according to need. 
Coping with the cuts? presented a hypothesis that retrenchment would 
increasingly replace efficiency measures in providing the highest 
proportion of spending reductions, and that this would happen more 
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quickly in deprived urban areas (Figure 6.2 shows their results in three 
case study authorities, Newcastle, Coventry and Milton Keynes).   
For the purposes of this research, this method of analysis was repeated 
using published budget data from Nottingham City Council, specifically 
savings proposals listed in the medium term financial plans published 
between 2011 and 2014, which included savings proposals stretching 
to 2016.  The process of aligning Nottingham’s strategic choices with 
this analysis framework had limitations.  First, it relied on a subjective 
judgement as to which category each savings proposal should occupy, 
with some savings potentially appropriate to two or more of the detailed 
categories.  Second, the categorisations of what constituted 
retrenchment, investment or efficiency were debatable; for instance, 
reduced staffing for a universal service was counted as retrenchment, 
but savings from integration of services (also implying reduced staffing 
levels) could be categorised under this model as ‘efficiency’.  Third, it 
did not include the substantial in-year cuts of 2010 (which particularly 
affected the voluntary sector) because these were unexpected and not 
documented in 2009/10 budget papers.  The first ‘strategic choices’ 
publication which could be deployed for this analysis was produced to 
inform the re-based budget of 2011/12.  Fourth, because the City 
Council’s strategic choices documents principally covered proposals for 
savings against existing budget lines, they did not fully reflect areas of 
invest-to-save activity, such as the extension of apprenticeship 
schemes or introduction of a living wage for lowest paid staff, meaning 
that spending to encourage economic growth or increase employment 
were underrepresented in this analysis.  This also means that this 
analysis is not precisely comparable with that conducted for the JRF 
study, as positive ‘investment’ decisions were not generally reflected.   
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Figure 6.2: Coping With Cuts? Comparison of savings 2011-2013 
and 2013-2016 by headline strategy and case study. 
 
Source: Hastings et al., 2013 p.22 
Nonetheless the analysis was useful in providing a tool to analyse in a 
broad sense how the majority of savings had been achieved.  In 
Nottingham, categorisation of ‘strategic choices’ and ‘big ticket’ savings 
indicated that the highest proportion of savings had been achieved 
through ‘back office’ efficiencies, which included management 
delayering, corporate redesign, reduced support functions, reduced 
interest payments and reduced office space (see Figure 6.3).  Back-
office efficiencies were twice as valuable as the next strategy, delivering 
approximately a third of total savings.  These savings included many 
one-off savings including the deletion of vacant posts, management 
delayering, and savings in procurement.  However the most substantial 
element of back office efficiency involved changes to the pay and 
conditions of staff, with half the ‘back office’ savings in 2011/12 (equal 
to £6m) arising from changes to staff terms and conditions. 
The next highest value strategies in terms of proposed savings included 
income generation, service redesign, and savings from external 
providers, with savings from passing responsibilities to other agencies a 
close fifth (see Figure 6.4).  Income generation reflected the council’s 
growing emphasis on commercialisation, which became increasingly 
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important throughout the period.  Significant income streams included 
trading energy and waste (worth £1.1 m in 2015-16); charges for 
parking; and increasing the income of services including parks and 
leisure.  The institutional implications of this more commercial approach 
to service delivery will be examined in further detail below.  
‘Service redesign’ included myriad instances of re-shaping and 
integrating services to fit lower levels of staffing and budgets; whilst 
savings from external providers included many examples of 
renegotiating existing contracts to fit reduced contract values.  In the 
context of the JRF framework all these strategies constituted ‘efficiency 
savings' with only the fifth most popular strategy, (passing 
responsibilities to other agencies) being counted as retrenchment.  
Retrenchment measures which were judged to ‘reduce the range of 
services’ accounted for just five per cent of overall savings. 
Overall, using this framework, Nottingham’s pattern of savings showed 
reduced use of ‘retrenchment’ in the second part of the spending review 
period combined with greater exploitation of efficiencies and investment 
(see Figure 6.5). There were several possible explanations.  First, the 
2010 Comprehensive Spending Review cuts were front-loaded, 
requiring councils to make greater reductions in the first two years of 
the spending review period. Second, the introduction of the council’s 
‘big ticket’ programme meant that there were slower-delivering but 
higher value systemic transformations in later years, for instance the 
more commercial approach to income generation, adopted across the 
council from 2013 onwards.  
Therefore despite the limitations of the analysis framework, the findings 
generally support an argument that the council was able to avoid 
retrenchment in the range of services it provided by finding alternative 
mechanisms to address the budget gap throughout the period under 
study. Instead of efficiencies becoming less effective as a savings 
mechanism, as hypothesised in Coping with the Cuts? (Hastings et al., 
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2013) they appear to increase in importance, as do savings from 
investment. 
 
Figure 6.3: Proportion of NCC savings programmed via different 
strategies 2010-2016 (using Hastings et. al. 2013 categories) 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of strategic choices and big ticket 
proposals, NCC Medium Term Financial Plans 2011-2014 
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Figure 6.4: Value (£ Million) of NCC programmed savings 2010-
2016 (using Hastings et al. 2013 categories) 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of strategic choices and big ticket 
proposals, Medium Term Financial Plans 2011-2014 
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This is not to say that all services continued to be provided at the same 
level or volume.  It was clear from successive medium term financial 
plans that some areas underwent a substantial reduction in budget and 
were extensively re-designed, particularly highways (Mills-Evans, 2011; 
Mills-Evans, 2012c) neighbourhood-based community development 
(Mills-Evans, 2012c) and youth and play (Mills-Evans, 2012d).  
Eligibility for certain services such as assistance with buying school 
uniforms (Mills-Evans, 2011a) and free access to adult social care 
(Mills, 2013b) was reduced and some ‘preventative’ services (such as 
support to people vulnerable to homelessness) were removed (Mills, 
2013a).  There were also examples of arms-length retrenchment where 
funding was cut for services provided by third parties - an issue 
explored in more detail in chapter 7.   
In addition there were examples of closure of specific facilities, although 
this often occurred as part of an overall programme where other 
resources were enhanced.  For instance Bulwell, St Ann’s and Carlton 
Road libraries were programmed for closure in 2011, but only in the 
context of two new facilities being created in the same areas.  
Bestwood day centre for learning disabilities was closed as ‘unfit for 
purpose’ but a new centre at Aspley Wood was opened, with savings 
used to ensure its financial viability (Mills-Evans, 2011).  This was 
confirmed through interviews, with an executive member emphasising 
that a guiding principle had been ‘before you cut, can you reorganise?’ 
(Interview, 2014g) and another senior manager stressing how members 
had set an expectation: 
‘we ought to do everything within our creative minds and power 
to avoid the budget cuts impacting upon those services. I don’t 
think you’ll see them saying we’ll close swathes of leisure 
centres unless we have exhausted every other opportunity’ 
(Interview, 2014d). 
Again, these examples showed that the range of services was being 
maintained, although it was possible that reduced local access may 
have adversely affected service quality for some users.   
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The ‘other opportunities’ that emerged, during the time period under 
review, included a diverse and creative selection of approaches to 
meeting the budget gap, some more strategic, management-led and 
top-down; others process focussed and bottom-up.  Table 6.1 shows a 
selection of the strategies observed in operation or mentioned in budget 
and policy documents, with specific examples of how and where they 
were applied.  
Whilst acknowledging reductions in service volumes, it therefore 
appeared from documentation that in most cases the Council, 
sometimes working with partners, was able to maintain some continuity 
in the range of services, so they did not cease altogether.  Moreover, 
despite meeting a budget gap of more than £100 million over five years 
it was also able to expand work on significant capital projects, including 
Line 2 of the Nottingham Express Transit, a partnership project to 
redevelop Nottingham Station, a new Leisure Centre at Harvey Hadden 
and proposals to re-develop Nottingham Castle.   
 
6.5 Service quality 
Whilst the evidence for a reduction in the range of services was limited, 
the effects of the spending cuts on the quality of services were harder 
to pinpoint.  This was partly due to a substantial reduction in published 
performance information from 2010 onwards after the Coalition 
government abolished statutory requirements to report against many 
performance indicators, in line with its commitment to ‘localism’ (DCLG, 
2010b).  Bodies that promote ‘benchmarking ‘services, such as the 
Association of Public Service Excellence (APSE), have claimed there is 
emerging evidence for a fall in quality standards (O’Brien & Johns, 
2015) but that evidence is currently available only to benchmarking 
subscribers, and lacks the transparency and accessibility of published 
and audited performance data.  There is also a time-lag in recording 
and publishing results, which means that available data may not reflect 
effects of recent spending cuts; for instance the most recent audited 
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data on Adult Social Care at the time of this analysis related to the 
2013-14 financial year, when the City Council’s re-organisation of Adult 
Social Care was only just starting to take effect (HSCIC, 2015). 
 
Table 6.1: Strategies to negotiate austerity  
Source: author’s research 
Strategy Definition Example 
Strategic asset 
Management 
Using land and 
investment assets to 
generate one-off and 
ongoing sources of 
income, or to influence 
other local bodies (for 
example to encourage 
service continuity or 
inward investment). 
Maximising returns from 
council cash balances by 
lending available capital to 
other organisations, 
profiting from interest 
rates.  Use of property 
assets to assist VCS 
organisations. 
Shared services Cross-organisational co-
operation in functions 
and/or resources such as 
HR or contact centres. 
Introduction of East 
Midlands Shared Services 
(joint with Leicestershire 
CC)  to cover HR and 
payroll services.  Project 
‘Aurora’ integrating 
management of police 
beat teams and city 
council neighbourhood 
staff.   
Commercialisation Adoption of business 
practices and trading 
powers to promote 
efficiency, self-
sufficiency and 
expansion into new 
markets. 
Expansion of vehicle 
maintenance to provide 
servicing to Fire and 
Rescue service and 
Rushcliffe BC.  Creation of 
energy company. 
Commissioning (Re-)design, 
specification and 
procurement of services 
on a contract basis 
(sometimes used in 
place of ‘outsourcing’ or 
‘grant funding’). 
Streamlining of VCS 
grants process.  Re-
commissioning major 
contracts (for instance 
within public health) 
People 
Management 
Measures to reduce 
workforce costs and 
increase productivity,  
Employee incentive 
schemes (Works Perks) 
Time buy-back schemes 
(My time and Holiday 
Plus) flexi-time, reducing 
use of agency workers, 
reducing headcount, 
reducing training. 
Early Intervention Investing in services that 
may reduce the longer 
Priority families 
programme.  “Small steps, 
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term requirement for 
public spending. 
big changes” (Big Lottery 
project). 
Co-production / ‘Big 
Society’ 
Working with partners 
(often in the community) 
to remove the 
requirement for public 
services or provide them 
in a different way 
Co-operating with partners 
like Advice Nottingham or 
food banks to provide 
financial management and 
debt advice in the 
community. 
Income generation Seeking new sources of 
income for instance 
through (limited) tax 
raising powers, charging, 
or seeking other grants. 
Workplace parking levy; 
increased charging for car 
parks; lottery funded 
projects (e.g. Forest 
Recreation Ground, 
‘Opportunity Nottingham’; 
Nottingham Castle) 
Demand 
management 
Reducing costs of high-
demand services e.g 
through channel shift 
Moving welfare rights from 
a face to face to 
telephone-based service.  
 
Where data is available, it often relates to outcomes (proxy measures 
for the overall wellbeing of the city, such as educational attainment, or 
GDP/capita) rather than detailed service outputs, which describe what 
has been delivered.  Some of these indicators (for instance, measures 
of child poverty or fuel poverty) do not reflect only local authority 
services, but a complex interplay of factors involving many societal and 
environmental effects.  Outcome indicators also suffer from time-lag 
effects, for example action to reduce levels of obesity can take years to 
show results.      
Despite these drawbacks, considering ‘outcome’ measures rather than 
service outputs arguably provides a way around problems in 
understanding how austerity affects issues of quality.  The National 
Audit Office has emphasised that although published performance data 
shows reductions in service volumes, it does not necessarily indicate a 
deterioration in the service (NAO, 2014b p.36).  The need underlying a 
service may be met in many different ways, and there is no automatic 
link between funding, volumes, outputs and outcomes (Lipsky, 2010 
p.178).  If one accepts this point of view, outcome measures provide 
the best representation of how well public services are meeting 
identified needs, as they measure whole-system effects, rather than 
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service outputs, and are not directly connected to the processes and 
institutions underlying service delivery.   
Whilst Nottingham City Council initially emphasised the importance of 
maintaining performance monitoring, its public reporting has become 
simpler and less frequent, on an annual as opposed to quarterly basis, 
and mainly  focussed on outcomes targeted in the key city partnership 
document, the Nottingham Plan, rather than discreet service areas 
(Banfield & Jones, 2010 p.2).  Priorities in the plan were also refocused 
and rationalised in response to the spending cuts (Lowry, 2011 p.2) and 
there were some adjustments to targets which had been affected by the 
recession, such as aspirations regarding the city’s economy (as 
measured by Gross Value Added or GVA), and housing stock.  Other 
targets were changed because public sector cuts had created an 
inability to gain comparative data (for instance due to  closure of the 
East Midlands Regional Development Agency, deletion of national 
indicator set, or cessation of the national ‘place survey’).  However, 
although targets showed some alignment with political priorities outlined 
in Nottingham’s Labour manifesto and the Council Plan (Nottingham 
City Council, 2012b; Nottingham Labour Party, 2011), the selection of 
performance indicators was not solely limited to topics where a 
favourable outcome was assured.  In 2014, 51 per cent of the plan’s 
ten-year targets were judged to be on track for delivery, with another 11 
per cent performing just below expectations, and 27 per cent showing 
minimal improvement (the remainder lacking reporting data) 
(Nottingham City Council, 2014e).   
Nonetheless, annual reports showed some progress against priorities 
(Jones & Johnson, 2013; Nottingham City Council, 2014e) although the 
most recent Nottingham Plan acknowledged that ‘the current climate of 
significantly reduced public sector funding is making it harder for us and 
our partners to deliver the changes we want to make for our city’ 
(Nottingham City Council, 2014 p.5).   Some of the more striking 
successes, given the spending cuts and introduction of welfare reforms, 
included strong progress on hosting internationally significant and 
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regional or city events, increasing the use of public transport, and 
reducing the proportion of people with poor mental wellbeing.  Areas 
which showed little improvement included targets to increase family 
housing stock; challenges around educational outcomes; alcohol-
related admissions to hospital and levels of child and fuel poverty.   
The most surprising improvement was in levels of citizen satisfaction, 
which, in the absence of detailed data on quality, provided a general 
perspective on how local citizens were experiencing public services.  
Nottingham City Council and partners carry out an annual Citizens 
Survey to obtain robust statistical data on a range of public opinion 
issues.  It might have been expected that this data would show 
decreasing satisfaction with ‘the way the Council runs things’, especially 
given the reduction in Council Tax relief, introduced as part of the 
Coalition Government’s welfare reform package.  A trend in national 
survey data towards decreasing satisfaction with ‘the way the council 
runs things’ and the ‘local area as a place to live’ has been noted by 
Hastings et al. in their analysis of the relationship between public 
satisfaction and austerity, although they emphasise a that margins 
remain small, possibly due to a time-lag between service cuts and their 
impact (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, Gannon, & Watkins, 2015 p.23).     
However, although there was a small, but statistically significant drop in 
the satisfaction of Nottingham residents during 2011 and 2012, the 
percentage of residents fairly or very satisfied had steadily increased to 
73 per cent by the end of 2014 (Nottingham City Council, 2014a).  The 
Local Government Association carried out national surveys on the 
same question in 2012 and 2013, and although their sample is not 
directly comparable with Nottingham’s, the average figures of 72 per 
cent (2012) and 70 per cent (2013) show consistency with Nottingham’s 
results (Figure 6.6). 
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Source: Local Government Association, 2014 p.5;  Nottingham 
City Council 2014a p.39 
 
Source: Local Government Association, 2014;Nottingham City 
Council, 2014a  
In addition ‘satisfaction with my local area as a place to live’ rose to an 
‘all time high’ of 88 per cent in 2013, which was maintained (within 95% 
confidence limits) the following year (Nottingham City Council, 2014a 
p.3). This is well above the 80 per cent target specified in the 
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Nottingham Plan and again, though results are not directly comparable, 
consistent with a national survey result of 84 per cent (Figure 6.7).   
There are several potential explanations for this rise in public 
satisfaction in Nottingham.   For instance, the next section of this 
chapter will show how the council had placed an emphasis on 
maintaining its visibility as an organisation, improving street cleanliness 
and championing the city’s reputation (Banfield & Jones, 2011), all of 
which have been found to correlate with achieving higher satisfaction 
levels (Local Government Association, 2006 p.6).  In prioritising 
functions connected with the effective presentation and representation 
of the city, it was therefore likely that the council was also making 
political choices which helped to maintain public satisfaction levels. 
It might also be suggested that public sympathy for local authorities has 
grown as public awareness of the spending cuts increases; in 2013 
Mori found that three times as many people blamed central government 
for the cuts than local government (Ipsos MORI, 2013a).   At the same 
time expectations of public services may have been lowered given the 
publicity surrounding the spending cuts, possibly adding to the 
perception that the council is providing ‘value for money’ (Page, 2015). 
Nonetheless, Nottingham’s figures did appear to contradict the national 
trend towards declining satisfaction noted by Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, 
Gannon and Watkins et al. (2015 p.23).  Whilst an imperfect proxy for 
service quality, these figures seemed to show that residents’ 
expectations for public services and the local neighbourhood 
environment were being met, and that despite multiple changes in 
underlying systems and processes of delivery, public perception of local 
services was improving. 
To summarise the evidence relating to P1, analysis suggests that the 
range of services available to the public was substantially maintained 
between 2010 and 2015 albeit with a certain fragility.  Many of the 
efficiency savings delivered at the point of analysis represented one-off 
reductions in costs (such as the deletion of vacant posts) which could 
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not be repeated.  Certain functions had also been substantially re-
designed to offer a lower volume of service, reductions in eligibility, or a 
decreased level of access.  There is less evidence relating to quality of 
services, but data from the Nottingham Plan shows steady progress 
against a majority of the outcome targets, and climbing citizen 
satisfaction levels, both in relation to the way that the council runs 
services, and the local living environment.  The overall impression 
created by this evidence is therefore one of relative stability despite the 
cuts, showing that Nottingham’s case conforms outwardly to the 
concept of the ‘austerity puzzle’.  This chapter will now go on to address 
the second proposition, to understand whether the institutions 
underpinning local services have remained equally stable.   
 
6.6 The effect of austerity on institutional 
rules, practices and narratives 
This section of the analysis will make use of Lowndes and Roberts 
conceptualisation of institutions as a system of ‘rules, practices and 
narratives’ (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013) discussed in section 3.3.  In 
Lowndes and Roberts analysis ‘rules’ are formally constructed and 
recorded, for instance, law or policy documents.  ‘Practices’ reflect the 
informal rules of the game, including prescriptions for possible and 
desirable behaviour which are distinct from actors’ personal values or 
broader cultural tendencies, specific to a particular political setting and 
enforceable (2013 p.62).  Meanwhile in defining narratives Lowndes 
and Roberts highlight ‘familiar stories’ and ‘shared understandings’ 
which reinforce ‘taken for granted’ assumptions (2013 pp.52-53).  The 
proposition suggests that, in line with the relative stability in the range 
of services, we might expect that ‘The council’s institutional rules, 
practices and narratives have been maintained during the period 2010-
2015’.  However, the analysis presented here suggests that institutions 
underlying service delivery are less stable, particularly at an ideational 
level, than the apparent service continuity would suggest.  By looking at 
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subtle changes it is possible to build up an image of an institution under 
increasing strain, with divergent practices and narratives undermining 
established institutional rules.  
 
6.7 Rules 
Rules governing institutions at the council can be divided into two 
types: externally imposed rules produced by the legal and financial 
framework which surrounded the local authority, and organisational 
rules establishing policy direction and procedures.  In relation to 
externally imposed rules, both politicians and senior officers were clear 
that the council needed to work within the given legal and financial 
framework.  Senior politicians had taken a conscious decision to 
‘manage despite the cuts’ 
‘We learnt from the poll tax that you’ve got to battle through. The 
people that would blame you first would be local people…The 
public would end up blaming us and not the government’ 
(Interview, 2014g). 
Officers cited a number of areas where the council was ‘pushing 
boundaries’ including vocal opposition and mitigation for the ‘bedroom 
tax’ (Interview, 2014b, 2014h, 2014n); working around statutory 
guidance on council publicity (Interview, 2014e); and seeking to expand 
local authority powers through the lobbying activity of Core Cities 
(Interview, 2014b, 2014k).  However this work was generally conducted 
without explicit challenge to legal constraints.  As one director put it, 
‘[This council] has never felt it wants to go to the barricades.  It always 
works a different way.  We are very rarely in the courts’ (Interview, 
2014e). 
Within this context of acknowledging and submitting to external legal 
and financial constraints, executive members and the corporate 
leadership team collaborated early in the spending review period to 
produce a strong statement of organisational ‘rules’ steering the 
council’s policy priorities in a way that was politically and locally 
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distinctive.  Acknowledging the need to manage within the cuts, a report 
to executive board  (Probert, Banfield, & James, 2010) described how 
previous plans needed to be ‘recalibrated’ and viewed through the ‘lens 
of local affordability’ (see figure 6.8 below).   The report asserted that 
strategic priorities were ‘unchanged’ but identified four ‘areas of focus’; 
‘supporting the most vulnerable’; ‘local jobs’; ‘presence’ (acknowledging 
the role of the council in key activities and the provision of services); 
and ‘enjoying Nottingham’ (ensuring opportunities for leisure and 
enjoyment during austere times).  The ‘areas of focus’ were included in 
the medium term financial plan for 2011/12-2013/14 (Mills-Evans, 
2011e) and interviews with directors and senior officers confirmed that 
they remained important in shaping responses to austerity in 2014 
(Interview, 2014c, 2014k, 2014l).  
The ‘lens of affordability’ diagram revealed much about the council’s 
policy rules for retrenchment.  It situated ‘local affordability’ - setting a 
legal balanced budget - as the lens, or principal rule, at the forefront of 
priorities.  It also outlined a set of ‘enablers’ or preferred ways of 
working, as a guideline for the practices determining how savings would 
be achieved; through working ‘effectively’ with others; ‘re-shaping’ 
services and functions; and ‘early intervention’ (addressing emerging 
problems before they reached an acute stage; for example, supporting 
vulnerable adults to help prevent homelessness).  Finally, the four 
areas of focus prioritised a limited range of policy areas which were 
strongly rooted in the politics and economic context of Nottingham.   
Taken together, the areas of focus asserted a strong sense of 
continuity with local political priorities, despite the straightened financial 
context.   They showed that there were certain ‘bottom lines’, which 
were core to the council’s aims as it negotiated its way through 
austerity.  For example ‘supporting the most vulnerable’ demonstrated 
continuity with longstanding council and strategic partnership policies 
for breaking ‘the inter-generational cycle of poverty’ (One Nottingham, 
2009 p.28), while the focus on ‘local jobs’ was a response to the high 
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levels of unemployment experienced by the city as a result of the 
recession.  
Figure 6.8: The ‘lens of affordability’  
 
Source: Probert, Banfield, & James, 2010 p.2/3 
The council was also explicit about aiming to preserve certain universal 
services despite the spending cuts.  ‘Presence’ pointed to politicians’ 
concerns to continue being visible and accessible to communities whilst 
ensuring stability and security, particularly on the outer estates (see 
also the preceding comments on maintaining citizen satisfaction, 
section 6.5) (Interview, 2014g).  ‘Enjoying Nottingham’ linked to a 
longer tradition of regeneration through cultural and leisure activities 
and One Nottingham’s long term aspiration for the city to be ‘world 
class’ (One Nottingham, 2009).  This recognised the city’s relatively 
young demographic profile and the need to maintain the arts, cultural 
and sporting offer to support other drivers of the city’s economy and 
promote ‘clear, shared and positive messages about Nottingham and its 
future’ (One Nottingham, 2012b p.1; One Nottingham, 2012c p.1).  
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Consistency was also reflected in the council’s published strategic 
priorities (see Table 6.2, below) albeit with some moderation (in the 
2012 indicators for crime and cleanliness) and refocussing (in education 
and recycling).   
Table 6.2 comparison of priorities 2006-2011 and 2012-2015 
Council’s Six Highest Priorities 
2006-2011 
Source: Banfield & Jones, 2011 
Council plan priorities 2012-
2015 
Source: Nottingham City Council, 
2012 
Cut crime by 25 per cent Continue to cut crime and halve 
anti-social behaviour 
Make Nottingham England’s 
cleanest big city 
Keep your neighbourhood as 
clean as the city centre 
Fastest rate of improvement for 
GCSE results 
Ensure that more school leavers 
get a job, access to training or 
further education than any other 
city 
Reduce waste and double the rate 
of recycling 
Help you to keep your energy bills 
down 
Improve physical access and 
infrastructure 
Cut unemployment by a quarter 
Improve attractiveness and 
balance of Nottingham’s Housing 
offer 
 
 
Where changes emerged, for instance in the move away from targets 
for access and infrastructure, these sometimes reflected the 
achievement of major policy aims to win funding to extend the tram 
network, improve highways infrastructure (on the ring road and A453) 
and improve the main railway station.  However, there was also some 
realism; in education the council was able to exercise diminishing 
influence over GCSE results, as more schools opted out of local 
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authority control to take up ‘academy’ status.  In addition, capital 
resources to influence housing in the city were reduced by austerity, 
although the council continued to pursue some substantial changes to 
housing stock, including the demolition of an estate of five tower blocks 
in the inner-city ward of Lenton and their replacement by new ‘low rise’ 
social housing.   
Yet within the apparent stability and continuity of these policy rules 
there was a great deal of room for interpretation.  The ‘enablers’ in the 
‘lens of affordability’ diagram were ambiguous; for instance, the 
definition of ‘working effectively’ or ‘re-shaping our activities’ was not 
clear, and begged a question as who would be the judge of 
effectiveness, or the main beneficiaries of ‘re-shaping’.  In addition 
defining the ‘most vulnerable’ was a relative, rather than absolute 
measure, representing a moveable judgement rather than a line in the 
sand.  Accordingly, the practices and narratives which appeared to 
underpin these rules showed less coherence and stability, and it is to 
practices that this chapter now turns. 
 
6.8 Practices  
The work of Streeck and Thelen (2005) provides a helpful framework 
for the consideration of changes to practices.  Although their analysis 
refers to institutions as a whole, it can also function as a means of 
identifying challenges to the separate elements of institutional 
constraint identified by Lowndes & Roberts (2013 p.52-3).  Moreover 
Streeck and Thelen conceive of institutions as ‘building blocks of social 
order’ which create collectively enforced expectations on behaviour 
‘distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate, ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ actions (2005 p.9).  This has a 
strong resonance with Lowndes and Roberts view of ‘practices’ as 
‘informal rules of the game’ (p.58) which provide prescriptions for 
possible and desirable behaviour which are both enforceable and 
specific to a particular political setting (2013 p.62). 
164 
 
However, in order to recognise emerging tensions, it is important to 
consider agency as well as structure; what actors are actually doing in 
the context of constraint, as well as the contexts in which informal rules 
are applied (or ignored).  This analysis will therefore also draw upon 
interpretive perspectives on practice which place emphasis on the 
significance of practical judgements, expressed through ‘situated’ 
agency (Wagenaar, 2004) through processes of ‘acting upon the 
situation at hand’ (Griggs, Norval, & Wagenaar, 2014 p.15).  The 
following analysis therefore uses a slightly broader definition of 
practices than that adopted by Lowndes and Roberts, considering the 
actions taken in response to rules, as well as the informal ‘rules in use’, 
which in Ostrom’s terms include the ‘dos and don’ts that one learns on 
the ground’ (Ostrom, 1999 p.38). 
As outlined in section 3.5, Streeck and Thelen’s concept of ‘conversion’ 
involves adapting existing rules and structures to new agendas through 
a process of reinterpretation.  ‘Layering’ occurs when new rules are 
superimposed on previous ones, leading to the compromise and 
eventual defeat of the original rules.  ‘Displacement’ describes the act 
of replacing or subordinating one set of institutional rules with another, 
sometimes with rules that have previously been suppressed.  ‘Drift’ 
describes the neglect of rules in response to changes in the 
environment, leading to slippage of practice on the ground.  Streeck 
and Thelen also describe a final category of ‘exhaustion’ which is more 
akin to punctuated equilibrium, in that it encompasses a situation where 
the environment has changed to the extent that existing institutions are 
no longer viable or appropriate (Streeck & Thelen, 2005 p.31). 
Using this framework it is possible to observe conversion, layering, 
displacement, and drift in the council’s practices as the spending review 
period progressed.  Elements of practice underpinning the council’s 
services were re-purposed, overlaid with new approaches, and in some 
cases displaced or abandoned.  This process challenged and 
sometimes contradicted the published ‘rules’ or policies setting out how 
165 
 
the organisation was intending to manage the financial pressure of 
austerity. 
The following analysis uses four of the highest value corporate savings 
strategies outlined in section 6.4 of this chapter to illustrate ‘conversion’ 
in workforce management practices; ‘layering’ in the practice of 
commercialism; ‘displacement’ in the application of new commissioning 
techniques; and ‘drift’ or potentially even ‘exhaustion’ masked by 
service re-design as the council retreated from previous positions on 
social services eligibility and Council Tax reductions.  In so doing, it 
shows how the development of new practices was starting to 
undermine formal rules, challenging the ‘fit’ between the different 
elements of the institutional configuration (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 
p.134).  Although these shifts in themselves did not represent a ‘full’ 
institutional change, in Lowndes and Roberts’ terms, they might be 
seen as precursors to more fundamental institutional transformation. 
 
A) Converting practices: workforce management 
As noted in section 6.4, savings through changes to workforce 
management contributed significantly to the overall value of efficiencies 
delivered in Nottingham between 2010 and 2015.  Although the 
reductions in the staff base were lower than in most other ‘core’ cities 
the council still decreased its workforce by 23 per cent between 2009 
and 2013 (see figure 6.9).  However, the imperative to reduce spending 
on the workforce potentially conflicted with the council’s stated ‘area of 
focus’ on local jobs.  Steps were therefore taken to minimise the need 
for compulsory redundancies, ring-fence new jobs to city residents, 
reduce the use of temporary staff and consultants and make additional 
investment in apprenticeships, as a contribution to addressing levels of 
youth unemployment.  Job cuts listed within ‘strategic choices’ 
documents tended to take place through deletion of vacant posts and 
management restructuring , within an ongoing process of service re-
design, rather than withdrawal of whole service areas.   
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Source: ONS Public Sector Employment Survey based on Q4 data 
in each year 
At the same time, the living wage was introduced for some of the 
Council’s lowest paid staff  (Kirkham, 2013). All these measures were 
consistent with the outward policy ‘rules’ of ‘local jobs’ and ‘protecting 
the most vulnerable’.   
Despite this apparent consistency, some new techniques in human 
resources management pointed to the gradual conversion of practices 
in workforce management in order to generate the required savings, 
moving the focus incrementally from an emphasis on staff welfare and 
being a ‘good’ employer to efficiency.  For example, there was steady 
attrition in wider workforce pay and conditions through successive 
salary, benefit and increment freezes, which brought the council into 
increasing conflict with the public sector unions (Interview, 2014g).  
Although the volume of jobs was being protected (to a limited extent) 
the quality of those jobs was arguably being diminished, with lower pay 
and a substantial de-layering of middle managers.  Many staff spoke 
about increased levels of stress and higher workloads (Workshop, 
2014a, 2014b). 
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Figure 6.9: Core Cities per cent FTE post reduction 2009-2013 
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Additionally, although several interviewees noted elected members’ 
traditional opposition to outsourcing (Interview, 2014c, 2014o, 2014q) 
senior officers had been allowed to explore the option in relation to a 
major area of benefits administration, prompting a director to comment 
‘its quite a radical change. It’s something you would have said was a 
core service …which you would have said was close to the heart’ 
(Interview, 2014e). 
This pattern of practices might therefore be interpreted as ‘conversion’, 
the redirection of activity that had formerly been focussed on one goal – 
being a good local employer - towards a new goal, efficiency.  The 
range of practical options that were available to officers were also 
changing to encompass more radical choices, prompting another 
director to comment ‘we’ve gone to areas that were no-go in 2010’ 
(Interview, 2014c).  
 
B) Layering practices: commercialisation 
Meanwhile the developing practice of ‘commercialisation’ provides an 
example of institutional layering in action, where new working practices 
were layered on top of old to generate savings and income.  Essentially 
this practice encouraged individual service managers to adopt a 
‘commercial’ approach, seeking mechanisms to minimise outgoings and 
maximise income generation.  Practical examples included winning 
vehicle maintenance contracts from other public sector bodies, doubling 
the size of the commercial waste service, increasing income from 
parking, and developing a local energy company.  In Nottingham a 
whole-council approach to commercialisation was introduced from 
2013, and between 2010 and 2015 it became the second most 
important approach to meeting the budget gap (see figure 6.4).   
For some proponents commercial practices could be easily reconciled 
with the Council's aim of protecting jobs and services.  An elected 
member explained simply that the strategy ‘allows you to cross-
subsidise valuable services’ (Interview, 2014g). A director admitted that 
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although the strategy of seeking contracts from other public sector 
bodies could seem ‘quite predatory’, Nottingham had ‘a commercial 
approach with public sector values’, citing implementation of the ‘living 
wage’ as evidence of the council’s social objectives (Interview, 2014d).  
For this individual commercialisation was a means to larger and less 
fragmented local state, and maintaining the council’s influence as a 
responsible employer, grounded in sustainable business practice.  He 
spoke of feeling: 
‘blessed by the fact that we still have big services, we haven’t 
outsourced, which limits your flexibility and creativity – we’ve got 
that natural opportunity….I’m almost wanting to take us back to 
big council departments’ (Interview, 2014d). 
Commercialisation was also viewed as integral to a longer term strategy 
of ending reliance on central government through increased self-
sufficiency:  ‘our long term strategy is being free from government grant’ 
(Interview, 2014d).  An elected member also noted the motivational 
value of developing the approach in a period of continual cut-backs, 
saying that the practice ‘gives staff something positive to aim for’ 
(Interview, 2014g). 
However, for others, commercialisation introduced market-based 
practices which were not rooted in the council’s political or ideological 
heritage.  Another elected member saw commercialisation as a 
distraction: 
‘you risk taking your eye off the customer and look too much at 
the balance sheet.  Not everything you do can be measured in 
how much value it gives financially, and whereas we’re 
supportive of our services being more commercial and selling 
both inside and outside the organisation, the price is probably 
that you can’t always have the same priorities in mind’ (Interview, 
2014f). 
Meanwhile a director saw commercialisation as a ‘Trojan horse’ which 
to encourage councillors to ‘into the right territory for a sensible 
discussion’ (Interview, 2014b). This individual perceived the commercial 
agenda opening new scope for practices which had previously been 
prohibited by the ruling party’s ideological antipathy to competition and 
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markets.  She described how she had been ‘rounded on’ for describing 
the authority as a business in her first year, but now this type of 
language had become main-stream.  In her view, retrenchment was not 
sustainable over the long term, and councils needed to increase their 
appetite for commercial and capital risk as a necessary survival 
strategy. 
Henceforth, Nottingham’s approach to commercialisation overlaid the 
paternalistic social-justice ethics of the council’s ethos with a layer of 
market-driven practice, creating a distinctive cocktail of civic leadership 
and social entrepreneurism.  Although the practice was, for some 
interviewees, enacted in a way which fulfilled the organisational ‘rules’ 
on responses to austerity, others felt that it had potential to challenge 
pre-existing ideological values. 
 
C) Displacing practices: commissioning  
Some commissioning practices provided examples of areas where the 
‘rules’ of the council’s approach to austerity appeared to be more 
directly contradicted by market-driven practices.  Commissioning 
represented a high-value strategy for engineering savings reductions, 
contributing heavily to ‘securing savings from external providers’ (figure 
6.4).  It had its own framework of institutional rules, including a 
dedicated sub-committee of executive board, chaired by the Leader of 
the council, senior management oversight, and several teams 
dedicated to the process of securing optimal contracts.  Yet a number 
of politicians, staff, and partners expressed discomfort with the way 
commissioning was being enacted under conditions of austerity, and 
implicitly, with its underlying philosophy. 
Some interviewees perceived the practice of commissioning as alien to 
the council.  One senior politician admitted to concerns that 
commissioning did not reflect Labour values; commenting that 
commissioning staff ‘talk a different language’ (Interview, 2014h).  An 
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officer also commented on a sense that the commissioning teams had a 
different perspective:  
‘staff in commissioning are quite innovative, but their attitudes 
are different to other staff members. Some areas were probably 
‘no go’ at the start, but now we are going down that route’ 
(Interview, 2014o).   
One criticism centred on the problem that commissioning decisions 
often used cost as a primary driver.  ‘The first question is always ‘how 
much is it going to cost’ not ‘what is the best service’?’ (Interview, 
2014h).  A private sector service delivery partner suggested that a 
dichotomy was becoming apparent, between Labour politicians who 
promoted the ideal of the living wage, and the commissioning practices 
of officers using frameworks based on the minimum wage (Interview, 
2014ad).  Another partner commented that ‘financial pressure is 
reflected in commissioning, its more about cost than value’ (Interview, 
2014ab). 
In addition, there was a sense that a policy decision to replace 
voluntary sector grants with commissioning processes had depleted the 
quality of relationships between the City Council and VCS service 
providers (this issue will be explored in more depth in chapter 7).  A 
middle manager commented that his involvement in commissioning 
contributed to a requirement to be ‘hands off’ with local delivery 
partners, affecting relationships with smaller groups (Interview, 2014j).  
A voluntary sector partner also described how the council’s voluntary 
sector support team had been replaced by a ‘market-making’ team, 
(Interview, 2014ae) whilst a senior member admitted discomfort that  
‘A lot of these organisations need TLC, commissioning and then 
withdrawing is sometimes a bit mechanical…. It’s a transactional 
relationship. I don’t like having to do it… I hate transactional 
relationships’ (Interview, 2014g). 
A further criticism was a sense that the mechanics of commissioning 
inhibited effective communication, with one partner commenting that 
‘sometimes people in commissioning don’t understand the services they 
commission’ (Interview, 2014ac), although other individuals were 
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praised for their efforts at consultation and involvement (Interview, 
2014ae).  Meanwhile a member of a commissioning team admitted that 
the pressure of the budget process could sometimes mean that 
processes of communication were futile: 
‘there has been lots of engagement, remodelling things, but it 
gets undermined through an uncollaborative process of making 
final cuts’ (Interview, 2014p). 
In summary, although there was some recognition that city 
commissioners had tried to mitigate some impacts of spending cuts, 
there was also a widespread view that commissioning practices had 
displaced other practices – particularly grant-making – with significant 
implications for organisational relationships and perceptions of 
organisational values.  These practices highlighted the ambiguity 
inherent in the organisational ‘enablers’ of ‘re-shaping activities’ and 
‘working effectively with others’ when there were different levels of 
organisational and financial power.  They showed that implementing 
these ‘enablers’ in the council’s interest could have negative 
consequences for other organisations with less financial power, 
potentially contradicting the council’s policy rules about supporting local 
jobs and protecting the vulnerable.  This theme will be addressed 
further in Chapter 7. 
 
D) Service re-design, drift and exhaustion 
Finally, there were a limited number of areas where it was clear the 
council had been unable to maintain cherished principles and to abide 
by their own ‘rules’, particularly ‘protecting the most vulnerable’.  For 
one senior member these included the inability to shield the poorest 
from making increased contributions to Council Tax: 
‘that’s the one that hurts the most. That and bedroom tax. Then 
there’s charging as well; categories of social care that are sliding 
away from us; that hurts.  Also help for the homeless, the loss of 
‘Supporting People’ (Interview, 2014g). 
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Although many of these issues concerned welfare reform rather than 
core council services, this did not diminish the sense of responsibility 
felt by some councillors and officers to mitigate the negative 
consequences for local people.  Efforts had been made by the council 
to temporarily off-set contributions to Council Tax, minimise the 
households affected by ‘bedroom’ tax, effectively distribute hardship 
funding and bolster advice services. However, politicians remained 
conscious that spending cuts were forcing neglect of the council’s 
principles on ‘early intervention’ and rules about protecting the most 
vulnerable (Interview, 2014g, 2014h).  Instances of policy ‘drift’ (Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005b) were evident in higher eligibility thresholds for adult 
social care services, as well as reductions to ‘floating support’ services 
established to prevent vulnerable people becoming homeless.  In 
Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) terms, there was also a sense that options 
for maintaining the previous organisational ‘rules’ were being 
‘exhausted’ as financial pressure increased, and in this context a 
number of interviewees spoke of the need to rebalance the 
expectations of citizens in relation to the local state (Interview, 2014b, 
2014f, 2014q).  This issue will be revisited in chapter 8.  
Taken together, these different examples show how the council’s formal 
rules on responding to austerity were being challenged in a subtle yet 
persistent way by emergent practices.  Workforce management and 
commercialisation were sometimes applied in a way that reinforced 
existing rules, but could also open new spaces and language for the 
challenge of pre-existing ideological positions.  Commissioning and 
service redesign could be deployed to mitigate the effects of austerity, 
but were also used to justify squeezing smaller suppliers and to 
rationalise the neglect of some long-held principles in service delivery.  
In other words the social construction of what was ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b p.9) for 
Nottingham’s approach to service delivery were changing.  Although 
these changes to practices did not in themselves indicate institutional 
change, they showed how the ‘fit’ (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.134) 
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between the rules, practices and narratives underpinning Nottingham’s 
governance was being affected by financial pressure.  The next section 
of this chapter will explore further how dominant narratives were 
beginning to be undermined through the dissonance created by 
austerity policies. 
 
6.9 Narratives 
In Lowndes and Roberts terms, narratives highlight ‘familiar stories’ and 
‘shared understandings’ which reinforce ‘taken for granted’ assumptions 
(2013 p.52-53).  Like any longstanding complex organisation 
Nottingham City Council had a wealth of myths, legends and stories 
underpinning its rules and practices, but three prominent narratives are 
highlighted here in relation to responses to austerity. 
The first was about ‘pride’ in Nottingham.  The word ‘proud’ was on 
every staff pass, adorned countless posters and bus shelters and was 
emblazoned on numerous vehicles in the council’s vehicle fleet.  A 
marketing campaign based around ‘pride’ had been instigated several 
years earlier when the city had been subject to negative media 
coverage associated with binge drinking and violence in the city centre, 
a spate of gun crime in inner city estates and poor inspection ratings for 
council services.  Improving and protecting the city’s reputation was 
now a core issue for the council and partners who viewed a positive 
image of the city as crucial to its ongoing economic health and 
prosperity, and the key words ‘safe, clean ambitious, proud’ were 
prominent in the city’s 2030 vision (One Nottingham, 2009 p.7).  This in 
turn was an explanatory factor in the choice of ‘presence’ and ‘enjoying 
Nottingham’ as core areas of focus in a time of retrenchment. 
The second narrative was about the extent to which Nottingham was 
member-led and controlled, with a strong left-wing and Labour ethos 
(see section 5.5).  Senior officers and partners were very clear that 
politicians were in charge, with members actively managing 
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performance against manifesto commitments (Interview, 2014e).  
Directors found leadership ‘consistent’ and valued the ‘clarity’ albeit with 
some reservations about constraints on scrutiny, challenge and debate 
(Interview, 2014b, 2014d). A partner also commented that the leader 
and deputy had a clear vision on political choices and resource 
allocation; ‘It isn’t just about slavishly following your statutory 
obligations…I’ve probably come to appreciate that more in recent years’ 
(Interview, 2014ab). 
In relation to austerity, this narrative created a sense of local policy ‘red 
lines’, signalling services which were likely to be protected.  Some of 
these were surprising; for instance one officer recounted how any 
suggestion about charging for the bulky waste collection service could 
still be ‘a very career limiting thing to say’ (Interview, 2014b).  A senior 
manager also emphasised that local political choice was still the 
determining factor in determining how spending cuts would be 
implemented ‘the things that adhere to Labour, the Labour group… 
have been pretty well protected from cuts’ (Interview, 2014e).  
A further narrative linking to both these stories concerned Nottingham’s 
concern to retain autonomy and manage cuts in a distinctively 
‘Nottingham way’.  
‘Its not just about implementing, its about finding a Nottingham 
response, ‘how far can we push it?’ There is scope for local 
interpretation and local policy commitments.’ (Interview, 2014o) 
The essence of the ‘Nottingham way’ appeared to lie in implementing 
distinctively local interpretations of national policies, whilst also 
mitigating their negative impacts, sometimes with subtly subversive 
intent.  As one director put it  ‘we respond to external stimuli in the way 
that we want to, and not in the way the stimuli may have intended us to 
respond’ (Interview, 2014e).   The adaptation of commercialisation to 
create larger and less disjointed services could be seen in this light, for 
example the council chose to create an in-house company to manage 
solar panel installations on its social housing (Municipal Journal, 
2015d). 
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These narratives formed important discursive foundations in the way 
the council responded to austerity, helping to shape the ‘rules’ of 
retrenchment.  However, just as practices had been subtly reshaped in 
the context of the persistent downward pressure on financial resources, 
narratives were also being re-purposed and modified by the search for 
solutions to meet the funding gap.  
For example, ‘pride’ in Nottingham was being invoked as part of the 
campaign for encouraging citizens to take greater personal 
responsibility for keeping the city clean.  A six-week campaign in 2014 
saw communities collaborating with the council to remove litter and 
graffiti; whilst a city-wide campaign called ‘Waste Wednesday’ 
encouraged everyone in the city to pick up and dispose of a piece of 
litter.  This type of initiative had resonance with the concept of a move 
towards the ‘responsibilisation’ of communities as the council drew back 
from areas of service delivery (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, Besemer and 
Bramley, 2015 p.601).  In the context of austerity, rather than the 
council delivering and championing a city that everyone could be 
‘proud’ of, the emphasis was on encouraging Nottingham’s citizens to 
demonstrate civic pride in a way which would reduce the requirement 
for local services. 
In relation to political leadership, although leadership was seen as 
consistent, there was also a sense that elected members were 
embracing new agendas and driving ambitious programmes of change.  
A director commented that ‘political ambition has pushed us’ citing the 
council’s energy company and the work-place parking levy as ‘real 
examples of bravery’ (Interview, 2014b).  Another senior manager 
talked about how members had developed a more ‘energetic appetite’ 
for commercialism (Interview, 2014k).  As new ideas were embraced, 
they sometimes brought a degree of ambiguity in members’ ideological 
stance, given their imperative to ‘manage despite the cuts’ (Interview, 
2014g).  The preceding section of this chapter noted that although 
commissioning was directed by elected members at a strategic level, 
interviews with two executive members also uncovered discomfort with 
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the process, alongside a sense of resignation about needing to release 
savings  (Interview, 2014g, 2014h).  A director also commented that 
councillors were steering ‘a clever path’ through welfare reform, 
commenting that they’d been able to ‘navigate the difference between 
their policy differences and staying true to their values, but it has been 
hard’ (Interview, 2014b).  Thus whilst strong political leadership 
remained a guiding narrative in Nottingham, members were also having 
to demonstrate flexibility in the policies they adopted, sometimes with a 
degree of compromise in values. 
What did this mean for the ‘Nottingham way’ in context of austerity?  
For some individuals it symbolised a narrative of resistance and 
autonomy: 
‘we do what we want to do anyway.  People think local 
government has these edicts they have to work to, but if they are 
not locally appropriate you can find a way around them.  It’s a 
huge misconception, we have more power than people believe’  
(Interview, 2014c). 
Another officer highlighted that leader of Nottingham had more power 
than a junior minister, labelling some of the infrastructure projects that 
were coming to fruition ‘visionary’ (Interview, 2014q).  A middle 
manager also commented that the council had combated welfare 
reform to the extent that ‘everything’s a fight’ , but conceded ‘there are 
limitations in what can be done to cushion the blow’ (Interview, 2014n).   
Yet for others the notion of local autonomy was an ‘illusion’ with two 
officers citing a ‘suspicious’ relationship between central and local 
government, where national performance frameworks had been 
replaced by financial constraint (Interview, 2014r).  A director 
highlighted the general weakness of the sector saying ‘we are so 
compliant in almost everything now that we’ve accepted this complete 
subsidiary status as a local deliverer of national policy’ (Interview, 
2014e).  Some staff also talked about the struggle to maintain 
consistent policies in an organisation that was experiencing substantial 
staffing reductions, higher levels of demand, loss of talent and 
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‘organisational memory’, and higher levels of stress (Interview, 2014l, 
2014o).  
In institutional terms this could be seen as an example of dissonance, 
whereby the practical challenges of austerity were causing actors to re-
work, question and disrupt narratives, with contrasting views surfacing 
as the council responded to the material realities of the external 
environment.  However at the time of this research such disruption had 
not yet displaced the dominant narratives, so ideational contest was 
ongoing.  Given the requirement for ever more radical change, in order 
to meet continuing budget gaps, it seemed likely that dissonance would 
grow and pressure increase for narratives to be modified.  
In summarising evidence for the second proposition, P2 ‘the council’s 
institutional rules, practices and narratives have been maintained 
during the period 2010-2015’, it has been argued that although 
organisational rules, as expressed through policy intentions, were 
largely maintained throughout the period; practices were changing 
through incremental processes of conversion, layering, displacement, 
drift and exhaustion; and narratives revealed contest at ideational level 
caused by ‘dissonance’ between the council’s narratives and the 
practical challenges of managing services in a context of austerity.  
Thus although the formal rules governing service delivery had not yet 
fundamentally changed, the ‘fit’ between rules, practices and narratives 
was weakening, creating the potential for more profound institutional 
change in the future. 
 
6.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined in detail how the council responded to the 
spending cuts, including the implications for service delivery and the 
institutions underpinning that delivery.  It found that despite losing at 
minimum 22 per cent of its spending power, in cash terms, the council 
was able to maintain relative stability in the range of services it 
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provided.  However, that stability masked incremental change and 
contestation at the level of institutional practices and narratives.  At the 
time of the research ideational positions were still in flux, but shifting 
practices and challenges to dominant narratives indicated that 
individuals within the council were beginning to consider how it needed 
to redefine its relationship with communities, modify formerly taken-for-
granted associations between political values and practices, and re-
define its scope for autonomy and action. 
Beyond the scope of these propositions, these findings also raised a 
suggestion that austerity conditions were helping to extend and 
strengthen the dominance of new public management-style ‘business’ 
practices.  Although the Coalition government had abolished many of 
the regulatory mechanisms associated with ‘New’ Labour’s 
modernisation programme, including audit, inspection, and statutory 
performance reporting; the growth in significance of commercialisation 
and commissioning meant that managerial language and techniques 
were thriving.  At the same time, the market-inspired ideological logic or 
as one director put it, ‘reality’ (Interview, 2014b) underpinning those 
approaches was subtly re-shaping local practices of service delivery 
despite the presence of strong political leadership that had traditionally 
resisted such pressures. 
The related normative question arising from this observation is whether 
the practices and narratives of service delivery mattered as long as 
services were maintained.  The New Labour ‘third way’ ethos of ‘what 
matters is what works’ (Cabinet Office, 1999 p.40) argued that if 
services were continuing to be provided to the satisfaction of the public, 
methods of delivery were not important.  However, many people 
interviewed for this research expressed disquiet about changes to the 
values underpinning service provision, looking beyond the immediate 
objective of service delivery to perceive wider meaning in subtle 
institutional changes (Interview, 2014g, 2014h, 2014i, 2014r, 2014w, 
2014ab).  This issue will be explored further in the next chapter, in the 
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context of an institutional and interpretive analysis of the council’s 
relationship with its partners. 
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Chapter 7: Austerity and 
traditions of service delivery 
through partnership 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how the council’s services and their 
underlying institutions responded to austerity.  This chapter considers 
service delivery in a governance context, investigating how spending 
cuts affected services delivered through multi-agency partnerships in 
Nottingham between 2010 and 2015. 
Section 2.2 notes that partnership became an integral feature of local 
regeneration programmes and service improvement initiatives during 
the 1990s and early 2000s, as successive governments sought to 
modernise and ‘join up’ an increasingly fragmented landscape of local 
service delivery (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Cabinet Office, 1999 
p.12).  The term ‘partnership’ covered a wealth of different 
relationships, including strategic inter-agency bodies, grant funding, 
contractual arrangements, and multi-agency neighbourhood working, at 
varying levels of formality.  Many of the aspirations councils sought to 
achieve on behalf of their locality could only be delivered through multi-
agency activity.  In 2012, 55 per cent of the Nottingham Labour group’s 
manifesto commitments were dependent on success in partnership 
work (Nottingham City Council, 2012b).  Partnership also constituted an 
essential aspect of councils’ community leadership and ‘place-shaping’ 
role, (DCLG, 2006, 2011b; Lyons, 2007) a topic which will be 
considered in more detail in chapter 8. 
Research into the impacts of austerity on local government has not 
generally focussed on the implications for partnership activity.  Existing 
studies have concentrated mainly on strategic partnership work 
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(Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012; Lowndes & Squires, 2012) or 
neighbourhood governance (Davies & Pill, 2012; Pill & Bailey, 2014) 
presenting a mixed picture as to whether partnership working has 
waned or waxed in the context of spending cuts.   This chapter 
considers the evidence for proposition 3, suggesting that if local 
services have been maintained, one might also assume that  
‘partnerships for service delivery between the council and other 
statutory, business and voluntary partners have been maintained in the 
period 2010-2015’. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the term ‘partnership’ embraces a 
broad swathe of arrangements between the council and other providers 
to facilitate service delivery, including strategic inter-agency partnership 
relationships, neighbourhood working, and commissioned services. It 
does not include any large-scale ‘outsourcing’ arrangements, or goods 
or assets rented or procured from external suppliers.  The inclusion of 
commissioned services is deliberate, based on the observation that, 
during the period under examination, many services which were 
formerly provided through grant funding to the voluntary and community 
sector have been moved to a contract basis. Organisations which had 
been termed ‘partners’ under the grant regime, became ‘service 
providers’ in terms of the commissioning process, despite the nature of 
the work remaining the same.  Reflections on this development form an 
important part of this analysis. 
Recognising the institutionalised nature of partnership work, the 
analysis starts by considering the extent to which institutional elements 
of partnership work have been maintained, using Lowndes & Roberts 
(2013 pp.52-53) definition of institutions as ‘rules, practices and 
narratives’ (see section 3.3).  It finds that although national-level 
institutions underpinning partnerships had been substantially altered, in 
Nottingham many local structures supporting partnership activity 
appeared to have been sustained.  However, in common with the 
tensions noted in the council’s own services (see section 6.9), certain 
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practices and narratives indicated stresses within the institutional 
framework.  
An interpretive analysis is then applied to Nottingham’s partnerships, 
using the concept of local government traditions, highlighted in section 
3.3, (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 2006; Gardner & Lowndes, 2015) to 
consider the local meaning of changes to narratives and practices.  
Using the example of voluntary sector commissioning, it argues that the 
‘dilemma’ faced by the council as a result of reductions to funding 
created impetus to draw on different local governance traditions, 
resulting in the waning of a local ‘collectivist’ approach to voluntary 
sector grants and growing influence for ‘enabling’ traditions.  The 
changes had consequences for structure, in terms of the institutional 
arrangements for funding distribution; for agency, in relation to the way 
actors perceived their roles and how they should operate; and for 
meaning, in respect to the ‘web of beliefs’ held by actors about the 
wider significance of the changes.  The shifting traditions also provide 
an explanation for the strain and conflict experienced as voluntary 
sector partners adjusted to the new partnership environment. 
 
7.2 Austerity and the institutions of 
partnership working 
The 2010 emergency budget and Comprehensive Spending Review 
brought rapid reorganisation of the partnership landscape inhabited by 
local authorities.  This consisted of a three-front assault on the 
institutions established by the preceding Labour government to promote 
collaboration, including a reduction in regulation in the form of statutory 
requirements for partnerships, (the institutional rules of partnership 
work,) a reduction in funding and infrastructure, (affecting institutional 
practices,) and a change in the locus of partnership activity (influencing 
narratives about partnership). 
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In the months after the 2010 election, many formerly compulsory 
partnerships and strategies were quickly shorn of their statutory status, 
including the removal of a statutory requirement to prepare a 
‘sustainable community strategy’23.  The multi-agency inspection 
process designed to succeed the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment system for local government24, Comprehensive Area 
Assessment, was abolished alongside its lead agency, the Audit 
Commission.  Residual regulatory activity was practiced mainly by the 
service-specific inspectorates, such the Commission for Social Care 
and Inspection, Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) and Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).  Suddenly the intensely 
instrumental ‘rules’ of partnership activity set by the previous Labour 
government had been swept away, leaving greater scope for local 
choice and initiative in partnership activity, but fewer legislative 
imperatives.  
As national regulation was removed, so was national funding, with 
fundamental implications for partnership infrastructure.  The emergency 
budget of June 2010 (HM Treasury, 2010a) cut several major funding 
streams which had been previously been distributed through local 
strategic partnerships.  These included the Working Neighbourhoods 
Fund25, Supporting People26, and ‘reward grant’ for the successful 
completion of Local Area Agreements27.  This decimated the resource-
power of some partnerships charged with distributing the grants.  As an 
example, the One Nottingham partnership went from managing 
                                                             
23 Sustainable community strategies were in long-term action plans for local strategic 
partnerships, introduced from 2000 onwards. 
24
 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) was an inspection regime introduced in 
2002 as a means to produce a national overview of local government performance.  It was 
briefly succeeded by Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) in 2009 which aimed to provide 
a multi-agency assessment of the performance of public services across whole localities, 
before being abolished in June 2010. 
25 The Working Neighbourhoods Fund was established in 2007 to provide additional funding 
to specific localities in order to address worklessness and skills challenges.   
26 The Supporting People programme was launched by the Labour government in 2003 to 
improve the funding, planning and monitoring of housing-related support for vulnerable 
people. 
27
 Local Area Agreements had two funding sources: ‘pump-priming’ funding, provided at the 
beginning of the agreement to assist in initiating service improvement, and a larger ‘reward’ 
grant, to be paid once performance had improved, using a ‘payment by results’ model. 
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‘Working Neighbourhoods’ funding notionally worth around £20m, (One 
Nottingham, 2010d) to having discretion over total funds of just 
£167,000 in a period of four years (Chapman, 2014 p.46), with 
immediate consequences for its supporting administration and the 
maintenance of its linked thematic partnerships (One Nottingham, 
2010b p.6).  In response to funding reductions, supporting staff for One 
Nottingham were cut, and remaining team members re-located from 
separate accommodation into the City Council offices.  The focus of the 
partnership’s activity also changed from oversight and management to 
a more advisory and co-ordinative role (One Nottingham, 2012e p.3).  
Objectives within the Nottingham Plan, (the city’s community strategy) 
were re-focussed, and performance management arrangements were 
rationalised from quarterly to annual reporting (see section 6.5). 
Eric Pickles ‘bonfire of the quangos’ (Flinders & Skelcher, 2012) also 
claimed regional Government Offices and Regional Development 
Agencies28, both of which had responsibilities for monitoring and 
promoting local partnership activity.  Local voluntary sector 
‘infrastructure’ bodies, which provided co-ordination, training and 
capacity-building services for the sector were further casualties of 
spending cuts.  For example, in Nottingham, the £1.217m cuts to the 
Working Neighbourhoods Fund resulted in reduced funding to involve 
voluntary organisations in the One Nottingham partnership, and cuts to 
support for black and minority ethnic voluntary organisations.  These 
compound cuts to funding and partnership infrastructure had wider 
implications for the relationships between local partners, which will be 
explored in more detail in section 7.7 below. 
Meanwhile new partnership loci were starting to emerge with their own 
dedicated funding streams.  These included sub-regional Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, (LEPs) the public/private partnerships created 
in 2010 to channel regional development activity following the demise 
                                                             
28 Regional government offices (known as the ‘GO’s) provided regional bases, intelligence and 
monitoring for Whitehall departments.  Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were 
launched in 1999 to promote economic development and regeneration.  Both were 
dismantled following the emergency budget of June 2010. 
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of the Regional Development Agencies; and ‘health and wellbeing 
boards’, installed as part of the governance arrangements for 
reorganisation of the NHS in 2013.  In establishing these new areas of 
focus the narratives of partnership working also changed.  Labour 
governments had focussed on working in partnership to deliver central 
(and local) performance priorities.  Under the Coalition, partnerships 
connected with ‘localism’ narratives, moving away from an emphasis on 
accountability to central government, towards more place-based policy 
choices, with business and the economy as a core driver. 
 
At a national level, in institutional terms, it can therefore be argued that 
the rules, practices and narratives of partnership working had been 
extensively revised.  In response the City Council took steps to adjust 
its local rules, and ‘rationalise the plethora of partnerships’ (One 
Nottingham, 2010c p.5), but in many ways institutions of partnership 
work remained intact.  The evidence for this assertion will be explored 
in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
7.3 Partnership work in Nottingham 
Rather than abolishing the local strategic partnership or ‘letting it die 
peacefully’ (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998 p.328), Nottingham City Council 
(NCC) strengthened its oversight of One Nottingham after the 2010 
spending review announcements, and continued to provide core 
funding, albeit at a lower level. It also reiterated a commitment to 
continue ‘working effectively with others’ as a core part of its policy to 
address austerity (exemplified in the lens of affordability diagram 
discussed in section 6.7) (Probert, Banfield, & James, 2010 p.2-3). 
In some ways the council used the opportunity of revising One 
Nottingham’s governance rules to remove any uncertainty about the 
relative influence of the partnership over the council.  Whilst Nottingham 
City Council had always held legal accountability for many of the 
funding streams administered by One Nottingham, the supporting 
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legislation had left some ambiguity in the degree to which local strategic 
partnerships should steer local strategy.  In Nottingham a series of 
governance reviews after 2010 underlined ‘the primacy of the City 
Council’s position and the role played by leading councillors’ and 
formally connected the council’s cabinet to One Nottingham (One 
Nottingham, 2010d p.3).  However, One Nottingham board members 
interviewed for this research generally considered that the council was 
the natural body to convene and resource the partnership, and were 
pragmatic about its influence over the direction and activity of the 
partnership’s work.  One partner commented ‘It does feel like its 
steered by the City Council, but then again in fairness, if the City 
Council didn’t steer it, would anybody else?’  (Interview, 2014ab)  
Another commented: 
 
‘ideally you could argue for more independence but - the praxis 
in an imperfect world – it’s got to have somebody to resource it.  
The best people to resource it are the City Council, unless some 
other body with people and financial resources is willing to drive 
the bus…’ (Interview, 2014y) 
 
Changes in governance therefore did not appear to diminish the 
commitment of board members to partnership working, and they told 
many positive stories about its benefits.  At an early stage One 
Nottingham partners recorded a joint aspiration to work together to 
mitigate cuts, and continue support for the Nottingham Plan (One 
Nottingham, 2011e p.1).  The strategic partnership became a forum to 
share the impacts of cuts and anticipate cumulative unintended 
outcomes, with detailed intelligence shared through an expanded chief 
officers group, which included Chief Executives from all the key 
statutory agencies.  Interviewees (Interview, 2014f, 2014aa) perceived 
an increased openness between the city’s elites, and saw this as a 
positive change to the former ‘rules in use’:  
‘Personal relationships have been developed and are better…I’m 
not saying it wasn’t there in the past but it was less uniform.  
Generally speaking the key leaders in the city, in the police, in 
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the social services, Chief Executives and faith communities now 
get together and know each other’ (Interview, 2014y).   
It was clear that partnership relationships were not always easy, and 
there were some examples of disputes over cuts to funding.  However, 
a middle manager in a partner organisation emphasised that whilst 
disagreement happened, it was possible to fall out ‘professionally’ 
especially if you concentrated on new opportunities as a focus for 
collaboration (Interview, 2014v).  One example of this in practice was 
the council’s relationship with the housing association ‘Framework’.  
Although Framework had initiated a judicial review against the council, 
over disputed levels of ‘Supporting People’ funding, relationships were 
later repaired (see chapter 8.6).  In addition new partnership initiatives 
were created, such as project ‘Aurora’, which integrated the 
management of local policing and neighbourhood services (Interview, 
2014x).  The partnership also played a role in protesting the cuts, 
through a joint letter to the Prime Minister, and was active in 
constructing joint bids to the Big Lottery Fund (One Nottingham, 2013b 
p.6). 
Several interviewees related narratives about the partnership being on 
a ‘journey’ (Interview, 2014y, 2014aa).  One interviewee argued that in 
many ways the loss of funding had made partnership more genuine 
because it was no longer ‘a fight to look after the money and to take 
money out of the door’, ‘people are beginning to sense they can 
influence a bit more and deliver a bit more….working relationships are 
better’ (Interview, 2014z).  Another commented that only constraints to 
partnership work were: 
 
 ‘egos and organisational boundaries, not money.  The lack of 
money will help, will force us to do it.  Its whether we can get 
people to put down egos at the door’ (Interview, 2014x).  
 
Perceived successes of the partnership’s joint work included the 
creation of the Nottingham ‘Young Creative’ awards, which had grown 
considerably in profile and status in recent years, showcasing the talent 
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of the city’s young writers, artists and designers (Interview, 2014f, 
2014z).  Partners also highlighted joint efforts to deal with the 
‘disturbances’ (riots) of August 2011 (Interview, 2014y, 2014z); and the 
co-ordinative work of the partnership in securing lottery funding 
(Interview, 2014ab).  The chief officer’s group was mentioned as having 
delivered effective joint working (Interview, 2014f) and some partners 
saw good initiatives emerging from the One Nottingham’s fora and 
theme partnership meetings (Interview, 2014y, 2014z).  Partners also 
referred to the value of networking and learning, the importance of 
personal relationships between board members and their commitment 
to the Nottingham Plan (Interview, 2014x, 2014y, 2014ab). 
More widely, partnership working continued at many different levels.  In 
One Nottingham there were some cuts to community focussed and 
theme-based sub-partnerships, but - in mitigation - board meetings 
became more cross-cutting, with wider ‘forum’ workshops taking place 
on ‘challenge’ issues (One Nottingham, 2011c).  Other partnerships 
supported by the City Council were praised by partners for their 
effective work, including the ‘Housing Strategy Implementation Group’s 
work on homelessness (Interview, 2014ae); partnership measures to 
mitigate the impact of welfare reform (Interview, 2014u); protection of  
voluntary sector funding and advice services (Interview, 2014j, 2014s); 
and promotion of emergency hardship funding (Interview, 2014u, 
2014ac). One middle manager from a local voluntary sector 
organisation commented ‘the City [Council] really tries at this stuff and 
they have got better’ (Interview, 2014ae). 
At a neighbourhood level, workshops with frontline staff also confirmed 
the centrality of partnership to their work on the frontline: ‘our best 
experiences aren't when we work on our own’ (Workshop, 2014b).  On 
the outer estate the Neighbourhood Action Team (NAT) had a palpable 
team atmosphere ‘This is a unique NAT, a unique combination of going 
that extra mile from all service areas’ (Workshop, 2014b).  The inner 
city team also saw their partnership as one of the most positive factors 
influencing the area.  Both teams told optimistic stories about the 
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potential within local communities.  The inner city ward was described 
as a ‘vibrant area’ where diversity was a positive strength (Workshop, 
2014a). Outer estate staff talked about ‘visible’ improvement and 
‘transformation’ which had occurred in recent years, a ‘step change 
from a low base point’ (Workshop, 2014b).  Both areas had also 
benefitted from modern, attractive public buildings built in the past 10 
years, physical evidence of substantial multi-agency investment in 
infrastructure at community level which was continuing to pay 
dividends. 
At the sub-regional level, the council was also active in shaping D2N2, 
the Local Enterprise Partnership, and supported early moves to 
establish a combined authority for Nottinghamshire in 2014.  A shared 
service for the council’s HR, Payroll and Finance had been established 
in 2012 with Leicestershire County Council (a Conservative-controlled 
authority) as an efficiency measure (Smith, 2013). The Leader of the 
council also took on the chair of East Midlands Councils, the regional 
arm of the Local Government Association.   Nationally, Nottingham 
played a vocal role in debates about devolution and freedom from 
central government funding as part of the Core Cities lobbying group 
(Core Cities, 2013b). 
Thus although many of the nationally-given rules and context of 
partnership had changed; and some of the ‘rules’ shaping the council’s 
relationship with partners had been adjusted, many narratives and 
practices of partnership working had remained solid, and perhaps even 
strengthened over the period under study.  The council and its partners 
had formally re-committed to the shared targets of the Nottingham Plan, 
and interviewees were in general positive about the benefits of 
partnership activity.  In terms of practices, the financial pressure of 
austerity had encouraged all partners to look more widely for 
opportunities to collaborate, and improved partnership connections 
which had formerly been under-utilised (for instance with the faith and 
business communities), reflecting new ‘rules in use’ (Ostrom, 1999 
p.38).  At the front line, there was an established and resilient practice 
191 
 
of agencies working together in an attempt to join up emerging gaps – 
for instance the inner-city neighbourhood action team described how 
early cuts within different agencies had created compound effects on 
services for domestic violence, but that partners had been able to work 
together to restore some provision.  At a sub-regional and national level 
time was still being found to lobby regionally and nationally for fresh 
resource. 
However, in the midst of this general resilience, signs of strain were 
also beginning to show, particularly in the relationships between the 
council and some voluntary and community sector partners.  The next 
section of this chapter will explore these in greater detail.   
 
7.4 Local practices and narratives under 
strain 
Although partnership working continued to be strongly in evidence, 
interviewees highlighted some areas where narratives and practices of 
partnership work seemed to be changing as a result of reductions in 
resources. 
The first narrative identified by a number of interviewees related to 
reduced trust between partners, stemming partly from competition for 
resources.  A One Nottingham board member recounted a story about 
intense local lobbying for particular community interests to be 
represented on the board, due to a perception that membership could 
influence council funding decisions.  He emphasised that in an 
environment of competition and influence, the partnership needed 
clarity in how it related to the council, particularly around funding 
decisions (Interview, 2014ad).  A different partner mentioned that some 
voluntary sector groups were also worried about challenging the council 
due to a perception that it might impact on their funding.  They didn’t 
‘want to be the person who asks awkward questions’ (Interview, 2014s). 
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A linked narrative focussed on the increased potential for conflict.  For 
two former senior managers at the Council, the spending cuts had 
brought more ‘competition, confrontation and fighting’ partly due to 
reduced opportunity for informal collaboration.  In the past the LSP had 
been able to provide ‘oil on troubled waters… oil in the machine’ but 
increasingly partners found it ‘easier to fall out when you are frazzled or 
in competition’ (Interview, 2014i).  
In addition there was a sense in which depleted resources had cut 
opportunities for networking and learning, with one voluntary sector 
manager describing how funders were more rigid in their requirements, 
‘some inspirational stuff doesn’t happen any more’ (Interview, 2014s).  
At the same time there was a loss of organisational relationship and 
organisational memory.  Front-line staff described the difficulty of 
maintaining connections ‘informal networking is so, so important.  There 
isn’t the time for that now’ (Workshop, 2014b).  A voluntary sector 
manager worried that the role of networking was undervalued in 
contracts focussed on service delivery.  Citing the time and effort 
required to draw strategic partners together around a specific topic she 
commented ‘the importance of this type of ‘weaving’ – strategic 
influencing – is not well understood’ (Interview, 2014ae).  
Several interviewees perceived a practice of partnership relationships 
becoming more contract and performance driven as a result of the need 
to demonstrate value for money (Interview, 2014x, 2014ab, 2014ae).  
This could be a problem if monitoring was ‘unintelligent’, particularly for 
the voluntary and community sector.  One statutory partner commented 
‘we introduce far too much commerciality’ but recognised that this could 
stem from central plans and targets.  ‘Changing a supervisory and 
managerial mind-set won’t take place overnight’ (Interview, 2014x). 
Concerns were also expressed about the way performance 
management could inhibit partnership activity, particularly at a frontline 
level.  Despite reductions in performance management at a national 
level, staff at the frontline and within contracted organisations perceived 
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that they were doing more performance monitoring (possibly as a result 
of management delayering).  ‘We’re all carrying our rucksacks of 
targets’ commented one frontline staff member, ‘three or four years ago 
we were empowering officers to sort things out’ but ‘now it feels as if we 
have a hand-brake on, it’s almost disempowering’ (Workshop, 2014b).  
A colleague in the multi-agency team added ‘Our team’s objectives 
don’t necessarily mesh with the CPSO [Community Protection Support 
Officer] team’s objectives, we’ve gone our own way’.  The issue was 
summarised as  
 
‘there’s a will for people to carry on working together, and they 
want to work together, but there’s an increasing pressure that 
they can’t work together, because they are having to look at 
separate targets.  They are getting their heads down’ (Workshop, 
2014b). 
 
Conversely, deterioration of facilities for gathering and sharing data, 
could also present problems for service providers.  One partner 
commented that after regional bodies were scrapped ‘decisions were 
made in ignorance’ (Interview, 2014ae).  Another spoke about the 
importance of the national housing database developed by St Andrews 
University commenting how glad he was that the council had retained a 
subscription to the service after DCLG had stopped providing the data. 
‘It helps to demonstrate outcomes’ (Interview, 2014v). 
These narratives suggested that although partnership for service 
delivery was being maintained, some narratives and practices 
underpinning institutions of partnership work were being challenged.  In 
particular, interviewees identified less trust, learning and informal co-
operation, and increased potential for conflict.  In addition partners 
perceived an increased emphasis on contracts and targets, coupled 
with a less effective infrastructure for using data effectively.  At one 
level these subtle changes might be attributed to the effects of resource 
dependency as organisations under financial stress sought to reach 
new types of accommodation (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998 p.317).  
194 
 
However, this analysis will suggest that the changes could also be 
argued to reflect a wider shift in the ‘traditions’ underpinning the local 
authority’s approach to partnership.  The next part of the chapter will 
explore this contention in greater detail. 
 
7.5 Local government traditions and 
partnerships for service delivery 
Rhodes defines traditions as ‘a set of inherited beliefs about the 
institutions and history of government’ (see section 3.4), (Rhodes, 2011 
p.6).  As noted in chapter 3, traditions provide an ideational context 
within which policy makers and practitioners make sense of their 
options.  Gardner and Lowndes (2015) outline five local government 
traditions: Civic, Professional, Collectivist, Enabling and Communitarian 
traditions (see table 7.1, below).  These categories are not mutually 
exclusive or exhaustive and elements of two or more traditions may be 
observed in councils at any given time.  However, in many councils, 
one or two traditions are dominant in providing a context for decision-
making and policy development.  Extending this analysis slightly (see 
table 7.1 below) this chapter argues that different local government 
traditions are also likely to be associated with different practices of 
partnership and with institutions which facilitate those practices. 
For example, the civic tradition lionises the ambitious city leadership 
pioneered by Joseph Chamberlain, and partnership work in this context 
would be weighted towards enhancing the reputation, power, and 
status of the locality, principally through work with elites.  In practical 
terms this type of partnership activity is enabled through structures 
including LEPs, combined authorities, LSPs and bodies like ‘Core 
Cities’. 
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Table 7.1 Traditions of Local Government and their implications for partnership  
Source: Gardner and Lowndes 2015 plus author’s own analysis 
Tradition Characteristics Partnership practices Facilitating institutions 
Civic 
 
Collaborative city leadership (political, 
business, civil society elites); city identity; 
large-scale, multi-purpose services; economic 
development focus 
Cross-border and inter-agency partnership 
relations between elites which aim to enhance the 
reputation, status and power of the locality 
LEPs, combined 
authorities, 
LSPs 
Core Cities 
 
Collectivist 
 
Comprehensive local services; good 
employer; class and community (of interest) 
identities; anti-poverty/equality focus; new 
ways of living/working 
Partnerships to ensure collaboration of statutory 
agencies; paternalistic  relationship with 
community and neighbourhood organisations.  
State-sponsored ‘convening’ role. 
Council –sponsored LSP, 
and neighbourhood 
governance structures  
Professional 
 
Specialist (social and technical) services; 
public service ethos; public as clients; 
standardisation; bureaucratic orientation; 
councillor/officer joint elite 
Cross-border partnerships focussed on building 
professional expertise, efficiency, innovation and 
sharing good practice 
National professional 
bodies e.g ADASS, 
SOLACE 
Enabling 
 
Minimalist state; new public management 
(efficiency/marketization); public as 
customers; councillors as board members 
who let contracts 
Delivery-focussed partnerships based on a 
commissioner / provider contract relationship.   
Minimal attention to convening role. 
‘Joint Ventures’ with 
private sector. 
Commissioning 
infrastructure. 
Communitar-
ian 
 
Small state with devolution to 
neighbourhoods; community identities 
(geographical/faith); self-help and co-
production of services; local variety 
Encourage VCS to lead on partnership activity 
and convening function.  Emphasis on strong civil 
society, fundraising and philanthropy. 
VCS Infrastructure 
bodies.  Civic societies 
e.g. Nottingham Citizens 
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Meanwhile the collectivist tradition prioritises the co-ordinative role of 
the state, within a hierarchical power dynamic (Powell, 1991) and would 
imply a paternalistic ‘positive sum’ approach to state funding of 
community and neighbourhood level partnership infrastructure, 
(Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 p.32) as well as a ‘convening’ role for the 
state in co-ordinating the achievement of central goals. 
In the professional/managerial tradition, partnership is likely to be 
associated with technocratic comparative work revealing new sources 
of innovation or best practice.  Such work is typically promoted through 
professional bodies such as the Association of Directors of Adult Social 
Services, (ADASS) or The Society of Local Authority Chief Executives 
(SOLACE). 
‘Enabling’ tradition partnerships prioritise a market-based approach that 
focuses on the delivery of measurable outcomes and provides scant 
resources to back office costs such as ‘strategic influencing’ and 
partnership ‘infrastructure’, leaving the market to fill the gap left by the 
retracting state.  Institutions facilitating the enabling tradition include 
strong commissioning infrastructure and ‘joint venture’ partnerships. 
Finally, in localities influenced strongly by the communitarian tradition, 
there would be encouragement for the voluntary and community sector 
to provide their own convening institutions, with an emphasis on moving 
away from state-facing and state-dependent partnerships to diverse 
funding sources and civic activism such as that expressed, in the case 
of Nottingham, through ‘Nottingham Citizens’. 
Interpretivist theory (see chapter 3.4) suggests that in the context of a 
crisis (such as the 2010 spending cuts) existing practices and 
institutions may become unsustainable, resulting in a ‘dilemma’ or turn 
to alternative traditions, as a source for institutional redesign (Hay, 
2011).  Such shifts carry impacts for institutions, which are subject to 
revision, and for actors in terms of their perceptions of institutional 
constraint and scope for agency.  They also carry meaning, based on 
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actors’ ‘web of beliefs’ (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010 p.74) about the context in 
which they are situated. 
The next section of this analysis will consider evidence for change in 
Nottingham’s local traditions, including the implications for institutions of 
partnership, and for voluntary and community sector agency.  It will also 
discuss the meaning of those changes for individuals. 
 
7.6 Nottingham’s local government traditions  
In Nottingham the council has historically resonated most strongly with 
the ‘civic’ and ‘collectivist’ traditions of local government.  Civic ambition 
is manifest through the city’s self-styling as a member of the ‘Core 
Cities’ lobbying group, its aspiration in the Nottingham Plan to be a 
‘world class city’ (Jones, 2011), extensive physical regeneration, policy 
intentions to develop and own utilities companies (Interview, 2014d), 
and the watch-words for the council, ‘ambitious’ and ‘proud’, which are 
printed on every staff member’s identity card.  The historic example of 
Joseph Chamberlain was specifically referenced by a senior politician, 
who upheld Chamberlain’s holistic approach to municipal leadership as 
a model for the future (Interview, 2014g).  
Meanwhile collectivist policies are reflected in the council’s 
championing of the workplace parking levy for improved public transport 
(Interview, 2014f) and concern for maintaining the scope and influence 
of the council as an employer and service provider (Interview, 2014d), 
as well as the city’s continuing commitment to some universal service 
provision and protecting those impacted most severely by welfare 
reforms (see section 6.7).   
By contrast, professional traditions are weaker, partly due to 
Nottingham’s extremely strong and stable political leadership (also 
noted in section 5.5 and 6.9).  One senior manager commented ‘Jon 
Collins [the leader] understands executive governance’ and had ‘taken 
on a lot of the clothes of a mayor’.  In his view the correlate had been a 
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diminished role for senior officers in the political executive (Interview, 
2014e).  Other senior officers also recognised the degree to which the 
council was ‘overtly politically led’ (Interview, 2014d) and recognised 
that officers sometimes found difficulties in bringing alternative views to 
the executive (Interview, 2014b). 
This strong political leadership had also sometimes been in tension with 
a communitarian tradition.  The council’s move after 2010 to assert 
itself within local partnership structures is consistent with this view, 
alongside perceptions from some local leaders that, prior to austerity, 
there had been less dialogue between the council and faith and 
business sectors (Interview, 2014y, 2014aa), and that councillors had 
some discomfort with the concept of ‘community empowerment’ 
(Interview, 2014e). 
Enabling traditions are also less well-developed.  Outsourcing and the 
compulsory marketization of services through compulsory competitive 
tendering were actively resisted in the 1990s (for example, the local bus 
company continues to be majority owned by the Council, despite being 
‘privatised’ in 1986).  However, as demonstrated in chapter 6, market-
based practices were beginning to assert themselves in the years after 
2010, particularly in relation to commissioning. 
In line with this analysis, it is possible to see how partnership 
governance has in the past been most strongly influenced by civic 
traditions.  Prior to 2010 the council had a long-standing approach to 
cross-border partnership work through the Greater Nottingham 
Partnership, which had arisen from the ‘New Commitment to 
Regeneration’ initiative29 and pre-dated the requirement to form and 
maintain a local strategic partnership.  The authority also had a history 
of working with elites to promote its national and regional interests, 
including the aforementioned partnerships with ‘Core Cities’ and ‘East 
Midlands Councils’, as well as more disparate groupings such as the 
                                                             
29 See note on New Commitment to Regeneration, section 2.2 
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‘Nottingham Ambassadors’30 scheme.  It could be argued that the One 
Nottingham Board was preserved after 2010 partly because it enabled 
this type of interaction.  
However, due to the 1997-2010 Labour Government’s substantial 
funding and promotion of partnership initiatives, it is more difficult to 
identify collectivist partnership approaches, prior to 2010, which can 
specifically be related to the initiative of the council, rather than 
European and national government policies.  Before the 2010 
emergency budget there was a great deal of funding via initiatives such 
as the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund31 and Community Empowerment 
Fund32.  These were used to supply funding for partnership 
infrastructure, including the core team of ‘One Nottingham’, funding 
towards the Nottingham Council for Voluntary Service, and money for 
niche infrastructure bodies such as the ‘Hostels Liaison Group’ (HLG) 
and ‘Nottingham Equal’, which acted as an umbrella body for Black and 
Minority Ethnic Voluntary Organisations.  There also existed a layer of 
local area partnerships, (with their roots in the governance of 
regeneration funding such as the Single Regeneration Budget33), which 
received state funding to represent the interests of neighbourhoods, 
and mirrored the council’s own area committee structure. 
After 2010, national funding for the majority of these activities was cut, 
and in most cases the council reduced its own spending accordingly.  
Evidence of a residual collectivist approach can be found in the effort 
made by the council to stabilise and guarantee a baseline level of 
                                                             
30
 Nottingham Ambassadors was originally created by the City Council as a means to promote 
the City through the contacts and profile of some of its most famous residents.  The campaign 
continues with details available at 
http://events.experiencenottinghamshire.com/ambassadors/ 
 
31 The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was established in 2001 to reduce social inequalities 
between deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country, focussing on the 88 most 
deprived local authority areas. 
32 The Community Empowerment Fund provided funds from 2001 for the 88 NRF authorities 
to engage communities in their local strategic partnerships. 
33
 The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) programme was launched in 1994 to bring together 
twenty separate programmes for economic, physical and social regeneration and act as a 
catalyst for partnership working in areas with high levels of deprivation. 
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funding for voluntary sector partners between 2012 and 2015 
(Interview, 2014g), and its protection of funding for partnerships 
perceived as alleviating welfare reform, for instance around advice 
services (Interview, 2014h, 2014u).  However, the mechanisms used to 
implement the council’s spending reductions also suggest a withdrawal 
from collectivist approaches and the adoption of practices associated 
with enabling traditions.  The next part of this chapter will provide a 
detailed example of this dynamic in action. 
 
7.7 Changing traditions: the voluntary sector 
and commissioning 
When the emergency budget provisions were announced from June 
2010 onwards, cuts began to impact on Nottingham City Council’s 
partnerships with the voluntary sector in three main ways. 
First, as detailed above, the substantial cuts to major funding streams 
administered via the local strategic partnership, ‘One Nottingham’, 
meant that there were rapid reductions in funding for many voluntary 
sector initiatives, particularly for projects which did not directly impact 
front-line services.  These included training and ‘capacity-building’ work, 
funding for ‘infrastructure’ organisations, and participation initiatives.  
Second, there was a reduction in the number of community-level 
council posts providing informal and day-to-day connections with 
partnership activities, including community development, youth work 
and play (see section 6.4). 
Third, the council undertook a rationalisation of voluntary sector grant 
funding, which instigated a more ‘transactional relationship’ (Interview, 
2014g, 2014i) between the council and voluntary sector, where the 
local authority commissioned services, often in blocks, from competing 
consortia of voluntary organisations.  As noted in Chapter 6, the 
‘voluntary sector support’ team was replaced by a ‘market making’ team 
(Interview, 2014ae).  Administration costs were also reduced by 
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devolving money and funding decisions down to community based 
‘infrastructure organisations’ (Interview, 2014g).  The relationship with 
voluntary organisations moved from a ‘grant’ basis to an ‘SLA34 based 
contract’ (Interview, 2014b).  
Both the pass-porting of funding cuts, and reduction in community-
facing frontline staff were symptoms of wider strategies adopted by 
elected members and senior officers seeking to balance the budget 
(see section 6.3).  The third response, however, represented a shift 
from the pre-existing institutionalised practice of grant making, 
(consistent with ‘collectivist’ traditions) towards more competitive 
techniques associated with enabling traditions.  What then, was the 
rationale for this, especially given that a senior officer admitted that the 
changes were ‘not without controversy’? (Interview, 2014b). 
Differing explanations were evident amongst interviewees in justifying 
the changes.  Two executive members from the council evinced 
discomfort with the commissioning approach, but justified the switch as 
an unavoidable cost saving measure: 
‘saves money, dumps administration on somebody else, doesn’t 
always bring a better result … It’s a transactional relationship.  I 
don’t like having to do it.’  (Interview, 2014g) 
‘Within the traditional voluntary sector organisations…there has 
been a lot of unease with us changing it, they think we are trying 
to do them down.  We’re not but we can’t keep helping them the 
way we do, and I think they are beginning to recognise that.’ 
(Interview, 2014h) 
Meanwhile, council officers provided a second reason for the changes, 
defending the approach on terms of efficiency and ‘good governance’ 
(recalling the appeal to similar values in relation to workforce 
management – see section 6.8).   A director described how  
‘it was the right thing to do because we had multiple schemes, 
we had multiple ways that money was allocated to other 
organisations, we had grants, we had delivery contracts, all sorts 
                                                             
34 SLA stands for Service Level Agreement, a technical specification of outcomes for a given 
piece of work. 
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of things being made in all sorts of committees and so it wasn’t 
particularly structured around things that we as an organisation 
wanted to achieve for the city’ (Interview, 2014c). 
Another council director described the adoption of the commissioning 
model as a transparency mechanism, with the added benefit of 
protecting councillors from political flak: 
‘Nottingham being what Nottingham is, where you’ve got a very 
close connection between some of the voluntary sector 
organisations and councillors, it’s important that this 
[transparency] is very clear in terms of the decisions you are 
making and the outcomes that you are getting for your money.  
Because you’ve got to keep councillors safe from that, especially 
when times are so hard’ (Interview, 2014b)   
Once more, these responses were framed as a pragmatic response to 
the cuts, albeit with a more technical and managerial focus.   
A different argument, encapsulated by an executive Councillor, spoke 
of the need to correct an unbalanced relationship between the council 
and the voluntary sector:  
‘I have to say there was something that was a bit unhealthy in all 
voluntary sector organisations relying on the council for their 
resources.  I think we have gone to the other extreme now, the 
pickings are meagre, however it has enabled some organisations 
to give themselves a stronger base ... I think the relationship was 
probably – what’s the word? I want to say patriarchal, but that’s 
the wrong word - there was too much dependence on the 
council’ (Interview, 2014f).   
These three core narratives - the imperative to save money; an (officer 
led) push to improve business practices; and a wish by some influential 
actors to shift away from a paternalistic (collectivist) approach to grant 
funding - combined for these actors to justify a change in the tradition of 
partnership work between the council and voluntary sector, from 
collectivist, grant-led relationships to enabling contract-focussed 
relationships.  However, it was not an approach which was supported 
by all.  Two former directors who had taken up voluntary sector roles 
saw the policy shift as part of a wider societal trend, with the ethos of 
the welfare state being a ‘gift relationship’, but the dominant narrative 
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now being consumer and individual choice.  In following this trend they 
felt that the council had departed from earlier principles: 
‘Dir 1: The contractual culture is coming in now strongly.  I’m not 
sure how I like that, and commissioning.  Because its back to this 
individualisation stuff, rather than communities.   
Dir 2: That purchaser provider split you know, the delivery and 
the contract.  Nottingham fought hard against that with its CCT’ 
(Interview, 2014i) 
For these interviewees, the introduction of commissioning techniques 
represented a cultural break with the collectivist policies of the past that 
could not be easily reversed.   
This shift in the traditions underpinning partnership relations came with 
material effects; revising and disrupting institutions facilitating 
partnership with the voluntary and community sector, and changing the 
scope for agency available to voluntary sector actors.  Such changes 
carried specific meanings for actors related to their internalised 
expectations of partnership, based on Nottingham’s previous traditions 
of partnership work.  The next section will look at institutions, agency 
and meaning in turn, with changes summarised in table 7.2, below. 
 
A) Disruption to institutions facilitating partnership 
The move from grant-based funding to commissioning-based funding 
created a shift from a highly centralised grant administration structure, 
where voluntary organisations were directly accountable to the local 
authority, to more a devolved form of administration, where funds were 
distributed through contracts via area-based, and voluntary and 
community sector-led, ‘infrastructure’ organisations.  This institutional 
revision brought a number of challenges. 
Communication and accountability channels were slow to establish. 
City-wide groups and communities of identity initially ‘struggled to see 
where they fitted in’ (Interview, 2014s).  An area-based infrastructure 
organisation also spoke about problems of establishing working 
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relationships with other voluntary organisations: ‘It is tricky for us 
because we don't have the contacts, we are having to work with 
community associations, it will be a long game’.  At same time, the 
participant agreed ‘multiagency working is vital’ but:  
very time-consuming for the voluntary sector. You can spend 
days in meetings which you need to, but it is difficult for small 
local voluntary organisations” (Workshop, 2014a). 
Some partners also cited a loss of relationship with the council, 
expressing a felt need for a greater level of connection and 
engagement: ‘something is not quite working’ (Interview, 2014ae).  A 
further interviewee commented that there was confusion on who to go 
to with issues and problems, due to a loss of key contacts who had 
provided ‘organisational memory’ (Interview, 2014s). 
An aspect of commissioning which was widely questioned was the rule 
requiring organisations to bid for contracts in consortia.  Forming 
consortia could be a problem if partners did not share objectives, or had 
unequal levels of power.  One partner recounted a successful example 
of consortium working, but emphasised that the approach within her 
sector had pre-dated the commissioning process.  In this case 
organisations had chosen to work closely together to win new work, 
while maintaining their local distinctiveness.  Partnership was 
maintained throughout the tender process by working out protocols and 
talking to all the relevant boards.  Trustees recognised that they had to 
work together, but it was ‘not a comfortable process’ (Interview, 
2014ac). 
When consortia contracts were cut, partners also emphasised that the 
impact could sometimes fall more heavily on small organisations, 
removing chunks of their core funding and leaving larger organisations 
with a dilemma over whether to continue to support struggling partners 
(Interview, 2014ab, 2014ae). 
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Table 7.2 Changing relationships with the Voluntary and Community Sector and their expression in institutions, agency 
and meaning. (Source: author’s analysis) 
Implications 
for: 
Grant based VCS funding distribution Commissioning-based funding distribution 
Institutions  Multiple gateways to council funding 
 Admin by council 
 Relationships through VCS ‘support team’ 
 Funding for capacity-building and infrastructure 
 
 Accountability from grant holder to grant maker 
(vertical) 
 
 Predominantly state-based funding 
 Single gateway to council funding 
 Admin by VCS infrastructure organisations 
 Relationships through ‘market making’ team 
 Minimal or precarious funding for capacity-building and 
infrastructure 
 Accountability between consortium members 
(horizontal) and from consortium to grant makers 
(vertical) 
 Diversifying funding sources 
 
Agency  VCS dependence on council 
 
 VCS agency shaped by core ‘mission’ and funding 
availability 
 Greater VCS independence – but subject to financial 
resources / power relations with consortia partners 
 VCS agency shaped by funding and available delivery 
roles 
 
Meaning  Paternalistic relationship with individual 
organisations.  
 ‘Gift based’ 
 Value for diversity 
 Acknowledges wider social value of VCS 
contribution 
 Business – focussed relationship with consortia. 
 
 ‘Transactional’ 
 ‘Survival of the fittest’ 
 Acknowledges only value of service delivery 
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In addition, interviewees also confirmed the tendency towards greater 
levels of performance monitoring.  One commented that ‘being forced 
into consortiums means that you are constantly being asked irrelevant 
questions’ adding ‘what they really want to do is the human stuff, 
building trust and relationships.  The time for that has been stripped out 
of contracts.’  Even in a consortium which was working effectively, there 
was a need to ‘count stuff you wouldn’t have counted in the past’ to 
demonstrate value (Interview, 2014ae). 
Therefore, from an institutional point of view clear vertical lines of 
accountability, supported by familiar personal relationships, had been 
replaced by more ambiguous horizontal accountability, where 
accountability was often enacted through monitoring.  Communications 
and relationship-building had become more complex, exacerbated by 
the effective devolution of difficult funding decisions. 
 
B) Effects on agency 
The new commissioning arrangements provided community and 
voluntary sector partners with greater independence from the council, 
but partners representing both larger and smaller organisations 
expressed a widely shared anxiety that commissioning provided clear 
advantages for large organisations, constraining the agency of smaller 
organisations (Interview, 2014aa, 2014ae).  
One interviewee commented that commissioners tended to go for 
‘organised and networked’ partners (Interview, 2014af).  In some cases 
consortium members would ‘compete to cherry-pick roles’ (Interview, 
2014s) and larger organisations could ‘play politics’ (Interview, 2014u).  
Certain organisations tended to be protective of their work or 
‘suspicious of faith groups’, who were ‘held at arm’s length’ (Interview, 
2014af).  Interviewees were also concerned about larger organisations 
holding too much power, cautioning ‘we need to think carefully before 
giving all contracts to one provider’ (Interview, 2014ae). 
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Four partners described how ‘mission drift’ could affect organisations 
pursuing new funding streams, though bigger agencies were judged 
better able to withstand service reductions, develop new business and 
to diversify (Interview, 2014s, 2014v, 2014ab, 2014ae).  One partner 
talked of inevitable tension, when senior managers were fighting to 
keep jobs, between the desire to grow the business and the charitable 
aims.  It ‘goes to the very core of “why are you here?”’ (Interview, 
2014v).  Another described a situation of ‘collaborate or die’ where 
smaller partners had to conform to the wishes of more powerful 
partners to survive ‘if push comes to shove you have to wait in line for 
your bowl’ [this comment was accompanied by a begging gesture] 
(Interview, 2014ae).   In this organisation’s case, retained 
independence had come at the cost of withdrawing from some areas of 
service delivery. 
Competition was also prompting a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the 
terms and conditions of VCS partners, which smaller organisations 
could not sustain.  One voluntary sector interviewee commented that 
her organisation had already been subject to six per cent wage cuts, 
from a low base to keep up with the competition - ‘one cuts wages and 
the others follow suit’ (Interview, 2014ae).  A senior manager from a 
larger partner explained that wages had been frozen but ‘larger 
organisations can make sharper offers in terms of prices and building 
resources’ (Interview, 2014ab) due to economies of scale.  He 
expressed concern that these factors could prevent smaller 
organisations from being competitive, endangering overall the diversity 
of providers, and – by extension – the range and inclusivity of services 
for clients.  There were also some comments that financial pressure on 
providers was leading to more difficult clients being deliberately 
excluded from contracts (Interview, 2014p, 2014ad).   
In summary, the more competitive environment was arguably 
constraining agency, rather than facilitating it.  Local actors, particularly 
within smaller organisations were experiencing a more complex 
governance environment where the space for exercising agency was 
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under constant negotiation, and subject to ambiguous and 
unpredictable power-play. 
 
C) Contests over meaning 
There was anxiety about whether a commercial approach was starting 
to re-define the meaning of the relationship between the council and the 
third sector.  One council director reflected that  
‘we’ve reduced our relationship to a business transaction… 
That’s become the central focus of our conversation with the 
VCS and that’s a very small slice of what the VCS do for our city.  
And that’s not necessarily a healthy relationship to have’ 
(Interview, 2014c). 
This narrowed perspective on the sector had a range of implications.  
Several respondents highlighted that communities of interest had 
particularly struggled to cope under new arrangements, with ‘some 
short term impacts on community cohesion’ (Interview, 2014s, 2014w, 
2014ad).  ‘Different communities are pitted against each other’ 
commented a VCS board member, in a process that was ‘alien to the 
sector’ (Interview, 2014w).  The emphasis on tendering had created ‘a 
massive amount of animosity’ and culminated in a loss of trust 
(Interview, 2014ae).  ‘When push comes to shove if you are both going 
for the same grant … the tendering process can be toxic for 
partnership’ reflected a frontline worker (Interview, 2014u). 
A further manager in an infrastructure organisation cautioned that the 
voluntary sector’s value base (which she saw as a strength, promoting 
service continuity)  should not be taken for granted: 
‘Its people’s sheer bloody will and passion…People will do 
unfunded stuff until the cows come home, but there is a real 
danger that it will get to the point where people say ‘enough is 
enough’  People have got to live’ (Interview, 2014ae). 
Yet for other partners, the loss of some organisations was an inevitable 
winnowing process after a period of plenty: ‘there is sometimes a sense 
in the VCS that organisations should always exist, but you have to 
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guard against that, we are better off without some of them (Interview, 
2014ab).  
Essentially these competing interpretations encapsulated a struggle 
over meaning, whereby many voluntary and community sector actors 
viewed the adoption of the commissioning framework as a negation of 
the wider social value delivered by the voluntary sector, including 
advocacy and campaigning, innovation, co-ordination, and self-help.  
This broader conception of social value had been acknowledged under 
previous funding arrangements, but now existed in opposition to the 
narrower focus of commissioning process, which concentrated on 
delivering services, saving money and creating transparent business 
practices. 
In summary, an interpretive analysis suggests that the shift to an 
enabling tradition was revising voluntary and community sector 
institutions, and destabilising actors’ perceptions of the space available 
for exercising agency.  Voluntary sector actors interpreted these 
changes with reference to their historic experience of grant funding 
arrangements, perceiving a fundamental shift in practice, and prompting 
narratives of resentment and conflict. 
 
7.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined proposition P3, that ‘Partnerships for 
service delivery between the council and other statutory, business and 
voluntary partners have been maintained in the period 2010-2015’.  The 
analysis considered partnership work from two perspectives; as a set of 
institutional arrangements, with rules, practices and narratives; and 
from an interpretive perspective using the reference point of local 
government ‘traditions’, and the example of Nottingham’s voluntary and 
community sector. 
It finds that, whilst the national context of partnership work has been 
substantially revised, many institutionalised aspects of partnership 
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activity in the City of Nottingham have been maintained or even 
strengthened, especially those relating to the city’s elite civic tradition. 
This finding will be explored in more detail in relation to the concept of 
‘community leadership’ in chapter 8. 
Nonetheless, attention to incongruous narratives and practices 
suggested that partnerships were under strain.  When examined from 
the perspective of the voluntary sector, using an interpretive framework, 
it appeared that the council had moved away from traditions associated 
with ‘collectivist’ governance to market-inspired commissioning 
informed by ‘enabling’ traditions.  Grant funding institutions had been 
revised, de-stabilising actors’ perceptions of the opportunities available 
for agency.  There was an ongoing struggle to articulate the meaning of 
the changes and their wider significance for the value delivered by the 
voluntary and community sector. 
The analysis provides additional depth to the conclusions drawn in 
chapter 6 about the rise of NPM and market-based practices.  It also 
complements that institutional analysis by highlighting the importance of 
articulating the meaning of institutional change within the local context, 
in order to understand why these practices appear incongruent with the 
history and traditions of the locality, and why they become contested. 
There are some limitations to this analysis.  It is unclear, from this 
research, whether the shift in traditions was a decision forced by 
austerity, or whether the spending cuts had in fact provided a 
convenient context for some officers and executive politicians to justify 
policy change.  The council’s strong leadership existed in some tension 
with ideals of community empowerment, and it was possible that former 
models of partnership engagement mourned by some of the 
interviewees for this research were more a product of the funding and 
guidance prescribed by previous governments, than a local political 
tradition.  However, the switch to market-driven approaches for 
voluntary sector partners did make a stark contrast to the policies 
historically followed by the council in relation to its own services, and 
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given the authority’s reputation for strong leadership, it was difficult to 
see the move to commissioning as an accidental or incremental 
process rather than a decisive political shift. 
It is also possible that a different partnership case study – for instance 
an examination of relations with the police, or health and wellbeing 
board, may have delivered a different perspective.  However, this study 
did not set out to specifically examine the case of the voluntary and 
community sector; rather their example became a recurring theme in 
interviews which required analytical attention.  Future research might 
fruitfully contrast the experience of statutory and non-statutory partners 
more explicitly. 
In drawing together this analysis one is also reminded of the 
specificities of place, and more research would be needed to 
understand how far this finding is specific to the situation and history of 
Nottingham, or whether such shifts in traditions apply more widely.  
However, similar struggles have been documented in other contexts 
and time periods.  Lowndes and Skelcher describe a similar dialogue in 
their 1998 paper on multi-agency partnerships, as partnerships moved 
in a cycle from network-inspired trust and reciprocity to market-inspired 
competition and bidding wars.  Milbourne and Murray (2014) have also 
recently described similar effects for the VCS from market-based 
practices in a comparative study looking at seven different areas. 
In conclusion, whilst the evidence does show that elite institutionalised 
partnership links were maintained in Nottingham during the 2010-2015 
Comprehensive Spending Review period, proposition P3 requires 
modification to acknowledge that different practices of partnership were 
being applied to some less financially-powerful partners.  This implies a 
shift in the ‘traditions’ of partnership work drawn upon by the council, 
with negative consequences for some suppliers. 
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Chapter 8: Austerity and 
community leadership 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined responses to austerity in relation to 
partnerships for service delivery.  This chapter extends that analysis to 
consider the evidence concerning Nottingham City Council’s capacity to 
exercise a ‘community leadership’ role in the context of austerity. 
From the 1990s onwards, academics and policy-makers championed 
‘community leadership’ as a legitimate role for local authorities working 
within an increasingly fragmented landscape of service delivery, 
arguing that the function of councils was ‘not just to deliver certain 
services well but to steer a community to meet the full range of its 
needs’ (Stoker, 2011 p.17).  This role went beyond service delivery, to 
acknowledge local authorities’ ability to facilitate responses to cross-
cutting social, economic and environmental problems (Leach & 
Roberts, 2011 p.113/114; Sullivan, 2007 p.156). 
Community leadership was also embedded within the New Labour 
‘modernisation agenda’, which promoted ‘joined up’ government.  The 
policy was developed through successive initiatives including the 
statutory requirement for councils to produce a ‘community strategy’ 
(HM Government, 2000), funding for ‘local strategic partnerships’ 
(LSPs), and from 2007 onwards, ‘local area agreements’, which 
positioned councils as leading negotiators with Whitehall departments 
on behalf of their locality (DCLG, 2011b; DETR, 1998; SEU, 2001).  Not 
all stakeholders engaged in local governance accepted local 
government’s community leadership role, and both Sullivan (2007) and 
central government evaluations, (DCLG, 2011b) noted tensions in the 
engagement of elected members and some strategic partners.  
Nonetheless, many local authority officers and members welcomed the 
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acknowledgment of the wider potential impact of local government 
beyond the scope of councils’ tightly constrained powers, (Leach & 
Roberts, 2011).  Concepts of ‘community leadership’ and ‘place 
shaping’ increasingly influenced policy discourse about local 
government’s identity and legitimacy (reflected, for example, in the 
‘central-local concordat’ of 2007) (Headlam, 2008).  The term remains 
an established part of the local government lexicon today (see for 
instance McMahon, 2015).  
On the basis that community leadership was viewed as a fundamental 
aspect of councils’ role and function; and that it was distinctive from 
responsibilities for service delivery though partnership; it was important 
to understand whether austerity-related policies influenced the role.  
This chapter addresses proposition P4, that if austerity policies had 
been enacted with minimal impact on frontline services, we would 
expect that ‘local political representatives continue to exercise 
community leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles’. 
To consider these issues in more detail, this chapter will use an 
interpretive framework (see section 3.4) to explore the local meaning of 
community leadership in the context of austerity.  The analysis begins 
by introducing Sullivan’s four varying interpretations of community 
leadership (2007) considering how they link to local government 
traditions in both Sullivan’s model and that described by Gardner and 
Lowndes in section 7.5 (2015).  It goes on to explore how changes to 
the national institutional frameworks of legislation and funding since 
2010 both expanded and closed-down opportunities for local authorities 
to express Sullivan’s four different variants of community leadership.   
Drawing on case study evidence from Nottingham City Council and its 
partners, the chapter argues that although ‘enabling’ civic leadership 
continues to be a core function of the council, the analysis suggests a 
withdrawal from engagement in ‘collectivist’ approaches to the 
articulation of ‘citizen voice’.  In turn voluntary sector and faith-based 
organisations appeared to be taking on some co-ordinative roles, 
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suggesting a strengthening communitarian tradition, but the evidence 
presented suggests that such agency did not fully replace the council’s 
mechanisms to ascertain ‘citizen voice’, and could also be also costly 
and contested. 
 
8.2 Interpretations of community leadership 
The term ‘community leadership’ has deep historical roots; Sullivan 
(2007) describes how the concept dates back to the municipal 
entrepreneurship of the 19th Century, when councils first took on 
responsibilities for providing sewerage, water and other utilities.  The 
concept was revived in the 1990s both as a response to the 
fragmentation of local services in the wake of market-led public service 
reforms, and as a potential vehicle for democratic renewal and 
‘modernisation’ of public services (Stoker, 2011).  Sullivan (2007) 
argued that there were four distinctive ‘traditions’ of local government, 
including local government as an ‘adaptive institution’; as ‘local self 
government’; as ‘community empowerment’; and as an agent of 
centralised control (discussed in section 3.4).  In response to these 
traditions, community leadership could also be interpreted in four ways; 
as a symbol of change; as an expression of local authorities’ ‘enabling’ 
role; as the articulation of ‘citizen voice’; and as an ‘expedient device’. 
 
Considering these variants in turn, Sullivan’s tradition of an ‘adaptive 
institution’ linked to the interpretation of community leadership as a 
‘symbol of change’; embodying a narrative about the modernisation of 
local government, which connected ‘a past golden age of local 
government with a ‘modern’ future’ (Sullivan, 2007 p.148).  Sullivan 
argued that such symbolism helped to construct a ‘new symbolic order’, 
legitimising the role and status of local authorities as leaders of local 
governance.  The ongoing importance of symbolism to partnership work 
was developed further in Sullivan, Williams, Marchington and Knight 
(2013) which identified ‘cultural performance’ as a key driver for 
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collaboration in a context of austerity, ‘encouraging and securing 
conformance to a set of traditions and values or promoting subversion 
of those same traditions and values in pursuit of others’ (p.125). 
 
Sullivan’s second (2007 p.151) tradition of ‘local self-government’ linked 
to an interpretation of community leadership as ‘a formalisation of local 
government’s ‘enabling’ role’, whereby the local authority acted as a 
‘linchpin of governance activity’.  This concept could also be likened to 
the idea of local government as a ‘network co-ordinator’ managing 
diverse relationships and recognising multiple accountabilities (Stoker, 
2011 p.17).  The interpretation was underpinned by the (somewhat 
limited) ‘wellbeing’ powers, granted to councils in the Local Government 
Act 2000 to promote social, economic and environmental wellbeing.  It 
was conceptually similar to the vision of local government as a 
‘convenor’ and ‘place shaper’ for local services expressed in the Lyons 
Report and the Strong and Prosperous Communities white paper 
(DCLG, 2006; Lyons, 2007).  Madden (2010 p.189) argued that policies 
supporting ‘place shaping’ intensified the power of this leadership role, 
bringing ‘certainty, stability and a unifying narrative’ and concentrating 
power in existing structures rather than re-distributing it. 
 
In a contrasting interpretation, Sullivan’s (2007) tradition of ‘community 
empowerment’ highlights that community leadership could also be 
interpreted as ‘citizen voice’, eliciting and acting upon community 
aspirations.  This responded to contemporary anxiety in the 1990s 
about a need for democratic renewal;  
‘Local government itself is based on the principle of 
representative democracy, yet democracy tends to be passive. 
Citizens have little opportunity to engage apart from periodic 
visits to the ballot box. Worse, for many, there is a sense of 
alienation and apathy. New relationships with citizens and 
communities are needed’ (Clarke & Stewart, 1999 p.2). 
 
As a response to this perceived deficit, Clarke and Stewart argued for a 
form of governance which would ensure that resources in the 
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community were used to the good of the locality.  This was a devolving 
vision of community leadership, within which ‘the local authority’s role in 
community governance is only justified if it is close to and empowers 
the communities…and the citizens which constitute them’ (p.2). 
 
Finally Sullivan (2007) suggests that local government also has a 
tradition of functioning as the agent of centralised control.  In this 
context, community leadership could be interpreted as an ‘expedient 
device’, diverting attention from the hard power lost to local government 
as a result of market-led reforms.  This interpretation was echoed four 
years later by Stoker; 
 
‘I worry that we.. may have sold local government ‘a pup’, that is 
the idea of local governance and the role of the community 
governor.  I have doubts about the sustainability of local 
government at all if all that it has to offer is the role of community 
network co-ordinator’ (Stoker, 2011 p.16).   
 
The four interpretations do not link seamlessly with the alternative local 
government traditions described by Gardner and Lowndes (2015) but 
they do have some overlap (see figure 8.1, below).  In particular, 
community leadership as a formalisation of local government’s 
‘enabling’ role links closely to Gardner and Lowndes concept of a ‘civic’ 
tradition. (‘Enabling’ in Sullivan’s sense has wider governance 
connotations, rather than narrower, commissioning-focussed meaning 
utilised by Gardner and Lowndes for a separate tradition – see sections 
2.2 and 3.4 for differing uses of this term.)   
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Figure 8.1: Links between Sullivan’s interpretations of community leadership and traditions described by Gardner and 
Lowndes (2015) 
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Community leadership as an expression of ‘citizen voice’ also links to 
aspects of Gardner and Lowndes’ ‘collectivist’ and ‘communitarian’ 
traditions, highlighting an interesting ambiguity in Sullivan’s 
interpretation as to whether citizen voice might be ascertained through 
top-down approaches to gathering citizen input, or bottom-up initiative 
arising from communities themselves. 
 
Community leadership as a ‘symbol of change’, or as an ‘expedient 
device’ are more difficult to link with Gardner and Lowndes’ traditions, 
although Sullivan’s concept of local government as an ‘adaptive 
institution’ could be seen to connect with ‘professional and managerial’ 
and ‘enabling’ traditions.  The ‘agent of centralised control’ has 
resonance with the emphasis on performance in Gardner and Lowndes’ 
(2015) professional and managerial traditions, but also with centralised 
collectivist practices of partnership. 
 
Although Sullivan’s four interpretations of community leadership were 
very distinct from each other, they were not mutually exclusive, and 
from different actors’ perspectives could co-exist in a single place at 
any given time.  The value of defining varying interpretations of the role 
lies in their capacity to offer lenses through which we can examine how 
community leadership has been practiced in the past, and how it may 
be expressed in the future, in response to challenges to local traditions 
and changing institutions. 
 
8.3 National enablers and constraints for 
community leadership 
Chapter 7 argued that changes to institutions could restrict – or expand 
- scope for individual agency, with implications for the way that actors 
interpreted change.  Similarly, a review of changes to legislation and 
policies constraining or empowering ‘community leadership’ helps to 
demonstrate how opportunities to enact differing interpretations have 
both emerged and closed down during the Coalition government’s 
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administrative term.   
Table 8.1 (below) lists the key policy and institutional changes made by 
the Coalition, according to whether they support or restrict the different 
interpretations of community leadership.  From this brief overview it 
appears that institutions facilitating the exercise of an ‘enabling’ role in 
community leadership continued to strengthen between 2010 and 2015, 
whereas those facilitating the exercise of ‘citizen voice’ have become 
more limited. 
Starting with the enabling role, it can be argued that the removal of 
funding and statutory impetus for local strategic partnerships and local 
area agreements (see section 2.5) reduced resources - and motivation - 
for an ‘enabling’ interpretation of community leadership.  However, new 
spaces also emerged in which local authorities were able to lead this 
type of multi-agency collaboration.  For instance, the removal of area-
based audit and inspection provided partnerships with greater scope to 
achieve locally defined (as opposed to central government) objectives 
(see note on Comprehensive Performance Assessment, section 7.2).  
The power of general competence gives local authorities a wide remit to 
initiate all kinds of activity in the interests of their local area35.  ‘Whole 
place’ community budget pilots36 provided the Coalition with a vehicle 
for the pooling of multiple funding streams, and prefigured both the pilot 
devolution of major areas of public spending (as in Greater Manchester) 
as well as continued lobbying by groups such as ‘core’ and ‘key’ cities 
for wider devolved powers (Core Cities, 2013b).  At a sub-regional level 
some local authorities have also helped to shape local economic 
partnerships (LEPS) and combined authorities, increasing their 
                                                             
35 The power of general competence was provided as part of the 2011 Localism Act, 
essentially granting Local Authorities the same powers as individuals.  For criticism see Jones 
and Stewart (2012) who highlight the subtle semantic difference between the original 
proposals for a ‘general power of competence’, and a more tentative ‘power of general 
competence’. 
36 Community budgets were launched by the LGA as a successor to the ‘Total Place’ initiative 
in 2011.  Four areas, Essex; London Tri-borough Partnership, Greater Manchester and West 
Cheshire were chosen as pilots.  The government subsequently rolled out the scheme 
through the Public Services Transformation Network from 2013. 
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influence over economic development (although this may also be 
perceived as a performative role- see below).  
In contrast, institutions supporting local authorities to elicit and express 
‘citizen voice’ have been restricted during the past five years.  This is 
partly an issue of reductions to funding for partnership activities 
(previously explored in section 7.4).  Cuts have impacted heavily on 
funding available for voluntary and community sector infrastructure, 
reducing capacity for third-sector advocates to work with statutory 
agencies.  However, the reducing capacity for councils to express 
‘citizen voice’ is also an issue of philosophy; the rhetoric surrounding 
the initiation of the ‘Big Society’ was clear that it stood in a ‘zero-sum 
concept of the relationship between civil society and the state, whereby 
more ‘society’ involvement equated to less ‘state’ activity’ (Cameron, 
2010; Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 p.32).  Correspondingly the Coalition 
government drew upon a very different concept of ‘community’ within 
the 2011 Localism Act (DCLG, 2011a), providing power to communities 
acting in opposition to existing public service institutions, rather than 
working alongside them.  Section 2.5 noted that the ‘community right’ to 
challenge services; the ‘community right’ to bid for assets; and 
‘community rights’ to plan and build, constituted local authorities as an 
obstacle which community rights could overcome.  Furthermore, legal 
restrictions on local authorities’ publicity, extended by the Coalition, 
made it increasingly difficult for councils to initiate dialogue with 
communities37.  The spaces for agency for local authorities wishing to 
exercise ‘citizen voice’ had increasingly been restricted.  
It is also possible to identify instances where policies enacted by the 
Coalition government supported the interpretation of community 
leadership as a symbolic and performative act, and community 
leadership as an expedient device. 
                                                             
37 Secretary of State for Local Government, Eric Pickles, declared his opposition to council 
newspapers (which he termed ‘Pravdas’, after the official Russian state newspaper) early in 
the Coalition’s administrative term (Pickles, 2010).  After councils were judged to be flouting 
a voluntary code of practice on local authority publicity, the ‘guidance’ was given statutory 
force in association with the 2014 Local Audit and Accountability Act. 
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Table 8.1 ‘Community leadership’: enabling and restricting factors 
Mode of 
community 
leadership 
Factors supporting this 
role for local authorities 
Factors restricting 
this role for local 
authorities 
Community 
leadership as 
‘Enabling’ / 
place shaping 
Removal of audit and 
inspection 
Power of general 
competence 
Whole place community 
budget pilots (2012) 
Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPS) 
Combined authorities 
Lobbying for additional 
powers (e.g. ‘core’ and ‘key’ 
cities) 
Devolution of major areas of 
spending (e.g. Greater 
Manchester)  
 
Removal of funding 
and requirements for 
local strategic 
partnerships and 
local area 
agreements 
Community 
leadership as 
‘community 
voice’ 
Our Place’ Programme 
(neighbourhood level 
community budgets) 
Reduction in sources 
of funding for VCS 
infrastructure bodies 
and regeneration 
partnerships 
Big society ‘zero 
sum’ approach 
‘Community rights’ to 
challenge, bid, 
reclaim land, plan 
and build 
Local government 
publicity controls 
Community 
leadership as a 
symbolic and 
performative act 
Local authority oversight for 
public health 
Councillor engagement on 
LEPs 
Rationalisation of 
statutory 
partnerships 
Community 
leadership as 
an expedient 
device 
Council Tax referendum limit 
Academy and free schools 
policy 
SoS interventions 
Continued central oversight 
for key programmes e.g. 
troubled families programme   
 
Power of general 
competence 
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In relation to the former, the rationalisation of statutory partnerships 
after the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review may have reduced 
purely ‘symbolic’ partnership activity. However, the engagement of 
elected members to provide a veneer of democratic legitimacy on 
(otherwise minimally accountable) bodies such as Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, and the unequal power allocation within public health38, 
contained more than a suggestion of community leadership as 
performance. 
Meanwhile, with regard to the idea of community leadership as an 
‘expedient device’; although the power of general competence indicated 
that the Coalition’s ‘localist’ agenda may not have been conceived in 
total cynicism, there were numerous limits on that power.  These 
include restrictions on tax-raising powers, the move to academies and 
free schools outside local authority controls; detailed interventions by 
the Secretary of State for the Department for Communities and Local 
Government in areas as diverse as job-roles, flag-flying and publicity;  
(Golding, 2010; Pickles, 2010; Werran, 2013b) and continued direction 
over performance in core policy initiatives;39 highlighting that Whitehall 
retained key marionette strings. 
The policy and legislation review therefore provides a framework which 
helps us to understand how institutional changes at a national level 
may have impacted upon the interpretations of community leadership 
open to local authorities at local level.  The next section of this analysis 
will look in more detail at how actors practiced community leadership in 
Nottingham, and at which opportunities were emerging or closing as 
austerity-related policies took effect. 
                                                             
38 Heath, (2014 p.8) notes that local authority influence has been granted over a relatively 
small proportion of the public health budget, compared to multiple billions transferred to 
Clinical Commissioning Groups). 
39
 For example the Coalition’s flagship ‘troubled families’ programme required local 
authorities to report against more than 50 separate pieces of data about each family they 
worked with  (Ecorys, 2013) 
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8.4 Nottingham’s traditions of community 
leadership 
As this thesis has already noted in section 7.6, Nottingham had strong 
tradition of ‘enabling’ or civic leadership.  This tradition helped to 
provide the impetus to sustain strategic level partnerships for service 
delivery, whilst new institutions facilitating ‘enabling’ community 
leadership emerged.  Major regeneration and infrastructure projects 
such as Nottingham’s second tram line, and a new station transport 
hub, had a symbolic significance beyond their value for service delivery, 
providing a physical manifestation of ‘place shaping’ in action.  The 
Council also made use of the platform provided through the Core Cities 
lobbying organisation to be amongst the first wave of councils agreeing 
City Deals with the Coalition government and was vocal about its longer 
term ambition to be free of government grant (Interview, 2014d).    
Although some officers commented that Nottingham came relatively 
late to the economic development agenda (Interview, 2014b, 2014d), 
the authority helped to initiate D2N2, the Local Economic Partnership; 
and the creation of a combined authority for Nottinghamshire.  
Members were bullish about the continuing opportunities for a civic 
leadership role and the Council’s unique responsibilities in drawing 
other agencies together.  One executive member referenced areas 
where he considered that the Council’s powers had increased, 
including to the health and wellbeing board, local enterprise 
partnerships, urban and regional development, and transport.  ‘People 
look to the council to take a lead.  We’re the only accountable body’ 
(Interview, 2014f).  Another commented: 
‘we still own a load of land, we’ve still got planning powers, 
investment portfolio, we still run transport, Workplace Parking 
Levy brings in eight to nine million per year.  The other thing is 
there is no one else to do it….  There is nobody else.  We are 
elected, we have a certain legitimacy’ (Interview, 2014g).  
This confidence in the council’s ability to perform a civic leadership role 
translated into a sense of local autonomy amongst many officers, who 
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felt that the council was able to advance its own priorities, even in the 
face of considerable financial pressure.  One director pointed to the 
power which came from being a relatively large authority which had 
retained a wide variety of in-house services and many local political and 
economic levers:  
‘I don’t fully subscribe to the graph of doom.  I get why people 
say that.  Our spending power is a billion pounds, that presents a 
huge amount of opportunity.  Some of that is money washes 
through the council, but if you look at the spending cuts in the 
context of our gross budget rather than our net budget you’ve 
got a slightly different lens’. 
This in turn meant that the council could be assertive in its policy 
choices: ‘we’re really not bothered what anyone thinks of us, we’re 
really not bothered what government says, because we’re 
Nottingham….  And you know, that’s it’ (Interview, 2014d).   
For others, the opportunities for expressing ‘enabling’ leadership 
existed in the technical ‘grey area’ between national policy and local 
implementation.  As noted in chapter 6, a middle manager emphasised 
that ‘its not just about implementing… its about finding a Nottingham 
response …and some of it is about ‘how far can we push it?’ (Interview, 
2014o).  
Nottingham’s political stability was seen by some members and officers 
as a core strength in this regard, allowing the council to pursue place-
shaping objectives over many years.  One member cited the ‘workplace 
parking levy’40 and changes to school holidays41 as examples of bold – 
and sometimes unpopular – political decisions which might not have 
been possible in a more volatile political setting: ‘it is easier for us to 
see it through’ (Interview, 2014f).  Another executive member 
emphasised that ‘I think you do need stability to get things done.  You 
need to be able to say [to central government], ‘we are going to do a 
tram, and its going to happen, so sod off’ (Interview, 2014g).  Officers 
                                                             
40 A local tax on workplace parking used to raise revenue for the second line of the 
Nottingham Express Transit (a light rail system). 
41 Nottingham City Council opted for a shorter summer holiday from 2013 onwards in an 
attempt to improve educational outcomes across the City. 
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also appreciated the benefits of this stability, including the ‘bravery’ in 
taking strong political decisions and clarity of direction (Interview, 
2014b, 2014d) although the flip-side of such stability could be a lack of 
challenge and debate for the executive leadership (Interview, 2014b, 
2014e). 
However, there was some acceptance amongst members and officers 
that the scope for performing an ‘enabling’ community leadership role 
was diminishing as the Council’s financial power reduced.  For one 
officer this created an ‘empty toolbox’ as service delivery capabilities 
were eroded (Interview, 2014l).  Others were more optimistic, 
emphasising the role of influence (Interview, 2014f, 2014z).  A director 
agreed that the degree of power was reducing but influence was 
growing.  ‘We underestimate influence that council can have.  A little bit 
of power and a lot of influence is where we are heading’ (Interview, 
2014a).  For another director there was a need to fundamentally re-
think the way that the authority approached its leadership role, in the 
context of reduced resources and increasingly fragmented services: 
‘we need to move towards having a greater focus on 
commissioning, enabling and the role of the business sector and 
voluntary sector.  We need to be less about direct delivery - and I 
don’t mean this in any political ideology sense, its just reality - 
and thinking more about early intervention so that we change - 
lessen -  future demand.  We need to take more of a role in place 
shaping, getting people to behave differently as a group, a 
collective, we need to be the oil or glue to make things happen, 
accepting that our role has changed… to one more of influence, 
nurturing, cojoling, persuasion and helping, and buddying up to 
people, rather than grabbing the democratic mandate’ (Interview, 
2014b). 
In summary, it was clear that the council had some scope for agency in 
which to exercise an ‘enabling’ leadership function, building on historic 
assets and service strengths, as well as strong and consistent political 
leadership.  However, some key actors perceived that the nature of the 
power available to the council was changing, due to reductions in 
financial resources, from a focus on leading-by-acting, to leading by 
cohering alliances, in a gradual shift towards a more ‘symbolic’ form of 
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community leadership.  There was also a paradox here, in that the time 
and funding available for providing ‘oil in the machine’ of strategic 
partnership work (Interview, 2014i) had radically reduced (see section 
7.4).  In this context, a number of interviewees noted how the council 
had increased its openness to the potential contributions of other 
sectors, including businesses and faith organisations (Interview, 2014f, 
2014l, 2014y, 2014aa). 
In contrast, the leadership role associated with articulating and 
expressing ‘citizen voice’ appeared to be in retreat at the time of the 
research.  Section 7.7 noted how the reduction in frontline community 
services, and cuts to neighbourhood regeneration programmes and 
local voluntary sector ‘infrastructure’ bodies impacted on the ability of 
the council to sustain informal and everyday connections with 
communities at a neighbourhood level.  One senior partner expressed 
concerns that in some areas the council’s intelligence about local 
communities was being eroded: 
‘I’m a bit worried that I think we have lost some of the 
underground intelligence that we used to have.  I think that we 
used to pick up quite a lot from a set of voluntary organisations 
and Local Area Partnerships and neighbourhood workers and 
things, so we could get a sense of what was going on in a 
particular area.  I’m not sure we can do that, I’m not sure the 
relationships are quite the same now…’ (Interview, 2014z) 
Another partner described how when fears of further disturbances had 
occurred in response to an extremist murder in London, it had been 
faith communities, rather than the Council, which had convened an 
urgent response to contribute to calming the situation (Interview, 
2014y). 
In replacement, the council was beginning to focus on a more 
facilitative role, whereby residents were encouraged to assume civic 
responsibilities and support each other.  This was apparent in council-
wide schemes, from a council-initiated social enterprise whereby 
residents were encouraged to share skills and offer mutual support with 
simple tasks, to a campaign to assist in litter collection.  It was also 
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observed at ward level, where examples were given of volunteers 
staffing community centres (Workshop, 2014a, 2014b), and local faith 
groups organising food banks (Interview, 2014o).   
Integral to this change was an emerging narrative that communities 
needed to contribute more.  A staff member spoke of how communities 
were increasingly expected ‘to sort themselves out’ (Interview, 2014l).  
Another mentioned the need to tackle ‘dependency culture’ (Interview, 
2014a) whilst a senior member talked of the ‘unrealistic expectations’ of 
some communities (Interview, 2014f).  As one director put it: 
‘We’ve had decades of the state being the paternalistic provider 
of all things that people need.  We expect more.  To turn that tap 
off when you’ve had that for several generations is a really hard 
message.  People have got an unrealistic expectation, there is 
something wrong where people will not accept responsibility’ 
(Interview, 2014b). 
Some interviewees did not view this as a negative shift, indeed faith 
representatives, in particular, highlighted that the post 1945 welfare 
state had ‘squeezed out’ community initiative, and saw the re-opening 
of opportunities for community involvement as a timely re-balancing 
(Interview, 2014y, 2014af; Workshop, 2014b).   
Another aspect to this narrative was a hope that the voluntary and faith 
sectors would ‘step up’ to meet emerging gaps in provision (Interview, 
2014ad), recognising that ‘people with a mission have a moral 
imperative’ (Interview, 2014z).  A senior member envisaged the 
Council’s future role more as a backstop against the failure of 
community-led activity, rather than convenor or initiator: ‘I do think 
increasingly councils are likely to oversee and are almost the fallback… 
taking a broker or policing role for when things fall apart, or when you 
have internicene warfare’ (Interview, 2014g). 
However, interviewees also expressed concern about withdrawal of the 
state and recognition that the ‘Big Society’ would not work in many 
localities. Workshops with frontline staff provided examples of areas 
where councillors and staff were struggling to stimulate community 
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engagement.  One participant commented that people didn’t take 
initiative to help themselves. 
‘They look to people, look to council, look to different 
organisations…they are not a community so much any more… 
They go to work and go back into their boxes’ (Workshop, 
2014b). 
 A director also acknowledged that ‘Some communities will do it for 
themselves.  Others need encouragement or incentive’ (Interview, 
2014b). 
In the absence of local community initiative, professionals sometimes 
attempted to fill the gap, with diminishing resources.  Sometimes this 
resulted in a subtle change of emphasis.  For instance, one senior 
manager observed that under a new regime of partnership collaboration 
between the police and council, there was greater influence on 
community protection than community development, and emphasis had 
moved towards sanctions rather than education (Interview, 2014e).  A 
frontline staff member reinforced this point, describing how staff cuts 
had removed opportunities for police officers to carry out preventative 
work with schools (Workshop, 2014b).  A ‘One Nottingham’ board 
member commented: 
‘I think our focus around respect and around cohesion now is 
actually about managing the public or community safety of an 
area rather than having a coherent community, and I think that is 
a bit of a problem’ (Interview, 2014z).   
To conclude, whilst opportunities for agency consistent with an 
‘enabling’ interpretation of community leadership appeared to have 
been sustained, (albeit moving towards a more symbolic, influencing 
role) there were concerns about the Council’s ongoing capacity to 
understand, elicit and give expression to ‘citizen voice’.  This linked 
back to the withdrawal of funds from VCS infrastructure bodies and 
community-level partnerships noted in chapter 7, which suggested a 
move away from ‘collectivist’ traditions of partnership work (Gardner 
and Lowndes 2015).  In effect, the ways in which the council was able 
to interpret and practice community leadership had been restricted by 
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its diminishing resources, although substantial scope remained in 
relation to a ‘civic’ or, in Sullivan’s terms, ‘enabling’ role. 
Yet as the council withdrew from its ‘top-down’ approach to ‘citizen 
voice’, some voluntary and community sector partners also appeared to 
be taking on community leadership’ functions, in an expression of 
‘citizen voice’ more consistent with Gardner and Lowndes concept of a 
‘communitarian’ tradition of governance.  The next section of this 
chapter will explore this finding using the perspectives of two faith-
based partners connected to the council. 
The first focuses on a small Christian organisation, ‘Transforming Notts 
Together’.  It was established in 2012 as a ‘joint venture’ company 
between the Anglican diocese of Southwell (which includes the City of 
Nottingham), and the Church Urban Fund (a national charity connected 
to the Church of England) with an aspiration of connecting faith 
communities to local projects addressing poverty.  Its launch coincided 
with increased interest from the statutory sector in the locality in 
working with faith partners (Interview, 2014f, 2014i), and intentional 
action by local faith networks to become more engaged in civic life 
(Interview, 2014af).  The board was highly experienced in working with 
statutory agencies, being initially chaired by a former Chief Executive of 
Nottingham City Council, and including several trustees who worked at 
a very senior level in local authorities.  The venture had an initial budget 
of around £40,000 and initially employed just one part time 
development worker, with a remit focussed mainly on facilitating 
churches and other partners to take action, rather than direct delivery of 
services. 
The second looks at ‘Framework’, a large regional housing association 
based in the Midlands, employing around 600 people and with an 
income in 2013/14 of nearly £28 million.  It describes its mission as 
‘helping homeless people, preventing homelessness, and promoting 
opportunities for vulnerable and excluded people to change the 
direction of their lives’.  Although now a secular charity, Framework 
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maintains links to its faith-based roots, with an annual service in the 
local cathedral and many church-based funding activities.   A senior 
manager emphasised the importance of values to the organisation, 
particularly in providing clients with ‘second, third and fourth chances’ 
(Interview, 2014ab). 
Although these organisations were very different in size, both had faith 
roots, both had good connections to statutory partners and both had the 
opportunity to draw on resources not available to the statutory sector.  
Interestingly, both organisations were also trying to fill perceived gaps 
in community leadership but found that this was often an uncomfortable 
space. 
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8.5 ‘Transforming Notts Together’ 
‘Transforming Notts Together’ (TNT) initially focussed their work on 
three core objectives.  First, they sought to create additional capacity 
for welfare rights and debt advice.  Second, they supported the 
development of winter night shelter provision by churches in 
Nottingham and Mansfield. Third, they aimed to grow voluntary 
involvement and participation in tackling poverty, by facilitating 
volunteers from local church congregations to offer time and skills to 
local projects (TNT, 2013). 
 
As a ‘new’ entrant to the local voluntary sector scene, the TNT board 
paid considerable attention to how it was positioned in relation to 
existing voluntary sector bodies.  For instance, at the organisation’s 
launch in 2013 the Chair presented a diagram to show the 
organisation’s distinctive offer around debt advice (Figure 8.2, below) to 
allay potential fears from other advice organisations that TNT would 
become a new competitor for funding. 
 
Conversations took place at an early stage to co-ordinate with other 
Christian umbrella groups, and build relationships with other voluntary 
and community sector partners.  TNT aimed to follow an ‘asset based’ 
community development model (Baker, 2013c) which meant focussing 
on opportunities rather than need, sometimes building on pre-existing 
projects (such as the Mansfield night shelter) and at other times 
allowing other partners to take a lead (for example, avoiding duplication 
of the Nottingham Night Shelter, co-ordinated by another charity, 
Emmanuel House)(Baker, 2013b).  Despite the emphasis on the 
complementary role of the organisation, both the board and the 
development worker maintained an acute sensitivity in dealing with 
areas of potential overlap and conflict, for instance it was noted in the 
minutes of one meeting that the development worker would need to ‘be 
aware of politics and personalities’ and bear in mind need for ‘tact’ 
(Baker, 2013a). 
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Figure 8.2: TNT’s Launch Offer 
 
Source: TNT Launch Presentation 2013 
 
During the first two years of operation TNT initiated a number of 
projects to put its objectives into practice.  Achievements included 
adapting and developing training courses on ‘basic budgeting’ and 
‘signposting’ for people in need, designed to be picked up and rolled 
out by local churches through a ‘train the trainer’ model.  They helped 
to organise several one-off events, for instance working with the City 
Council to promote emergency hardship funding and with local 
voluntary groups on different ways to access funding.  The charity 
sourced volunteers for more advanced debt advice training delivered by 
another voluntary sector organisation, ‘Advice Nottingham’, and 
developed a website which included a tool for local voluntary sector 
projects to use in advertising for volunteers.  They also acted as the 
linchpin for the fundraising and organisation of a winter night shelter in 
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Mansfield, North Nottinghamshire, and supported the establishment of 
a debt advice organisation in the town.   
In seeking to play this co-ordinative role, the organisation also 
encountered a number of challenges.  First, it had to establish its 
credibility with local partners.  It was helped in this regard by the 
expertise and local profile of board members; for example they were 
able to hold a launch event at Nottingham City Council’s offices, 
welcoming a wide variety of elected members, officers, and other 
voluntary and community organisations.  However, there was some 
reluctance from non-faith-based partners to cede a role to faith 
organisations.  One comment in TNT’s 2013 annual report suggested 
that ‘being connected to the wider church network is sometimes viewed 
with hesitation’ (Henderson, 2014) whilst a TNT interviewee admitted 
that church connections could ‘work both ways..sometimes you take on 
other people’s baggage’ (Interview, 2014u).  Several organisations 
were also keen to emphasise the need for professional, rather than 
amateur engagement with issues such as advice and housing, because 
‘so much can’t be done by volunteers’ (Interview, 2014ab, 2014ac, 
2014ae).   
As a small organisation TNT sometimes found itself caught up in the 
political machinations of larger partners.  In Nottingham it had to 
negotiate with local partners carefully to position the basic budgeting 
course in relation to other advice offerings.  In Mansfield, preparations 
for the night shelter were disrupted in 2013 when a larger partner 
unexpectedly withdrew co-ordination and funding.  These problems 
were resolved, but demanded considerable time and relationship 
building from the development workers and board members, as well as 
more direct hands on delivery than had originally been envisaged in the 
organisation’s ‘facilitative, brokering and capacity building’ role 
(Interview, 2014u).  
There were also challenges in matching churches with resources with 
areas of need.  In practice the churches engaging most readily with 
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TNT’s training courses in Nottingham tended to be large predominantly 
middle-class congregations which were not necessarily geographically 
connected to areas of deprivation, particularly deprived estates.  In 
contrast, churches in poorer areas were often unable to engage with 
such initiatives, due to being ‘under-resourced, exhausted and 
overwhelmed’ (Interview, 2014t).  Whilst the larger and better resourced 
churches were often keen to engage in direct delivery, it was more 
difficult to encourage them to connect-up with smaller churches to 
capitalise on existing community links.  
As an infrastructure organisation, TNT also found it difficult to evidence 
its contribution in terms of outcomes, as these often involved 
intervening partners.  This connected to their sensitivity to other 
organisations’ contribution and territory; ‘we have to be so careful, we 
can’t take credit’ (Interview, 2014i).  
Whilst these challenges at times slowed the progress of individual 
initiatives, board members were keen to emphasise that they were not 
insurmountable, and the charity continues to develop its local 
convening role.  In summary, TNT provides an interesting example of 
the Church (in its widest sense) seeking to address perceived gaps 
arising from austerity policies by harnessing and focussing the social 
capital present in churches and their congregations.  However, in 
moving into this public policy space, it was having to work hard to 
establish its contribution, competence and credibility; overcome 
prejudice against faith-based organisations; negotiate routes around 
the power machinations of larger partners; and seek solutions to inter- 
denominational supply and demand barriers.  It showed that even with 
core funding, national support, and well-connected local expertise, 
moving into a community leadership role was not an easy or 
straightforward undertaking.  
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8.6 ‘Framework’ 
Prior to 2010, much of Framework’s activity was based around 
providing contracted services to local authorities in Nottingham City and 
County as part of the ‘Supporting People’ funding stream (see footnote, 
section 6.2).  The Coalition’s emergency budget of June 2010 and 
subsequent Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010 brought 
heavy reductions to this funding stream, with Nottingham City Council 
estimating its cut at twelve million pounds (One Nottingham, 2011b).  In 
its annual report of 2010-11, Framework recorded that of twenty-two 
Supporting People contracts delivered in Nottingham City in April 2010, 
twelve had been decommissioned for 2011/12 with four closing by the 
end of March 2011.  All remaining Framework services were operating 
with reduced funding, eighty staff had been made redundant, and the 
whole workforce was subject to wage reductions (Framework, 2011). 
Framework’s initial response was to contest the cuts, initiating Judicial 
Review against both the DCLG and Nottingham City Council, who were 
in dispute about the amount of Supporting People funding included in 
City’s grant settlement for 2011.  However, on legal advice, action 
against DCLG was dropped, leaving the Judicial Review focussed on 
the City Council.   A senior manager at Framework later described this 
as a ‘mistake’, admitting that relationships had been negatively 
affected, but emphasising ‘staff and service users expected us to stand 
up’ (Interview, 2014ab).   
 
At the same time, the organisation started to restructure and re-focus its 
business, expanding into new geographical areas. In its 2012-13 
annual report Framework highlighted a new target of raising ten million 
pounds from social and philanthropic investment, with a focus on 
consolidating new commercial partnerships, most notably with the 
Nottingham Building Society.  This collaboration yielded an additional 
source of income, through specially designed philanthropic savings 
accounts; a Housing Crisis centre in Nottingham City Centre (in 2013) 
and a fresh source of capital funding for building new accommodation.  
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The organisation also continued to draw on and reference  strengths 
emanating from its community and voluntary roots, emphasising factors 
that were promoting continuity, including faith in the ‘professionalism of 
its staff’, faith in the ‘growing role’ of service users and faith in the 
‘strength of communities’ (Framework, 2014a p.2). 
 
Aside from its commercial and community collaborations, Framework 
made considerable progress in establishing itself as a powerful 
influence in partnership working within Nottingham City.  It re-built its 
relationship with the City Council, concentrating on new opportunities 
and partnership imperatives arising from public health funding.   
 
In 2013 Framework’s Chief Executive was elected by other voluntary 
sector bodies to the One Nottingham Board, acting as a representative 
for the local voluntary sector.  The organisation also led a successful 
£9.8m bid to the Big Lottery Fund in 2013, ‘Opportunity Nottingham,’ 
which aimed to ‘revolutionise’ support to the most vulnerable and 
challenging clients and people with multiple and complex needs 
(Framework, 2014b).   
 
‘Opportunity Nottingham’ included contributions from seventeen 
organisations, but represented a ‘Framework led response’ which 
aspired to create a ‘system change’ in the way people were supported   
(Framework, 2014b). Proposals to create this change included the 
involvement of ‘beneficiary ambassadors’ (former clients of the 
services) in initiatives to re-shape statutory services.  At the same time 
a ‘systems change group’ (chaired by a former Chief Executive of the 
City Council) was charged with delivering change in the ‘DNA’ of the 
system at a local, regional and national level.  Framework interviewees 
felt this was significant because, for the first time, they had an 
opportunity to influence and change statutory systems, rather than 
working around them. 
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Framework’s relative power as a partnership player in the city also 
sometimes brought it into conflict with other, smaller voluntary sector 
organisations.  Some voluntary sector interviewees expressed 
misgivings during the course of the research about Framework’s  
success in winning contracts, and the potential impact of a loss of 
diversity in voluntary sector service providers:  
 
‘as the biggest provider... they have secured contracts through 
commissioning services that have wiped out other, smaller third 
sector bodies.  They have taken over certain services….  They 
have not got a good reputation among the third sector.  Joe 
public, yes. The third sector in that area has an interesting 
relationship with them’ (Interview, 2014af). 
 
 These concerns were acknowledged by managers at Framework,  
‘I think four years ago if you’d gone around the voluntary sector 
partners and said “what do you think about Framework, does it 
work in partnership?” they would have said “yes”.  I’m not sure 
they would now.  But that’s change of perception rather than a 
change in reality.  It just illustrates how tough it is’ (Interview, 
2014ab).  
Framework interviewees were also keen to emphasise both their wish 
to see diversity in provision, and their role in preserving it: 
‘In the City you would want to see the range of services for 
homeless people continuing.  I think some people would 
probably think “Oh, Framework, they swallow up all the 
contracts” but also you wouldn’t want to have just one agency, I 
think it’s vital to have different kinds of services’ (Interview, 
2014v).   
‘Despite how it may feel to some of the smaller organisations 
who may well see us as a threat, actually I think we have helped 
to keep afloat organisations….  There is a limit to what we can 
do to help those organisations, but I think we have been of some 
assistance to them’ (Interview, 2014ab). 
However interviews also highlighted the difficulty of taking a wider 
community leadership responsibility whilst also acting as the lead 
organisation for commissioning consortia.  One senior manager 
commented that partnerships had become ‘a bit more brutal’: 
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‘We can’t afford to be nice to people in the same way that we 
could….it’s difficult, it’s all part of the management of shrinking 
resources, clearly that does impact on the relationships between 
organisations and the ability to co-operate’ (Interview, 2014ab). 
On the other hand, the same individual felt that partnership working at a 
strategic level had helped to ameliorate the impact of spending cuts.   
Health in particular was seen as a crucial area for the expansion of 
partnerships.   A staff member also emphasised the importance of 
partnership to future efficiencies:  
‘the needs of service users should be at the top, partnership 
working is crucial.   If as a result of austerity there is less of 
that…. if there is less money about, you can afford less waste, 
you need to be as efficient as you can’ (Interview, 2014v). 
In summary, Framework’s story provides an example of a large 
voluntary sector organisation exploring expanding opportunities to lead 
collaboration as it sought solutions to reductions in public spending.  In 
common with local authorities, it had developed new ways of structuring 
services and income, including a more commercial approach and the 
pursuit of new and varied funding sources.  Like other organisations 
approached for this research, it also found resources in the resilience 
and pragmatism of its staff base, involvement of service users and 
inspiration and values from its faith-based roots.  However, although the 
move into a role where it acted as a partnership ‘convenor’ provided 
opportunities in gaining contracts and funding, as well as potential 
influence over statutory partners, the new responsibilities also brought a 
degree of conflict and contestation, especially with smaller voluntary 
sector partners.  In the context of ever decreasing budgets, hard-
headed business practice and community leadership could not easily 
co-exist. 
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8.7 Analysis 
The findings raise a number of interesting points in relation to the 
development of community leadership in Nottingham between 2010 
and 2015.  
 
First, they highlight that community leadership remained a core function 
for the council, although the local authority appeared to be moving from 
an active civic ‘enabling’ interpretation towards a more symbolic 
influencing role.  It was also withdrawing from the direct connections 
with communities that facilitated what Sullivan (2007) terms ‘citizen 
voice’. 
 
At the same time, voluntary organisations were starting to move in an 
opportunistic way into community leadership roles, with some 
encouragement from the council.  These went beyond the maintenance 
of service provision, to encompass some co-ordinative activity, drawing 
together people and organisations in pursuit of joint action.  In this 
sense the third sector was indeed beginning to ‘step-up’ to fill emerging 
gaps, prompting one faith partner to claim ‘the ‘Big Society’ has worked’ 
(Interview, 2014y).   
 
However, it is questionable whether the roles performed by TNT and 
Framework helped to replace the diminishing council activity associated 
with expressing ‘citizen voice’.  Some of their work (such as the lottery 
funded initiative) was likely to impact on the policy of statutory 
organisations, but the majority was focussed on service delivery rather 
than communications and advocacy.  Whilst other organisations existed 
to express citizen voice (for example organisations representing 
‘communities of interest’ such as Nottingham Citizens, and Nottingham 
Equal) these did not necessarily represent or replace the geographical 
community-based connections which the council appeared to be losing.  
The top-down, paternalistic ‘collectivist’ traditions of partnership 
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described by Gardner and Lowndes (2015), were not being fully 
replaced by bottom-up communitarian approaches. 
 
Although TNT and Framework were very different in size and capacity, 
they also both met with challenges in assuming ‘community leadership’ 
responsibilities.  For TNT these may also have been the challenges of a 
pioneer organisation; establishing a space in which to act, 
demonstrating credibility (especially with non-faith partners), achieving 
autonomy and deciding how best to match capacity to action.  
Framework’s challenges were those of a more mature organisation.  
Their financial power meant that they did not have to create new 
spaces for action, but they did need to pay careful attention to the effect 
of their power relations on others, and had challenges in maintaining 
trust, and influencing other statutory partners in areas of strategy which 
had formerly been beyond their remit.   
 
Both organisations could access resources unavailable to the council or 
its statutory partners such as volunteers, philanthropy, and lottery 
funding, but these were also less stable and flexible than state funding.  
Accordingly the functions they helped to provide had a high degree of 
precarity, involved some complex power relationships and depended on 
continuous negotiation, which proved time-consuming and costly for the 
organisations involved.  Overall the case study evidence demonstrates 
that although new opportunities for community leadership were 
potentially being created – or left behind – as the local authority 
withdrew from a ‘citizen-voice’ role, these were not easy or uncontested 
areas to fill. 
 
8.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored theory and evidence in relation to proposition 
P4: ‘local political representatives continue to exercise community 
leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles’. It found national-level institutional 
support for a continued ‘enabling’ civic leadership role for councils, 
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although emerging opportunities were predominantly focussed on sub-
regional initiatives including local enterprise partnerships and combined 
authorities.  As resources at a local level continue to reduce through a 
further five years of financial austerity, with attendant concerns about a 
deterioration in the ability of the local authority to exercise ‘hard’ power, 
(Stoker, 2011) there are suggestions that future ‘civic’ leadership may 
be increasingly focussed on symbolic leadership and influence rather 
than direct action. 
The main qualification of the proposition occurs in relation to the ‘citizen 
voice’ interpretation of community leadership; specifically that there 
appears to be a reduction in the resources and possibilities to perform 
this role, and, in Nottingham, a growing acceptance that the council 
must inevitably withdraw from community-focussed activity.  Although in 
some cases voluntary sector and faith-based organisations were 
beginning to explore community leadership roles, these tended to be 
focussed on communitarian approaches to service delivery, which, 
although closer to specific communities of interest, are unlikely to 
provide a direct replacement for the diverse neighbourhood 
connections that previously enabled the articulation of ‘citizen voice’.  
There is a fit between these findings and the traditions discussed in 
chapter 7.  In particular Nottingham’s strong civic tradition is underlined 
by these findings, as is the weakening of the state-led collectivist 
tradition of partnership.  However, it is unclear from this research to 
what extent this is a (widespread) response to national institutional 
change or a result of Nottingham’s historic preference for elite and civic 
leadership (see section 7.6). Additional research would be helpful in 
understanding whether the identified constraints on the ability to 
exercise ‘citizen voice’ are manifested in similar ways across different 
localities.   
This chapter has also suggested that ‘communitarian’ leadership 
traditions may be viewed as strengthening, which stands partly in 
tension with Nottingham City Council’s historic ambivalence towards 
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communitarian approaches, noted in chapter 7.  However - drawing on 
the findings of that chapter - it is also possible that leadership 
opportunities are restricted principally to those parts of the voluntary 
and community sector which, through a diverse and independent 
funding base, have been able to mitigate the worst impacts of the cuts 
and the instigation of market-based commissioning practices.  More 
research focussed on the changing role of civil society organisations 
would help to explore this further. 
In respect to Sullivan’s 2007 typology, the analysis highlights the 
benefits of separating (top-down) ‘collectivist’ and (bottom-up) 
‘communitarian’ perspectives in determining whether the local authority 
(or other bodies) are exercising leadership consistent with ‘citizen 
voice’.  In particular it demonstrates that, as local authorities withdraw 
from community-facing activities, we should be alive to the potential for 
other types of organisation to perform ‘community leadership’ functions. 
In this circumstance, ‘backbench’ councillors could play a key role in 
bridging the divide, making a link between voluntary and community-
level agency and wider place-based leadership.  However the 
centralisation of powers in political executives, combined with the 
pressures under conditions of austerity for radical top-down savings 
initiatives does not facilitate this connection.  The government’s current 
proposals for imposing elected mayors on combined authorities with 
cabinets formed through representative (rather than direct) democracy 
will only serve to exacerbate any disconnection between civic elites, 
working at a sub-regional level, and the communities they serve. 
This also begs an important question: if community leadership was 
originally conceived as a contribution towards democratic renewal, at 
what point will this issue be revisited?  Whilst service delivery and sub-
regional governance in England is undergoing radical transformation, 
local political structures lag unreformed.  If community leadership was 
originally conceived as part of the answer to problems of trust and 
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legitimacy in mature democracy, then a potential disconnection of 
councils and their communities renders this challenge more acute.  
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Chapter 9: The type and extent 
of change in local public 
services in Nottingham 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at how we might characterise the type and extent of 
change occurring within local public services in Nottingham as a result 
of austerity policies. Chapter one of this thesis explored how 
government ministers have tended to play down the extent of change 
occurring within councils, claiming that ‘sensible’ cuts could be 
delivered without serious impact for front line services (DCLG, 2012; 
Osborne, 2013).  At the same time there has been a tendency within 
the local government press to celebrate local authorities’ ability to 
maintain delivery and absorb spending cuts (Jameson, 2013) and in 
Nottingham the expressed policy of ‘we will manage within the cuts’ 
(Interview, 2014g) has already been noted as a guiding narrative 
(section 6.6).  However, chapters six, seven and eight have shown that 
despite the outward appearance of relative stability, financial pressure 
has brought some material changes to Nottingham City Council’s 
services and interactions with partners, as well as evidence of shifts in 
the ideas and underpinning traditions shaping how services are funded 
and delivered.  
This chapter considers two propositions: 
P5: The change processes instigated in response to austerity have so 
far been characterised by incremental change rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’. 
P6: Austerity policies have so far been delivered with minimal (first 
order) change to local governance and systems. 
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The two propositions are interlinked but represent a separation of the 
process and outcome elements of change.  The rationale for this 
separation is explained in detail as the starting point to this chapter.  
Proposition P5 is subsequently examined by considering Nottingham’s 
situation in context with national policy drivers, reviewing the change 
processes explored in earlier chapters and looking more closely at 
issues of institutional resilience and expressions of agency.    
Proposition P6 is then assessed using Hall’s idea of policy paradigms 
(see section 3.5) to look at evidence for first, second and third order 
change outcomes to date.  Whilst this framework’s linear nature does 
not perfectly reflect the change observed, evidence is presented to 
support the argument that transformational change is occurring and 
may continue to occur as a result of austerity.  The chapter’s 
conclusions explore the implications of this finding. 
 
9.2 The nature of change: analytical 
considerations  
This chapter argues that within the context of a multi-layer system of 
governance it is possible to observe both a national-level punctuated 
financial change, and incremental institutional adjustment relating to 
austerity policies.  To help illustrate this point, the analysis draws a 
deliberate distinction between the type or process of change occurring 
and the extent of that change.  A focus on process allows differentiation 
between changes occurring at national level and local level, which is 
important because national changes in funding and legislation arguably 
constitute a policy punctuation (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; John & 
Bevan, 2012; Jones et al., 2009), while the change implemented at 
local level has so far been characterised by more incremental 
processes, including displacement, layering, conversion, drift and 
exhaustion (see section 3.5 for further discussion of these models, and 
section 6.7 for the observation of incremental changes in Nottingham).  
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This chapter therefore also asserts that these types of change process 
can co-exist simultaneously. 
The separation of types of change from an attempt to categorise the 
extent of change also recognises the principle that incrementalism is 
defined by its processes rather than its outputs (Cope, 1994) and that 
gradual adjustment can still be transformative over the longer term 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005b) (see section 3.5).  Given the relatively short 
timescale of this thesis, from 2010-2015, and the lack of distance 
between the end of the spending review period and the time of writing, 
strong caveats must be given in regard any attempt to accurately judge 
cumulative outcomes of austerity policies at a local level.  Nonetheless, 
existing institutionalist theory, including Hall’s ideas of policy paradigms 
(Hall, 1993) and  Jones et. al.’s concept of ‘stick slip friction dynamics’ 
(Jones et al., 2009), can help in attempting to categorise the extent of 
change to date, and in discussing prospects for change in the future.    
Questions of structure and agency are also core to these two 
propositions.  In relation to structure, it is important to take account of 
the different ways of conceiving institutions, particularly that changes 
can be sought and observed at both material and discursive levels (as 
demonstrated in chapters six and seven).  In addition, this analysis will 
highlight the diminishing resilience to change exerted by local 
institutions, with reference to Paul Pierson’s ideas about obstacles to 
revision, including co-ordination problems, veto points, asset specificity, 
and positive feedback (Pierson, 2004 p.142-153) (see section 3.5). 
In relation to agency, attention is given to the complex role played by 
actors in processes of change.  Institutional theory suggests that they 
will be active in the ‘maintenance, defence, revision and discovery’ of 
institutions (Streeck, cited in Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.136), and that 
their methods might involve deploying ‘tried and tested templates’, 
resulting in institutional reproduction, or ‘mobilizing purposefully to 
change or resist existing constraints’ (Crouch & Keune, 2005 p.84-5; 
Lowndes & Roberts, 2013 p.129 - 136).  To better understand the role 
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played by actors, Mahoney and Thelen’s framework will be used to 
explore the role of institutional change agents including 
insurrectionaries, subversives, symbionts and opportunists (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010) (see section 3.5).   
Utilising these theoretical tools, this chapter will explore how 
Nottingham City Council has been able to exercise some constrained 
agency in mitigating a punctuated change in national budgets, 
modifying the financial cuts into more incremental changes at a local 
institutional level.  However it will go on to argue that although changes 
to date have been characterised by incrementalism, they may 
nonetheless still be transformative in their effects. 
 
9.3  National and local processes of change: 
from punctuation to mitigation 
At a national level, a strong case can be made for viewing the 
emergency budget and Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 as a 
financial policy punctuation, understanding punctuation as ‘a 
discontinuous pattern, characterised by a large sudden shift in attention 
that departs from a long period of stability’ (John & Bevan, 2012). The 
28 per cent cuts to local government’s central grant funding (HM 
Treasury, 2010b) represented an unprecedented reversal in public 
spending, unequalled since the second world war (Taylor-Gooby, 
2012). Changes to local government’s grant formula were accompanied 
by a decoupling of the previous link between rates of deprivation and 
funding, with authorities in areas with higher levels of multiple 
deprivation experiencing much higher cumulative cuts than local 
authorities in more affluent areas.  This had a regressive redistributive 
effect, whereby the difference in spending between English authorities 
in the most and least deprived bands has fallen from 45 per cent in 
2010/11 to just 17 per cent in 2014/15. (Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, 
Gannon, & Watkins, 2015 p.16). 
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At the same time a series of incremental policy shifts affecting 
institutions at the local level served to reinforce and sharpen the 
punctuated financial change, particularly with regard to the restriction of 
income generation.  These are explored in more detail in section 2.4, 
but include the capping of Council Tax increases at first three and then 
two per cent unless local authorities were prepared to hold a 
referendum; the de-ringfencing of government grants, which contributed 
to the obfuscation of spending cuts; and the design of income-raising 
measures such as business rates uplift or the New Homes Bonus, such 
that they benefitted more affluent areas to a greater extent than areas 
with high levels of deprivation.  The cumulative effect of these changes 
was to increase financial pressure on local authorities particularly in 
deprived areas, whilst decreasing their access to grant funding, and 
restricting the ability to close the funding gap through local tax-raising.       
Despite the financial punctuation at national level, compounded by the 
more incremental local changes noted above, the changes in 
institutional processes observed in Nottingham were initially 
characterised by incremental adjustment.  Yet it was also possible that 
this phase of incrementalism was temporary, as by the latter half of the 
spending review period, tried and tested mechanisms to achieve 
savings were starting to be supplemented by more radical approaches.   
Reviewing Nottingham’s responses to austerity, evidence was provided 
in chapter 6 for an evolving approach to managing the City Council’s 
budget gap, which moved from an incremental approach of ‘pass-
porting’ cuts - making ‘salami slices’ from departmental budgets - to 
seeking more substantial savings through the ambitious ‘big ticket’ 
transformation programmes (see section 6.3) alongside a forensic 
search for small savings.  Whilst a core set of policy priorities (as 
exemplified in the lens of affordability and the Nottingham Plan 42 
(Lowry, 2011) were protected, the shift from incremental savings to 
more fundamental service re-design was accompanied by a steady 
                                                             
42 Nottingham’s community strategy, drawn up between  the council and the One 
Nottingham partnership. 
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reduction in the staff base, ongoing re-evaluation of existing policy 
parameters, (including, for instance, eligibility for certain social care 
services) and the substitution of voluntary sector grants with 
commissioning approaches (see section 6.7, and 7.7).  In turn, as 
policies were changed, there was evidence for increased debate on the 
rationale and philosophy underpinning the way the Council provided 
services, including the officer who recounted how the organisation had 
moved from an anti-business philosophy to the roll-out of 
commercialisation (Interview, 2014b), and other interviewees who 
explained how the Council’s aims had changed from acting as a 
paternalistic provider of funding to a situation where communities were 
being left to ‘sort themselves out’ (Interview, 2014l) (section 8.4). 
None of this happened in a radical moment of change; indeed one 
director commented  ‘I don’t think this is a place that does radical, 
because the ideology is quite traditional in some ways’ (Interview, 
2014b).  This apparent minimisation of change may also have been a 
factor in the growth levels of citizen satisfaction in recent annual 
surveys (Nottingham City Council, 2014b).  However, the identification 
in chapter 6 of examples of displacement, layering, conversion, drift and 
exhaustion (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b) shows that practices and 
narratives were being altered as financial pressures mounted.  This 
gradual shift to increasingly radical responses could be likened to the 
pace of an athlete on a treadmill which was speeding up: as the pace 
(or requirement for budgetary savings) became more challenging, the 
strides (or movements away from existing ways of doing things) began 
to increase.  In summary, the radical financial punctuation had been 
mitigated into small, incremental shifts, but the transformational 
potential of those incremental changes, which increasingly drew upon 
different traditions of service delivery and challenged formerly dominant 
narratives, was increasing as time progressed. 
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9.4 The erosion of institutional resilience at 
national and local level 
Using Paul Pierson’s ideas on institutional resilience (see section 3.5 
for a discussion), it is also possible to see how sources of institutional 
resilience, which would normally act to prevent the revision of local 
government institutions, were gradually being eroded at both national 
and local level.  Pierson identified four potential sources of resilience: 
the requirement for co-ordination, veto points, asset specificity, and 
positive feedback (2004 p.142).  The next part of this argument will look 
at each of these areas in turn, examining co-ordination in relation to 
Nottingham’s ability to exercise political choices on modes of co-
ordination; veto points in regard to controls over finance; and asset 
specificity and ‘positive feedback’ in relation to the value of 
Nottingham’s asset base as a source of continued influence, power and 
resilience. 
Pierson (2004) describes how institutional stability is sometimes 
attributed to the value and importance of continued co-ordination, in 
that institutions constitute a stable position or equilibrium, which is of 
shared benefit to powerful actors, with strong disincentives to explore 
alternative approaches. In relation to local government, Peter John has 
echoed this view, with his portrayal of local government as a resilient 
organisation built around a strong central core of members and officers 
(John, 2014).  It is therefore worth examining whether the co-ordination 
role was a factor in Nottingham’s ability to maintain institutional stability.   
Nottingham had certainly defended its role and position as a local 
service provider.  It had a historic tradition of circumventing laws on 
compulsory competitive tendering (see case study background chapter 
5).   Interviews conducted for this research found that outsourcing was 
generally (though not consistently) resisted by both council members 
and officers in 2014 (Interview, 2014c, 2014g, 2014o, 2014q) and 
bringing services back in house was encouraged, although this was 
justified on cost, rather than ideological grounds (Interview, 2014g).  It 
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was also far from unique in its approach, with a National Audit Office 
report finding that – whilst outsourcing had increased most amongst 
authorities with lower funding reductions - authorities with higher levels 
of funding reduction were actually reducing levels of outsourced activity 
(NAO, 2014 p.23).    
Nonetheless, it was clear from the evidence in chapters 6 and 7 that – 
whilst it was defending a role in service delivery through partnerships,- 
market-driven approaches to co-ordination were growing in importance 
in comparison to state-driven models.  This was evidenced by the 
exploration of outsourcing in relation to specific functions (Interview, 
2014c, 2014e) growth in commissioning approaches and the move from 
‘gift’ to ‘transactional’ relationships with the voluntary sector (Interview, 
2014i).  Although commercialisation had been deployed in Nottingham 
as an approach to developing a new twist on state co-ordination, this 
tactic also explicitly acknowledged the dominance of a market-driven 
philosophy of service delivery.   
Moreover, whilst local authorities’ community leadership role had been 
adopted and codified by the new Labour government, and was being 
continued in a ‘civic’ sense in Nottingham, chapter 8 showed how the 
‘community voice’ aspect of this role was gradually being eroded.   The 
‘empty toolbox’ resulting from a reduction in financial power (Interview, 
2014l) meant that the Council needed to pass greater responsibility to 
communities just as it withdrew from them, making space for other 
partners to exercise some of its local convening functions.  
Therefore in relation to both service delivery and community leadership 
in Nottingham, whilst the Council maintained service and civic 
coordination responsibilities, the nature of that role - and the traditions 
that guided how it was enacted - were changing.  State-centred 
approaches were being challenged and eroded as the Council’s 
financial power reduced, and market-driven and communitarian 
approaches were increasingly influential. 
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Turning next to ‘veto points’, Pierson borrows from rational choice 
scholarship to create an institutional interpretation of veto points 
showing how they can affect resilience to institutional change over time 
(Pierson, 2004 p.144-146).  He highlights that it is important to 
understand when institutional vetoes have been constructed to be ‘self-
referencing’, or controlled by the actors who are protected by them, 
thus carrying strong disincentives for change.  An example of this would 
be legislation on budget referenda in the 2011 Localism Act.  Councils 
are theoretically able to agree an unbalanced budget, or hold local 
referenda to increase Council Tax above the Government’s given limits, 
but have very strong political, financial and legal disincentives to taking 
that path, sufficient to dissuade any local authority from adopting that 
approach to date: effectively they exercise a self-referencing veto 
(NAO, 2014a p.33).43  Their only other route to avoiding cuts is 
alternative methods of income generation or the strategic use of 
reserves, but in 2014 the National Audit Office found that most councils 
had not yet used the latter strategy to supplement service related 
expenditure, preferring to retain funds in an effort to offset future 
instability (NAO, 2014a p.16).  
For actors in Nottingham, the gap between legislation and 
implementation undoubtedly provided some leeway for local 
interpretation, as highlighted in sections 6.8 and 8.4.  Yet as one 
director noted, open insurrection was also relatively rare, especially 
when it involved court action (Interview, 2014e).   Elected members 
were clear that they could not set an unbalanced budget, and their only 
route was to ‘manage despite the cuts’ (see section 6.7).  Thus, 
although the council was able to mitigate the effects of financial 
reductions on services, it had limited scope to prevent those effects 
within the limits of its own veto.   
                                                             
43 A 4.75 per cent Council Tax rise which would have triggered a referendum was explored by 
Brighton and Hove Council in 2014, but eventually rejected by opposition parties.  In 2015 the 
Police and Crime Commissioner in Bedfordshire triggered a referendum when he proposed a 
rise of 15.8 per cent in the Council Tax allocated to policing. 
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Third, Pierson cites ‘asset specificity’ and ‘positive feedback’ as a 
source of resilience, in which organisational adaptations to existing 
arrangements make the removal of institutions unattractive, and their 
replacement increasingly costly.  He suggests that ‘all other things 
being equal, an institution will be more resilient, and any revisions more 
incremental in nature, the longer the institution has been in place’ 
(Pierson, 2004 p.147 emphasis Pierson's own).  Asset specificity 
suggests that actors with an interest and long term investment in 
assets, such as relationships, expectations, and knowledge of 
procedures, are likely to support the continuation of activity wherever 
those assets are applied (p.148).   
Considering local government’s asset base from a national perspective, 
and using Pierson’s broad definition as a guide, it is striking that - 
although local government as an institution has been around since the 
19th century - its assets have come under a sustained attack over the 
last three decades.  Following on from this observation, it is reasonable 
to assume that as the asset base is eroded so there will be fewer 
assets specific to a local government setting, and accordingly reduced 
incentives for actors to protect their interests through the maintenance 
of local government-related institutions.  
As implied above, the deterioration in physical local authority assets 
pre-dates austerity, for instance the Thatcher government took 
significant legislative steps to limit local government’s powers and 
income in the 1980s, (Loughlin, 1996) and pioneered the ‘right to buy’ 
for council houses, substantially reducing the physical asset base.  In 
turn the post-1997 Labour administration embedded the division 
between councils and housing providers by introducing ‘ALMOs’ (arms-
length management organisations) for council housing functions, and 
encouraging greater engagement of the private and voluntary sectors. 
Since 2010 however ownership and retention of all physical assets by 
local authorities has come under further pressure from central policies 
encouraging asset reduction (BBC News, 2011).  Limitations on raising 
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income also mean that councils are unable to easily replace assets 
which have been sold.   
Furthermore, considering the staff base as a group of actors with an 
interest in the continuation of local government, it has been argued that 
the rise of new public management techniques in the 1990s did much 
to weaken the power-base of the local government professions, whilst 
the neutralisation of local government unions was facilitated by the 
‘new’ Labour government (Laffin, 2009 p.27).  These factors  may have 
contributed to the relatively uncontested 16.6 per cent national 
reduction in the staff base between 2010 and 2013 (NAO, 2014b p.8).   
Finally, as the asset and staff base of local government was reduced, 
local politics had also been weakened.  Again this process had deep 
roots, stretching back many years.  There was anxiety about electoral 
turnout from the early years of the Labour governments (Cole, 2003; 
DETR, 1998) and the membership base of all political parties had 
dropped from 4 per cent of the population to less than 1 per cent in 
2010 (Mcguinness, 2012 p.5).  Without widespread popular support, or 
strong professional interests, local government lacked potential sources 
of the positive feedback which helped to defend other longstanding 
institutions such as the NHS. 
In this context of reducing physical assets and diminishing producer 
power, local adjustments to the organisational form of local government 
in response to financial pressure are becoming common, through the 
creation of shared services and cross-borough collaboration, such as 
the tri-borough agreement in London between Kensington and Chelsea, 
Westminster and Hammersmith and Fulham.  Although Eric Pickles 
joked that he would ‘shoot’ the first civil servant who came in and 
suggested widespread reorganisation, he was careful to explain that 
this was not because local government did not need reform, but that it 
was preferable to ‘change the reality and wait for the structure to catch 
up’ (Pickles, 2014).   
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Compared to this national context of attrition in assets and reduction in 
sources of ‘positive feedback’, Nottingham had some features which 
enhanced its institutional resilience.  First, the council had a large 
property portfolio, managed through a number of trusts, which allowed it 
to use land and property to generate income, and facilitate investment 
(Interview, 2014g).   Second, its high level of political continuity 
promoted stability in relationships between council members and other 
civic elites, supporting increasing depth and maturity of high-level 
partnership collaboration, (noted in section 7.3).  The council had also 
been consistent in its policy of protecting assets relating to service 
delivery, such as the bus company and district heating system.  Such 
building blocks were crucial as the basis for innovation and delivery of 
initiatives such as a second line for the ‘Nottingham Express Transit’ 
(NET) tram network, and the ‘Robin Hood’ not-for-profit energy 
company, despite the context of spending cuts.   
Nonetheless, the council was not able to entirely insulate itself from 
impacts to its assets.  Although not excessive in the context of other 
core cities (see section 6.7), Nottingham’s reduction to its staff base 
was 23 per cent between 2010 and 2013.  This loss of personnel, 
coupled with a drop in financial power contributed to changes in 
relationships with some partners; from a trust and support based 
environment to a more contract-led basis (noted in Chapter 5); and from 
the ability to promote direct action to an environment where progress 
depended on influence and ‘wheeling and dealing’ (Interview, 2014z).   
Shared services had already been piloted in relation to human 
resources and payroll, and new management models were being 
explored with other statutory agencies, such as the police.  
To summarise, at both a national and a local level, it can be argued that 
as processes of institutional change appeared to be speeding up, local 
government’s institutional sources of resilience were being steadily 
eroded.  Councils had less influence and choice in the form of ‘co-
ordination’ they provided; self-referencing veto points prevented the 
contestation of the cuts; organisational assets were under pressure, or 
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(via the transfer of services and assets) no longer specific to local 
authorities; and they had little positive feedback to sustain the current 
organisational forms: indeed these were already changing.  Although 
Nottingham’s particular institutional context had mitigated these effects 
to a limited extent, between 2010 and 2015 it was experiencing similar 
pressures. 
 
9.5 Processes of local agency 
The effect of individual actors on change processes was more complex, 
indeed all four of the elements of ‘maintenance, defence, revision and 
discovery’ described by Lowndes and Roberts could be observed from 
the interviews.  In considering the role of actors, the four categories of 
change agent described by Mahoney and Thelen (2010 p.23) provide a 
useful guiding framework within which to understand the findings.  
Importantly their agents work from very different motivational positions, 
a useful idea in a local government context, because it recognises that 
actors will have differing levels of power and divergent motivations or 
political positions, affecting their ability to be open about intentions to 
influence change.  It also raises the possibility of unlikely coalitions, 
where actors with varying motivations can band together for a common 
purpose.    
Given the context of Nottingham’s opposition to austerity, this analysis 
has adapted Mahoney and Thelen’s definitions to take account of how 
actors work to maintain or undermine institutions and contest 
institutional change (as well as enact it) against the external shock of 
austerity.  In this analysis, insurrectionaries are the defenders of 
institutions, those who wish to preserve local services against prevailing 
financial pressure, to the point of radicalism; subversives aim at 
maintenance, providing the appearance of conformity with change, but 
using loopholes to pursue an anti-austerity agenda; symbionts 
outwardly support the organisation’s stance on austerity, but have 
sympathy with some objectives of austerity policies and the aim of 
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‘never wasting a good crisis’; whilst opportunists are intent on 
discovery, looking for creative possibilities within change. 
Although, as noted above, opportunities for outright insurrectionary 
resistance to austerity were severely constrained, interviews certainly 
showed evidence of a politically-inspired defence against the 
ramifications of the spending cuts and welfare reform.  One middle 
manager officer commented that in relation to housing ‘everything’s a 
fight’, alluding to resistance to welfare reform proposals (Interview, 
2014n).  Another frontline officer said she was ‘impressed’ with how 
vocal the Council had been in contesting the ‘bedroom tax’ (Interview, 
2014m).  Certain routes for achieving savings also remained taboo, with 
outsourcing considered as a ‘red line’ for many interviewees (Interview, 
2014c, 2014g, 2014o, 2014q).   
More commonly there was evidence for ‘subversion’ as apparent 
compliance with the government’s agenda was subtly aligned with the 
council’s policy priorities.  A repeated refrain was that the City was ‘not 
taking it lying down’ (Interview, 2014n, 2014o) with activity in opposition 
to central policies taking place in the ‘grey area’ between legislation and 
implementation (Interview, 2014c).  This included, for example, a 
commitment to funding welfare rights in order to maximise benefits take 
up; an unwritten policy of trying to avoid evictions related directly to the 
‘bedroom tax’ (Interview, 2014h), and the mobilization of 
commercialisation in a way that could ‘take us back to big council 
departments’ (Interview, 2014d). 
However amongst interviewees, and particularly senior officers and 
partners, there were also examples of ‘symbionts’ who sought to use 
the pressures arising from austerity to promote revision of the City’s 
processes and institutions.  These included the director who described 
commercialism as a ‘Trojan horse’ to get councillors ‘into the right 
territory for a sensible discussion’ (Interview, 2014b) and partners who 
were keen to radically reform the existing shape of the public sector. 
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‘our reality is quite stark lest we get in and deal with it. 
Leadership is about recognising that so that we shape our future 
and don’t react to it’ (Interview, 2014x). 
Meanwhile a private sector service provider commented that the officer 
body sometimes tended to behave as a ‘small c’ conservative force, but 
that the ‘C’ had become bigger with retrenchment, inferring that officers 
were now using right wing values in designing and implementing 
policies.  The extension of cost-driven commissioning approaches was 
also cited as an example of these values in practice (Interview, 
2014ad).    
Nonetheless, it could also be argued that by committing to ‘manage 
within the cuts’, the political leadership had created a context within in 
which such apparent compromises and conflicts of interest were 
inevitable, and thus the mantle of ‘symbiont’ could in some senses also 
be extended to senior politicians.  One director described the sense of 
compromise, saying that members had, in the main, 
‘been able to navigate the difference between their policy 
differences and staying true to their values, to minimise the worst 
impact of it, but it has been hard’  (Interview, 2014b). 
There were also a number of examples of opportunism, embodied in 
actors who were seeking to discover new practices and models of 
delivery.  These included members, partner organisations and council 
staff who were seeking to explore how to shift the balance of power and 
responsibility between the council and the community (Interview, 2014f, 
2014k, 2014x; Workshop, 2014b).  Another example of opportunism in 
action was the move to use the context of austerity to re-define the 
central/local relationship, through arguing for devolution in combination 
with freedom from central grant funding (Interview, 2014d). 
In practice the council found itself drawing on all these motivations and 
perspectives to identify novel ways of meeting the budget gap.  In some 
areas, and particularly the frontline, there were examples of institutional 
reproduction, with partners mobilising ‘tried and tested’ partnership 
relationships to mitigate the effects of cuts, for instance through the 
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establishment of food banks, or local providers being mobilised to fill 
gaps in a domestic violence service (Workshop, 2014a, 2014b).  At a 
strategic level there were also examples of actors ‘mobilizing 
purposefully’ using creativity and innovation to develop new solutions 
including the new local energy company, or the ‘Project Aurora’ 
collaboration between local policing teams and neighbourhood 
managers.    
The outcome of this diverse agency was essentially that in the short 
term the punctuated change instigated by budget cuts was being 
modified.  As one senior manager put it austerity had not ‘de-railed the 
agenda’ and was being actively mitigated ‘within constraints’ (Interview, 
2014k).  However, as the financial pressure grew, defensive and 
maintenance focussed strategies championed by insurrectionaries and 
subversives were being replaced by novel and revisionist proposals 
from symbionts and opportunist players.  This was demonstrated by 
comments in interviews showing how austerity was acting to embed 
reforms that had formerly been resisted.  One manager identified a 
more ‘energetic appetite’ for using things like commercialism (Interview, 
2014k), another commented that ‘we’ve really softened up the 
boundaries over the years.  We had to say ‘please don’t stifle the 
ideas’’ (Interview, 2014b).  Another longstanding director reflected that 
some of these changes had multiple antecedents, for instance greater 
involvement of the private sector could be traced back to the use of 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Local Improvement Finance Trust or 
LIFT schemes for health-related capital investment.  As he put it, such 
delivery mechanisms ‘became the routes available to provide bread and 
butter as opposed to the cream, it’s happened organically’ (Interview, 
2014e).   
Thus in relation to proposition P5, although it is possible to agree that 
the change processes instigated in response to austerity have so far 
been characterised by incremental change rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium, this could be the result of mitigating responses, which may 
be temporary in their effects.  Over the longer term traditional 
261 
 
institutional and agential sources of resilience were being challenged as 
the continued financial pressure acted to embed change at a material 
and discursive level.  Potentially the foundations were being laid for 
more far-reaching institutional reform.  In effect Nottingham provided a 
working example of what Pierson terms ‘longer term incremental 
changes’, which are ‘typically invisible’ in studies of political 
phenomena, but ‘crucial in creating the preconditions for institutional 
reform’ (2004 p.164).  The next part of this chapter will assess how far 
that reform has progressed to date.   
 
9.6 Assessing the extent of change 
Proposition P6 suggests that, building on the argument that austerity 
has to date been delivered with minimal impact on front line services, 
we might expect that austerity policies have so far been delivered with 
minimal (first order) change to local governance and systems.  This 
proposition draws on Peter Hall’s (1993) argument that it is possible to 
identify three distinct kinds of changes in policy making: first order 
change which amounts to changes in the ‘levels’ and ‘settings’ of 
policies, within a paradigm set by past policy decisions; second order 
change, which involves greater changes to policy instruments; and third 
order change, which refers to a radical paradigm shift in the hierarchy of 
goals behind policy (Hall, 1993 p278-9) (see chapter 3.5). 
 
Whilst a longer time scale and greater historical distance is arguably 
needed to properly appreciate the long-term outcomes of the Coalition 
government’s austerity measures, the time of writing, at the end of 
2015, makes this a useful point to try and take stock of the effect of 
austerity policies to date.  This is particularly important given that the 
new Conservative Government has committed to continue its existing 
trajectory of public spending cuts until the UK deficit has been 
eliminated (HM Treasury, 2015a).  Attempting to understand and 
categorise the extent of change so far gives the basis for reasonable 
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conjecture on the significance of the continuation of such policies.  This 
part of the analysis will therefore review the evidence found within this 
research for each type of change.  
 
A) Evidence for first order change: changing the settings 
There is extensive national and local evidence for ‘first order change’ or 
alterations to the ‘settings on the instruments’.  In the context of this 
research, the ‘settings’ of local authorities might be interpreted as 
budgetary changes, changes in functions and service volumes.  Over a 
longer time scale, analysis could also include service quality, but (as 
detailed in section 6.5) data on changes to service quality is either 
unavailable or has not yet caught up with the progression of spending 
cuts, and thus remains an item for future research to consider in more 
detail. 
Taking these changes in turn, while the extent of budgetary reductions 
is disputed between national and local actors (see section 6.2) it is plain 
that substantial budget reductions have occurred, and in Nottingham 
these amounted to a (minimum) cash terms reduction of 21.6 per cent 
in revenue spending power between 2010 and 2015/16, or (according 
to the City’s own analysis) a real-terms 50 per cent cut in its total 
government funding (Chapman, 2015).  Multiple strategies were 
employed in Nottingham to meet the resulting budget gap, but the 
majority of savings to date have been delivered through ‘efficiencies’, 
including a 23 per cent cut to the overall staff base and significant 
reductions in the amounts paid to other service providers.  This has in 
turn led to a reduction in the volume of some services – for instance in 
community development, youth and play and highways (see section 
6.4) and reductions in contract value, impacting for instance on 
contracts to provide early intervention services to prevent 
homelessness.  The picture in Nottingham is entirely consistent with 
national reports which have shown that budget reductions to date have 
mainly been managed through efficiency savings and reductions in 
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service volumes, rather than reductions in the range of functions (Audit 
Commission, 2013 p.5; NAO, 2014b p.33; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, 
Besemer, & Bramley, 2015 p.609).  More extensive retrenchment is 
thought to be likely in the future as opportunities for efficiencies are 
exhausted (Hastings et al., 2013).   
 
B) Evidence for second order change: changing the 
instruments 
Second order change implies changing the techniques or instruments 
of policy in pursuit of policy goals.  In local government’s case the 
implication would be moving away from traditional structures and 
institutions to new forms of delivery.  Arguably this type of change is 
also in evidence at a national and local level, although in many cases 
traditional institutional bodies still persist alongside new delivery 
mechanisms.   
At the national level we can see increased austerity driving the adoption 
of ‘shared services’ and cross-border collaboration, in 2015 there were 
416 shared service arrangements occurring between councils across 
the country delivering in £462 million of efficiency savings, compared to 
173 such arrangements in 2012 (Local Government Association, 2015).  
Inter-agency collaboration was also promoted by the integration of 
public health with local government in 2013, and although this change 
was not wholly driven by austerity, siting public health in local councils 
has resulted in challenges to the costs of local public health 
interventions (Iacobucci, 2014). 
There have also been innovations in institutional form for the purpose of 
economic development, including sub-regional LEPs and combined 
authorities.  The flagship example for the Coalition Government is 
Greater Manchester, which was granted devolved NHS funding in 
February 2015 in return for commitment to a number of policy outcomes 
and democratic reform in the shape of a nationally imposed ‘metro 
mayor’.  This emerging institutional form is closely linked to arguments 
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for creating economically viable city-regions, which could eventually be 
governed without central government grant funding (Core Cities, 
2013b).  It was also implicitly linked to the government’s plans for future 
spending cuts in the Summer of 2015, when councils were requested to 
submit proposals for combined authorities by early September, in order 
to inform the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review. 
In Nottingham, changes to policy instruments were at an early stage, 
but nonetheless in evidence.  Shared services had been established 
with neighbouring councils, and shared management arrangements 
were being explored with other statutory agencies.  A combined 
authority had recently been initiated for Nottinghamshire, although its 
aims and objectives remained under discussion.  In essence there had 
been surprisingly little change to the formal institutional arrangements 
for local government and other statutory agencies in the city, and at 
least one partner felt that public sector integration could be taken much 
further (Interview, 2014x).  However, at an ideational level, the 
introduction of commercialisation could be seen as an alternative type 
of second order change, introducing a fresh set of policy instruments to 
achieve the council’s objectives. 
Perhaps more significant were the areas of community leadership 
examined in chapter 8 where Nottingham City Council was withdrawing 
from its co-ordination functions at community level and allowing other 
organisations to become the policy instrument in its place.  This was 
particularly evident in interviews which explained how the council was 
transferring responsibilities for service delivery to service users and 
local communities (Interview, 2014k, 2014l, 2014q).  It was also 
apparent in the way that voluntary organisations were stepping into 
gaps to take up emerging convening roles (see chapter 8.7).  In this 
respect the council’s role as the principal policy instrument for 
community leadership was diminishing, and whilst other organisations 
started moving into the spaces left by its withdrawal from the 
‘community voice’ function, although they did not fully assume this role.  
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C) Evidence for third order change: changing the goals 
If first and second order change can be observed, is there also 
evidence for a more fundamental third order change? 
At a national level multiple commentators have argued that austerity is 
being used by the Coalition (and now Conservative) government to 
advance an ideological agenda which aims to dismantle the welfare 
state and embed neo-liberal policy agendas into public services (see for 
instance Clarke & Newman, 2012; Levitas, 2012; Newman, 2013; 
Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011; and Wilks-Heeg, 2011).  To date 
institutions have endured the spending cuts, but there have been clear 
warnings that further cuts – which are fully expected under the new 
Conservative Government, are unlikely to be achieved whilst 
maintaining existing institutions and meeting existing statutory 
requirements (Hastings et al., 2013; NAO, 2014a).  In Hall’s terms the 
‘policy anomalies’ and ‘frequent policy failures’ that presage a major 
third order change may be starting to appear on the radar, embodied – 
for instance - in recurrent political debates about affordable housing 
and funding for adult social care. 
Given this national context, to what extent can symptoms of third order 
change be detected locally, given that Nottingham remains a solid 
Labour council, and has maintained that position for more than 25 
years, making it – at least in theory - less open to the ideological drivers 
behind austerity? 
This thesis argued in chapter 6 that despite the outward appearance of 
stability, Nottingham City Council’s institutions were being challenged at 
a narrative and discursive level, which resulted in practices being 
altered incrementally through conversion, layering, displacement, drift 
and exhaustion.  Looking through a slightly different lens, in Chapter 7 
the case study of the voluntary sector showed how financial pressure 
from austerity seemed to be contributing to a shift in the partnership 
traditions of the council, from a collectivist tradition to an enabling and 
professional / managerial approach. Given these observations, and the 
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acknowledgment of potential overlap between Bevir and Rhodes’s 
concept of traditions, and Hall’s definition of a ‘policy paradigm’ (see 
chapter 3.5) it could be argued that the steady financial pressure 
accompanying austerity was changing the ‘third order’ goals of the 
organisation, forcing political compromise and narrowing expectation of 
what the local state could achieve.  A partner perceived this shift 
commenting that the ‘neo-liberal agenda has been taken on board 
uncritically’ there was a need to ‘get back to the Robin Hood agenda’ 
and ‘become a more progressive authority’ (Interview, 2014w).  Again, 
as in the case of processes examined above, changes were not 
happening in a radical moment of alteration, and perhaps were not 
even being perceived by officers and members in the cut and thrust of 
everyday business, but it did appear that – as the long term goals or 
traditions of the organisation subtly shifted - this change had the 
potential to be transformative in its long term effects. 
 
9.7 Conclusions 
This chapter started from two propositions that aimed to understand the 
process and extent of change.  These propositions were conceived to 
help scrutinise Coalition claims that the spending cuts would not impact 
on frontline services, and that they could be delivered through ‘sensible 
savings’ (DCLG, 2012; Osborne, 2013).  They also help to test 
academic arguments which contrast the resilience and even path 
dependency of local government (John, 2014), with contentions that the 
Coalition’s aim was to radically shape the welfare state (Taylor-Gooby, 
2012).   
In response, this chapter has argued that it is possible, in a multi-layer 
governance context, to have different types of change occurring 
simultaneously.  In summarising responses to the two propositions 
shaping this chapter, some important points are evident.  The first is 
that – despite their relative lack of power - local institutions and the 
exercise of local agency have made a difference to the way that 
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austerity was experienced on the ground.  In Nottingham’s case, the 
council had acted to mitigate a significant punctuation in funding 
through incremental processes of change.  Institutions had (mainly) 
retained their form, albeit under considerable pressure, and actors had 
combined to devise ways of navigating the crisis.  However, the 
increasingly radical steps needed to meet budget deficits meant that 
this mitigation seemed likely to be temporary: processes of change 
appeared to be speeding up; sources of resilience, though strong in 
Nottingham, were diminishing, and actors’ differing motivations were 
contributing to on-going challenges to established narratives and 
traditions. 
Regarding the extent of change to date, analysis utilising Hall’s ‘policy 
paradigm’ framework (Hall, 1993) suggests clear evidence for first and 
some second order change.  Second order changes (to the policy 
instruments) remained fairly minimal, but from an institutional theory 
perspective this was unsurprising, as the ideas and traditions 
underpinning institutions at a discursive level will change before 
institutions are altered at a material level. The goals of local public 
service delivery were also actively under debate amongst key local 
actors, potentially presaging (in Hall’s terms) a third-order 
transformational change in local services.   
Therefore despite the lag in institutional change, Coalition policy 
architects could make a claim that – from their perspective - austerity is 
working.  They have proved particularly adept at establishing a 
legislative, financial and normative framework that has restricted 
councils with opposition political views from exercising extensive 
resistance.  From a perspective of changing ‘the reality and allowing 
structure to catch up’ (Pickles, 2014) austerity has been a policy 
success: transformational change appears to be occurring without 
disruptive ‘punctuated’ policy shifts at a local level.  
However Hall highlights that recurrent policy anomalies presage third 
order change, and Baumgartner and Jones also caution that ‘prior to a 
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major quake there is seismic activity’ (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002 
p.296).  Recent reports in the local government press have highlighted 
that a number of councils are entering severe financial difficulties and in 
danger of becoming insolvent (Municipal Journal, 2015c, 2015e).  
Social care has already been mentioned as an area of considerable 
anomaly, and also possesses the high political salience which might 
drive a rapid shift in policy attention in the event of a scandal or major 
policy failure.  This is likely to have been a factor in the Conservative 
Government’s November 2015 decision to ‘localise’ a greater proportion 
of the revenue for social care, via a ‘freedom’ for councils to add an 
additional 2% to Council Tax bills (HM Treasury, 2015b).  However, a 
funding gap is likely to remain, and what is not yet certain is whether an 
instance of social care failure will result in some mitigation of austerity, 
or an opportunity for the current government to drive-home third-order 
change.  Despite the argument that most change to date has been 
incremental in process, it is therefore too early to rule out the possibility 
of a punctuated shift in public services at a local level. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis began with the research question ‘how are local public 
services responding to austerity?’  It focussed on the actions taken by 
English local authorities and their partners to address the 
unprecedented public spending cuts enacted through the UK Coalition 
government’s 2010-2015 Comprehensive Spending Review.  The 
apparent stability of many local services throughout this period 
provoked important theoretical and empirical research questions about 
how local authorities had retained their capacity to function in the 
context of radical reductions to national grant funding.  This issue 
became even more salient in the context of the 2015 Conservative 
government’s summer budget of the 8th July 2015, which outlined a 
further five years of public spending cuts, alongside a continued 
squeeze on public sector pay and growing pressures on local authority 
finances.   
 
Using the UK city of Nottingham as an exploratory and revelatory case 
study, this research found that the Labour controlled local authority had 
– to a degree - been able to mitigate the effects of 22 per cent cash 
terms spending cuts arising from austerity during the period 2010-2015.  
However, it also noted that the sustainability of existing services and 
functions appeared increasingly precarious, balancing on an 
institutional base which was steadily being eroded by incremental 
change processes. 
 
Evidence presented in this study is consistent with wider research 
findings which suggest that the measures employed to date to meet 
growing local authority budget deficits will not be sustainable during 
further five years of austerity (Audit Commission, 2013; Hastings, 
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Bailey, Bramley, et al., 2015; NAO, 2014a).  This study also extended 
existing service-focussed analyses (see for example Crawford & 
Phillips, 2012; Innes & Tetlow, 2015; The Audit Commission, 2012, 
2013), to offer evidence that, in Nottingham’s case, austerity policies 
had broader impacts on the functioning of local governance, including 
some restrictions on local political choice; a negative impact upon 
smaller providers of commissioned services; and a reduction in 
important communication channels linking the council and the 
communities that it sought to lead.  In regard to the extent of change, 
local evidence and recently published national research suggested that 
fundamental changes were occurring within the ‘settings’ and 
‘instruments’ of local governance, whilst the underlying goals of local 
government were also being debated and re-focussed (Hall, 1993 
p.278-280).  These findings indicated that austerity policies could 
potentially be creating conditions that could lead to transformative ‘third-
order’ paradigm change in local services. 
 
This chapter will recap on the scope (and technical limitations) of the 
research before going on to present a summary of the main arguments.  
It will highlight implications for policy and practice, and place those 
findings in the context of other recently-published research.   Finally it 
will outline the contribution of the thesis in theoretical, methodological 
and empirical terms, and set an agenda for further research. 
 
10.2 Scope of the research  
This research focusses on the period from June 2010 to April 2015, 
during which the UK Coalition government introduced the most 
significant restructuring of public spending since the Second World War 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2012) in response to the UK banking and debt crisis of 
2008-9.  The Coalition’s ‘emergency budget’ of June 2010 (HM 
Treasury, 2010a) and subsequent Comprehensive Spending Review 
(HM Treasury, 2010b) included a funding settlement for local authorities 
that subsequently gained infamy as the ‘worst financial settlement in 
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living memory’ (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015).  This  loaded 
substantial cuts to local authority grant funding into the early years of 
the spending review period, at a time when councils were also 
experiencing rising demand pressures relating to the recession and 
demographic changes (Bailey, Bramley, & Hastings, 2015 p.574). 
 
For the purposes of this study, local public services have been defined 
as the functions provided by the local authority, as well as services 
commissioned from other local providers, in accordance with English 
local government’s service delivery and governance roles.  ‘Austerity’ 
has been interpreted as a political device, a deliberately ambiguous 
construct which signals a substantive change in the political 
environment and governing ethos, impacting at a local level upon a 
wide range of political choices and decisions (Appelbaum, 2014).  
Austerity’s most obvious manifestations include spending cuts and 
welfare reform, but this study also recognises that the concept of an 
‘age of austerity’ (Summers, 2009) has informed the broader context of 
policy-making and public administration, influencing how policies are 
developed, implemented and projected into the future.  Austerity has 
also been widely viewed as a pretext employed to deepen and cement 
neo-liberal reforms of the welfare state (Bailey et al., 2015; Levitas, 
2012; Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011). 
 
In Chapter 2 a literature review sought to contextualise the position of 
English local government in 2010 as a convenor of partnerships for 
service delivery, and ‘community leader’, as well as a service provider 
and commissioner.  Reviewing the effects of the Coalition’s austerity 
reforms, from June 2010 onwards, (as well as other key policy changes 
including the 2011 Localism Act (DCLG, 2011a)) the literature 
highlighted three broad research questions.  First, were austerity 
policies genuinely being delivered with minimal consequences for local 
services, and if so, how was this being achieved?  This aimed to 
explore a division between studies which focussed on local 
government’s capacity for adaptation based on creativity and resilience 
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(see for instance John, 2014; Lowndes & McCaughie, 2013), and those 
emphasising the diminishing power and resource base of local 
authorities (Hastings et al., 2012).  
 
Second, had austerity policies affected local government’s ‘convening’ 
role as a leader and co-ordinator of local governance?  Existing 
research was unclear on whether austerity policies would cause 
partnership activity to ‘wither on the vine’ (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012 
p.29) or whether, alternatively, partnership might offer a buffer against 
austerity (Lowndes & Squires, 2012 p.1).  This question also implied the 
need to consider separately the effects of austerity on partnerships 
focussed on service delivery, and the continuation of the ‘community 
leadership’ role which had been widely promoted and adopted under 
the preceding Labour government (Leach & Roberts, 2011; Sullivan, 
2007). 
    
A third area of enquiry questioned ‘how fast (and to what extent) is local 
government changing in response to austerity?   This was identified as 
a result of the competing narratives that, on the one hand, cuts could 
be delivered through ‘sensible savings’ without impacting front-line 
services (DCLG, 2012; Osborne, 2013); whilst on the other hand. 
academic and campaigning assertions suggested that austerity policies 
were re-scaling the welfare state (Anderson, 2012; Bailey et al., 2015 
p.571; Taylor-Gooby, 2012) 
 
These research questions were further informed in chapter 3 by an 
exploration of theory relevant to the research topic.  Historical 
institutionalist perspectives (for instance John, 2014; Pierson, 1994) 
provided a potential explanation for the ‘austerity puzzle’ suggesting 
that the institutions which underpinned local government would prove 
resistant to radical change.  However, alternative approaches to 
institutionalism emphasised that change could occur at a discursive, as 
well as material level (Hay, 2006; Lowndes & Roberts, 2013; Schmidt, 
2002, 2008, 2009, 2010) and that human agency could be significant 
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driver of change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).  Henceforth this study 
committed to seek evidence of change in both material and discursive 
senses, allowing for the varying motivational positions of different 
actors.  Lowndes and Roberts (2013) perspective on institutions as 
‘rules, practices and narratives’ provided a model which facilitated this 
nuanced analysis. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes interpretive approach to understanding government 
‘traditions’ (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 2006, 2010) provided a 
complementary means to explore the meaning and significance of 
institutional changes within the local historical and political context.  
Bevir and Rhodes’ approach had been applied to local government 
both by Gardner and Lowndes (2015) and by Helen Sullivan (2007) and 
these adaptations were deployed in analysing changing traditions in 
partnerships for service delivery (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998) and 
varying interpretations of community leadership.  
 
On the type and extent of change, differing theoretical perspectives 
suggested that responses to the shock of austerity might occur rapidly 
via a process of punctuated equilibrium (Gould & Eldredge, 1993; John, 
2012; Jones et al., 2009) or more incrementally through gradual 
endogenous adjustment (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b).  Pierson (2004) 
provided some conceptual clarity on sources and manifestations of 
resilience which might be recognised within local authorities, whilst 
Mahoney and Thelen’s concept of differing agential motivations 
provided further theoretical leverage to understand how the process of 
change was occurring.  In addition to issues of process, there was also 
a need to consider the outcomes of change to date, and in this regard 
Hall’s (1993) concept of policy paradigms offered a framework which 
could be used to inform a (very tentative and interim) assessment of 
how far change had progressed.  
 
In order to examine these issues in depth, the City of Nottingham local 
authority area was chosen as a single revelatory and exploratory case-
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study, being an example of a locality that had been relatively severely 
impacted by the 2008/09 recession and by the distribution of 
subsequent spending cuts.  In choosing a single case-study approach 
the intention was to provide a different perspective from studies of 
austerity existing at that time, moving beyond comparison across 
services or functions to consider responses to austerity ‘in the round’, 
examining both service delivery and governance issues. Within this 
single case there were also many different perspectives to take into 
account, and the research drew upon a wide range of data from the 
council and its partner organisations. 
 
Nottingham City Council collaborated in the research design and data 
collection as well as providing a small (7 per cent) financial contribution 
towards the PhD studentship.  This approach allowed the researcher to 
be embedded alongside the council’s policy team, facilitating an 
iterative process of research design, as well as access to documents, 
interviewees and opportunities for participant observation.   
 
The three main research questions were operationalised through a set 
of propositions (see box 10.1) which drew on the literature review and 
theory chapters.   In theorising that that minimal change would be 
observed, the propositions sought to test the arguments emerging from 
practice and new institutionalist literature that local government 
institutions could be expected to mitigate the exogenous shock of 
austerity, and that services and functions of governance would be 
resilient, with change likely to occur incrementally, rather than in a 
punctuated way.   
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Box 10.1: Propositions 
 
P1) The range and quality of services available to the public has been 
maintained during the period 2010-2015 
 
P2) The Council’s institutional rules, practices and narratives have been 
maintained during the period 2010-2015 
 
P3) Partnerships for service delivery between the Council and other 
statutory, business and voluntary partners have been maintained in the 
period 2010-2015 
 
P4) Local political representatives continue to exercise community 
leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles 
 
P5) The change processes instigated in response to austerity have so 
far been characterised by incremental change rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ 
 
P6) Austerity policies have so far been delivered with minimal (first 
order) change to local governance and systems 
 
These propositions were used to create a framework of detailed 
research questions (see Appendix 4) which were used to inform a 
document review, interview framework and interactive workshops.  Data 
collection was conducted with reference to action research and 
‘appreciative inquiry’ principles (Ludema & Fry, 2008) which took into 
account the potential impact of research questions on the organisations 
involved in the study.  Data was then analysed with reference to the 
theoretically-informed propositions, and emerging conclusions 
triangulated using three or more data sources. 
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There were some technical limitations to this research.  The principal 
limitation was scope, which was partly dictated by the nature of the PhD 
process and resources available for the study.  One key choice was the 
decision to focus mainly on institutional responses rather than 
population-level impacts, as institutional responses were felt to be 
subject to a shorter time-lag and fewer intervening variables than 
population effects.  Recent larger-scale studies, including recent work 
on the cases of Bristol and Liverpool (Kennett et al., 2015) have since 
added greatly to our understanding of the impacts of austerity on 
particular groups in an urban context, but further links remain to be 
made between the institutional changes and the ways in which 
populations have been affected by austerity in different types of locality. 
 
A second limitation on this research was the timescale.  Although it 
attempts to provide a sense of the effects of the first five years of 
austerity, this thesis inevitably provides a snapshot of a dynamic 
situation, with most of the analysis having been conducted in 2014 
(albeit using documentary evidence that projected cuts to 2015 and 
beyond).  As time moves on, the impacts of austerity are continuing to 
be compounded, and with every month that passes this study risks 
understating the extent of change.  There is also the disadvantage of 
having no historical distance on the policy impacts of the spending cuts, 
and the passage of time will certainly provide a fuller picture of the 
change that has – or has not - occurred.  However, given that austerity 
is likely to form a key aspect of the context for public policy 
development from 2015-2020 onwards, an attempt to reflect on its 
consequences is both justifiable and timely in respect to considering 
implications for policy and practice. 
 
A third key limitation relates to the perennial limitation of single case 
studies, with regard to the problems in generalising to a wider 
population, and the degree to which findings rest on specificities of 
place, particularly factors such as Nottingham’s status and economic 
power as a ‘core city’ and its unusual degree of continuity in political 
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leadership.  Yet local context also forms a core variable in this study 
which would have potentially been obscured by the categorisation 
required by a larger ‘n’ study – section 2.4 demonstrated that the 
impacts of austerity policies were localised and contingent on a wide 
range of spatial and historical factors.  Additionally although the findings 
in this study cannot be generalised to a population, they can be 
generalised to theory via the substantiation or modification of the 
propositions (Yin, 1994).  The next part of this chapter will therefore 
examine how far the propositions have been supported by the 
research. 
 
10.3 Summary of research findings  
Chapters 6 to 9 presented research findings in relation to the 
propositions, as set out in table 10.1 below. 
 
Table 10.1 Research findings chapters and focus of analysis 
Chapter Proposition(s) Focus 
6 P1 and P2 Evidence for sustaining frontline service 
delivery and underlying institutions. 
7 P3 Maintenance of partnerships for service 
delivery. 
8 P4 The local exercise of community leadership. 
9 P5 and P6 The type and extent of change in local 
government . 
 
A summary of the findings against each proposition is presented below. 
 
Proposition 1: The range and quality of services available to the 
public has been maintained during the period 2010-2015 
Research to test this proposition sought first to understand the extent of 
cuts to grant funding in Nottingham, before going on to explore how the 
council had managed those cuts.  The analysis drew on published 
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committee reports, medium term financial plans and detailed budget 
documentation, as well as comments made during interviews and 
frontline staff workshops.  To assist in interpreting the data, the study 
utilised a framework published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(Hastings et al., 2013).  Although this framework proved to be 
subjective (limitations are discussed in more detail in section 6.4) it was 
helpful in broadly categorising the strategies in use by the local 
authority. 
  
The total reduction in grant funding was difficult to pin down, due to 
complexity of local government funding mechanisms.  Nottingham City 
Council’s medium term financial plans showed a minimum cash-terms 
reduction of 21.6 per cent of spending power between 2010/11 and 
2015/16.  However revenue spending power only partially reflects cuts 
to government grants, and Nottingham City’s own analysis claimed a 
real-terms spending cut of 50 per cent (Chapman, 2015).    In addition 
ONS data showed that there was a 23 per cent reduction in the 
council’s staff base between 2009 and 2013.  Yet despite these 
considerable retractions in resources, there were relatively few 
examples noted in interviews or the document review of aspects of 
frontline service delivery that had completely ceased.   
 
Instead, detailed analysis of budget documentation found that the 
highest proportion of savings had been  achieved through ‘back office’ 
efficiencies, including strategies such as management delayering, 
corporate re-design, reduced support functions, reduced office space 
and lowering interest payments.  Back office efficiencies delivered 
approximately a third of total savings, totalling nearly £35m between 
2010 and 2016.  Income generation and service redesign were the next 
most important categories, each programmed to deliver around £15 
million (14 per cent) of savings by 2016.   In the context of the JRF 
framework all these initiatives constituted ‘efficiency savings’.  By 
contrast, measures judged to ‘reduce the range of services’ accounted 
for just 5 per cent of overall savings during the period under study.  
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Overall it appeared that the council had been able to maintain some 
continuity in services, sometimes in conjunction with partners.  In 
addition a number of ambitious new capital projects had been 
progressed, including Line 2 of Nottingham Express Transit and a new 
leisure centre at Harvey Hadden.   
 
Although in most cases services had not been entirely deleted, many of 
the efficiency savings represented one-off reductions in costs (such as 
the deletion of vacant posts) which could not be repeated.  It was also 
clear from successive financial plans that certain functions had been 
subject to substantial reductions in budget and were extensively re-
designed to offer a lower volume of service, spread more thinly.  
Examples included neighbourhood-based community development, 
youth services and highways.  There were also reductions in eligibility, 
for instance in relation to access to adult social care, and for assistance 
with buying school uniforms.   In addition there were instances of ‘arms-
length’ retrenchment, where funding ceased to services provided by 
third parties.   
 
The maintenance of service quality was harder to assess, as much data 
on quality had ceased being collected or published since 2010, whilst 
nationally published audited data, such as that relating to adult social 
care, was subject to a time-lag.  There was clear evidence from 
interviews and workshops of increased work-related pressure on 
remaining staff and managers, but the council also published figures 
which showed they had made progress against a majority of the 
council’s priority targets, and that citizen satisfaction levels had 
improved significantly during the period under study.  This data was 
recognised to be a partial and problematic proxy measure, and further 
research, over a longer time-scale would be needed to fully understand 
the effects of funding reductions on service quality, and concomitant 
changes in users’ expectations. 
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Henceforth, in relation to P1 there was evidence to support the 
proposition that the range of council services had been maintained 
since 2010, with a caveat that the existing range of provision appeared 
fragile.  Many of the efficiencies in the period under study consisted of 
one-off cuts or reductions to service volume and eligibility, which would 
prove difficult to repeat without retrenchment.     However it was not 
possible to determine how responses to austerity had affected the 
quality of services, although progress against key indicators in the 
Nottingham Plan and rising levels of citizen satisfaction were noted as 
imperfect proxy measurements. 
 
Proposition 2:  The Council’s institutional rules, practices and 
narratives have been maintained during the period 2010-2015 
Despite the surface-level stability in the range of services available to 
the public, analysis of Nottingham City’s institutions, using Lowndes 
and Roberts (2013) concepts of ‘rules, practices and narratives’ (p.52) 
revealed incremental change in institutional constraints.  For the 
purposes of this analysis Lowndes and Roberts definitions were 
expanded, so that rules were viewed as formally constructed and 
recorded (including law, policy and guidance), whilst practices were 
interpreted broadly to take note of actions taken in response to rules, as 
well as the less formal ‘way we do things round here’ (Lowndes & 
Roberts, 2013 p.51).  Meanwhile narratives included stories, myths and 
explanations.   
 
Applying these definitions, although the council’s explicit ‘rules’ were 
largely maintained (for instance the need to achieve a balanced budget, 
meet statutory requirements and deliver core manifesto policies) there 
was evidence that practices were challenging former ‘rules in use’ 
(Ostrom, 1999 p.38).  Streeck and Thelen’s incremental processes of 
conversion, layering, displacement, drift and exhaustion (Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005 p.31) which were introduced in section 3.5 were 
discernible in the four strategies which made the greatest contribution 
to council savings (workforce management, commercialisation, 
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commissioning and service redesign).  Thus, although the council had a 
stated rule of protecting its workforce, elements of ‘conversion’ could be 
viewed in the gradual attrition of pay, terms and conditions which 
brought the organisation into conflict with the unions, a tentative 
exploration of outsourcing, and the way in which holiday ‘buy back’ 
schemes were re-packaged as a means to deliver efficiency savings as 
well as a staff welfare measure.  Similarly, the ‘layering’ of 
commercialism over existing services – though squarely in line with 
council objectives for some interviewees – represented a distraction or 
‘Trojan horse’ for others.  Meanwhile commissioning was viewed by 
some interviewees as ‘displacing’ the council’s traditional practices with 
alien values, management techniques and language.  Finally some 
aspects of service redesign, for example in relation to certain categories 
of social care, masked ‘drift’ in long held principles, and a sense that 
options for maintaining existing organisational rules had been 
‘exhausted’.  These changes to practices did not in themselves indicate 
completed institutional change, but showed how the ‘fit’ (Lowndes & 
Roberts, 2013 p.134) between rules and practices was being affected 
by financial pressure. 
 
Whilst local narratives asserted that some autonomy could always be 
retained to ensure policies were shaped in a ‘Nottingham way,’ they 
also revealed an ideational contest over the best way to resolve the 
‘dissonance’ between the council’s historic approach and the ‘reality’ of 
austerity. It appeared that managerial and market-driven techniques 
were increasingly being mined for solutions which could achieve the 
ruling Labour group’s policy objectives.  Whilst some interviewees 
viewed the adoption of such approaches as irresistible, given the 
financial context, others expressed disquiet that subtle changes to the 
ideals underpinning service provision could lead to unintended 
consequences.  
 
Therefore in relation to P2, the evidence suggests moderating the 
proposition to recognise that although the council’s institutional rules 
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had been largely maintained in the face of austerity, practices showed 
evidence of challenge to ‘rules in use’ (Ostrom, 1999 p.38) and there 
were contesting narratives about the best approaches to address 
austerity.  Although the formal rules governing service delivery had not 
yet fundamentally changed, the ‘fit’ between rules, practices and 
narratives was weakening, creating the potential for more profound 
institutional change in the future. 
 
Proposition 3: Partnerships for service delivery between the 
Council and other statutory, business and voluntary partners have 
been maintained in the period 2010-2015 
Analysis relating to proposition 3 considered partnerships focussed on 
service delivery from both a new institutionalist and an interpretive 
perspective.  This combined analysis concentrating on the structures of 
local partnership activity, with an exploration of local meanings adhering 
to change, in the context of wider ‘traditions’ of local governance. 
 
Using the new institutionalist perspective, the research found that in 
relation to strategic and elite partnership work (and despite some 
rationalisation of formal partnership bodies since 2010) the ‘rules, 
practices and narratives’ of partnership working had been maintained or 
strengthened.  For example the council had maintained the ‘One 
Nottingham’ strategic partnership as a coordinative body for sharing 
intelligence and mitigating the impacts of cuts.  Interviewees perceived 
an increased openness between city elites, and local politicians had a 
growing involvement in sub-regional bodies, including the local 
economic partnership, a combined authority for Nottinghamshire, and 
chairing the East Midlands local government association.  From an 
institutional point of view partnership working remained intact. 
 
However, taking an interpretive perspective, and focussing more on 
agency, it was clear that some partnership relationships were under 
strain, and this was particularly true of the relationship between the 
local authority and the voluntary and community sector.  In this case, 
283 
 
the introduction of ‘commissioning’ practices by the local authority in 
place of voluntary sector grant funding had created contract-oriented 
relationships, which reportedly resulted in a dynamic of ‘survival of the 
fittest’ or ‘largest’ amongst voluntary sector organisations.  In terms of 
Gardner and Lowndes’ interpretation of local government traditions 
(2015), the council appeared to have moved from a paternalistic, 
collectivist tradition of partnership with the voluntary sector, to a way of 
working which had more in common with market-driven ‘enabling’ 
traditions.  It was unclear whether this was a deliberate political 
decision or simply driven by financial imperative, but the negative 
effects of this change on voluntary sector partners and their workforce 
bore out concerns expressed in relation to proposition 2, that changes 
in the underlying values of the local authority (captured in this analysis 
through traditions) could have wider consequences in the context of 
governance relationships, in this case affecting smaller and less 
financially powerful delivery partners. 
 
Therefore proposition 3 requires modification, to acknowledge that 
although institutions supporting partnerships for service delivery had 
been maintained at an elite level, changing practices were being 
applied to partnerships with less-powerful partners.  This implied a shift 
in the ‘traditions’ of partnership work drawn upon by the council, with 
negative consequences for some suppliers, particularly within the 
voluntary sector. 
 
Proposition 4: Local political representatives continue to exercise 
community leadership and ‘place shaping’ roles  
This proposition analysed the council’s community leadership role with 
reference to Sullivan’s four interpretations of community leadership, as 
‘enabling’ (or place-shaping) leadership; ‘community voice’; a ‘symbolic 
act, and an ‘expedient device’ (2007 p.145).     
 
Considering recent legislative and policy changes made by the 
Coalition government, the research noted that national initiatives such 
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as the creation of combined authorities and local enterprise 
partnerships, supported continuation of a civic ‘enabling’ or place-
shaping interpretation of community leadership, particularly at a sub-
regional level.   
 
By contrast there appeared to be a reduction in the resources and 
opportunities for local authorities to adopt a ‘citizen–voice’ interpretation 
of community leadership.  In relation to the case study locality, the 
research observed that Nottingham City Council was increasingly 
withdrawing from community-facing roles including neighbourhood-level 
partnerships and voluntary sector infrastructure.  As the council drew 
back, there were examples of some voluntary sector and faith-based 
organisations moving into this space, but two mini case studies 
demonstrated how assuming such convening functions could prove 
both costly and problematic for the organisations concerned.   
 
Given that the ‘citizen-voice’ interpretation of community leadership was 
originally advocated as part of the answer to issues of democratic trust 
and legitimacy, this research potentially highlights a future risk of a 
democratic deficit, as the focus of local government’s community 
leadership activity moves to cross-boundary and sub-regional level, 
alongside a central requirement to accept directly-elected Mayors in 
return for devolution.  At the same time, local authorities are being 
forced by budgetary pressures to withdraw from community-facing 
functions that support their ability to elicit and express ‘citizen voice’.  
Possibilities for exercising community leadership as a symbolic act 
were limited by evidence that the City Council was increasingly 
dependent on influence rather than direct action, due to a continuing 
deterioration in their ability to wield ‘hard’ power.  However it was 
unclear whether this effect was particularly acute in Nottingham’s case 
and more research would be required to understand if this finding was 
evident on a wider basis across England. 
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In relation to P4 there is henceforth a need for clarification in the type of 
leadership being referenced in the proposition.  Although it is possible 
to agree that local political representatives continued to exercise a 
strategic ‘enabling’ leadership role on behalf of the city, their ability to 
act as a conduit for ‘citizen voice’ appeared to be diminishing.   
 
Proposition 5: The change processes instigated in response to 
austerity have so far been characterised by incremental change 
rather than ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
This proposition sought to understand the processes of change, as 
distinct from the outcomes or extent of change (which are examined 
further in proposition 6). It contrasted a  ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
concept of change whereby change occurs in earthquake like shifts 
(Jones et al., 2009), with more incremental adjustment (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010).   In analysing the evidence, the argument looked first at 
the nature of national change processes, before considering the local 
manifestations in Nottingham’s case.  The research found that a strong 
argument could be made for viewing the emergency budget and 
Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 as a financial policy 
punctuation, but that Nottingham City Council had been able to mitigate 
its effects so that they impacted as incremental change at the level of 
frontline services.  However, it was unclear how long that mitigation 
could be sustained. 
 
Utilising Pierson’s (2004 p.143-153) ideas on institutional resilience, the 
research noted that the council’s particular institutional context - 
including its longstanding political commitment to retaining services in-
house; its economic power as a core city; and its extensive asset base - 
had provided a number of advantages in terms of maintaining 
resilience.  Yet the basis of this resilience was also steadily being 
eroded, in terms of the council’s ability to choose the extent and form of 
local co-ordination it offered (for instance around aspects of community 
leadership), its ability to mitigate central government decisions as a 
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result of continuing financial pressure, and its ability to maintain and 
defend its asset base.   
 
This effect was being compounded at the level of individual agency.  
Analysis considering the roles of different types of change agent 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) (see section 3.5 for more details) showed 
how strategies championed by ‘insurrectionaries’ and ‘subversives’ 
which were focussed on the defence and maintenance of institutions 
were increasingly being challenged by novel and revisionist proposals 
from ‘symbionts’ and ‘opportunists’.   
 
Therefore, although it was possible to agree with the P5 that change 
processes had so far been characterised by incremental adjustment, it 
seemed likely that the mitigating responses employed to date might be 
temporary in their effects.  In Baumgartner and Jones’s terms, the 
factors creating institutional friction (or ‘stick’) were being eroded, whilst 
the pressures promoting institutional ‘slip’ continued to build (Jones et 
al., 2009 p.864).  Although change to date had been incremental, 
potentially the foundations were being laid for more radical instances of 
institutional change in the future. 
 
Proposition 6: Austerity policies have so far been delivered with 
minimal (first order) change to local governance and systems 
The final proposition attempts to make a cautious and interim 
judgement on how far institutional reform had progressed to date.  
Using Hall’s (1993) concept of paradigmatic change in policy-making 
(see section 3.5 for further explanation), the research finds clear 
evidence for first order and some second order change in the ‘settings’ 
and ‘instruments’ of local governance in Nottingham.  In regard to first 
order change or alterations to the ‘settings on the instruments’ of 
governance, it was demonstrated in section 6.4 that substantial budget 
and staffing reductions have occurred and service volumes had 
decreased, particularly in relation to community development, youth 
and play, and highways.  First order changes were also occurring 
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through reductions in the contract value of commissioned services, 
such as early intervention projects to prevent homelessness. 
 
Second order changes to policy instruments were at an earlier stage, 
and from some perspectives there appeared to be surprisingly little 
change to formal institutional arrangements for local government and 
other statutory agencies, (at least one partner felt that public sector 
integration could go much further) (Interview, 2014x).  Local evidence 
for change was nonetheless discernible in shared service 
arrangements, shared management arrangements for neighbourhood 
working with the police, and the initiation of a Nottinghamshire 
combined authority, as well as nationally inspired initiatives such as the 
transfer of public health funding to the local authority in 2013.  It was 
also apparent from analysis against proposition P4 that the local 
authority was starting to withdraw from elements of its community 
leadership function, allowing voluntary sector organisations to explore 
this role. 
 
Regarding third order change to policy goals, the local context and 
theoretically informed assumption suggested that Nottingham should 
not have experienced this type of change, particularly given its history 
as a solid Labour authority with remarkably consistent leadership over 
the past 25 years.  Nonetheless the evidence of chapter 6 for 
incremental change in the discursive institutions of the council, coupled 
with that in chapter 7, for a shift in the partnership traditions, suggested 
that financial pressure could be compromising the third order goals of 
the organisation, as it forced political compromise and narrowing 
expectations of what the local state could achieve.  Linking back to P5, 
although this change process had been incremental rather than 
punctuated, the outcomes had the potential to be transformative in their 
longer-term effects.  
 
Proposition P6 should therefore be rejected, as there is evidence for 
second and possibly third order change in local governance and 
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systems. Given that this analysis comes at a time when further austerity 
measures are expected in the forthcoming autumn 2015 
Comprehensive Spending Review, it would be reasonable to expect 
that change to be extended and deepened in the next five years. 
 
To summarise the relationship of these findings to the research 
question, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions in response to 
the research question ‘how have local public services responded to 
austerity’.  In Nottingham’s case the local authority had maintained the 
range of services by deploying a wide range of creative mitigating 
actions and strategies, but it is important to underline that a high 
proportion of cuts in the period 2010-2015 had represented one-off 
savings, which could not be repeated.  There was also evidence that 
service volumes and eligibility were being eroded, and the existing 
range of services appeared fragile. Although politicians and officers 
were continually exploring ideas and solutions from different governing 
traditions, these sometimes compromised local political principles and 
values.   
 
Meanwhile the council was acting to mitigate service delivery issues 
arising from austerity through strategic level partnership activity, but 
smaller and less powerful partners in commissioning arrangements, 
particularly in the voluntary and community sector, were suffering under 
a more competitive, contract led environment.  The local authority had 
also pursued emerging civic leadership opportunities as part of their 
community leadership role, but as sub-regional activity claimed 
increasing policy attention, links at a community and neighbourhood 
level were being eroded.  
 
Whilst these responses combined to slow the rate of change from a 
rapid (punctuated) financial change to an incremental adjustment at the 
front-line, there was evidence that the institutional resilience of the local 
authority was steadily being diminished, and that surface-level stability 
belied significant changes to the local ‘settings’ and ‘instruments’ of 
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local governance.  The findings suggest that a further five years of 
austerity could fundamentally revise both the local public service 
landscape and its central goals and objectives.  
 
10.4 Local findings and the wider research 
context 
The strength of these findings lies in the nuanced and context-specific 
representation of local responses to austerity, which pays attention to 
traditions, institutional form, meaning and the scope for both 
organisational and individual agency.  In taking this approach the study 
builds on arguments that the effects of austerity are unequally 
distributed and locally specific (Hastings et al., 2012; Peck, 2012), 
highlighting that responses to austerity are also contingent on 
responses specific to people and place.   However the limitations of this 
research also lie in its relatively narrow scope, and for that reason this 
discussion now turns to the fit between these findings and other 
recently published studies. 
 
Since 2012, when this research commenced, several significant studies 
have contributed to our understanding of austerity within English public 
service organisations. Intersections between the findings from 
Nottingham and this literature are summarised with reference to the 
revised propositions in Table 10.2 below. 
 
In relation to Proposition P1, Fitzgerald & Lupton (2015) echoed 
findings in Nottingham, reporting that three London boroughs were 
managing to balance budgets without major losses of frontline services 
(p.590) though, as in Nottingham’s case, it questioned their ‘remaining 
capacity’ to continue doing so (p.598).  Whilst the examples of creativity 
noted by Lowndes & McCaughie (2013) and  Lowndes & Squires 
(2012) (see section 2.4) were evident in the diverse responses 
developed by the Nottingham City Council and its partners to address 
austerity, the main body of measures used to absorb the spending cuts 
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in Nottingham showed consistency with those identified within the 
national comparative studies of the Audit Commission (2013) as well as 
findings from the Joseph Rowntree foundation  (Hastings, Bailey, 
Bramley, et al., 2015; Hastings et al., 2013).  These reports showed 
that the majority of savings made by councils to date have been 
achieved through ‘back office’ efficiencies including one-off staffing 
reductions.  Both studies warn that such savings will be difficult to 
repeat. 
 
With regard to service quality, the NAO (2014b p.33) notes a national 
reduction in the volumes of social care, echoing the observations made 
about reduced service volumes in Nottingham.  However, the NAO’s 
comparative study is unable to state at this point whether there has 
been an impact on service quality, making this area ripe for future 
research.  
Proposition P2 constituted a relatively novel piece of analysis showing 
how austerity was leading to subtle changes in practice and contested 
narratives.  Although this model of new institutional analysis has not, to 
this author’s knowledge, been deployed in a similar area of enquiry, 
shifts in narrative are explored further in Gardner and Lowndes (2015), 
which considers how the mobilisation of different local government 
traditions is creating fresh discursive resources, leading to novel and 
hybrid responses to austerity. 
 
291 
 
Table 10.2  Revised propositions and findings from wider research 
Revised propositions Findings from wider research 
P1) The range of services has been 
maintained – albeit in a fragile state – 
but it is too early to measure impacts 
on quality 
Fitzgerald & Lupton (2015) found that London boroughs were managing to balance budgets 
without major losses of frontline services (p.590), but questioned ‘remaining capacity’ 
(p.598). 
The Audit Commission (2013) and (Hastings et al., 2013) both drew attention to short-term 
savings strategies and back office ‘efficiencies’. 
NAO (2014b p.33) found that service volumes had dropped although they noted that 
judgements could not be made on service quality.  
 
P2) Outward maintenance of 
institutional rules masks subtle 
changes in practices and contesting 
narratives 
 
Gardner & Lowndes (2015) discuss changes in ‘traditions’ underpinning commercialisation 
and commissioning. 
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P3) Institutions of partnership work 
have been maintained at an elite 
level, but traditions of partnership 
work are changing. 
Meegan, Kennett, Jones, & Croft, (2014 p.138-9) highlight knock-on effect of cuts on ‘para 
state’ VCS services. 
Clayton, Donovan, & Merchant (2015 p.26) report that public sector provision through 3rd 
sector is in ‘survival mode’. 
Milbourne & Murray, (2014) argue that smaller VCS organisations are under greater stress. 
Fitzgerald & Lupton, (2015, p.596) note that pressure to drive down costs of procured 
services is also driving down wages.  
Newman (2013) sees local authorities as sites of conflicting discourse, or ‘landscapes of 
antagonism’. 
 
P4) Civic leadership has been 
maintained but community voice is 
diminishing 
Fitzgerald & Lupton, (2015) find evidence for broader civic engagement (p.595). 
Donald, Glasmeier, Gray, & Lobao warn of 'giving away of democratic process' (2014 p.11). 
Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., (2015 p.617) report a process of ‘citizen responsibilisation’. 
 
P5) Processes of change have been Fitzgerald & Lupton, (2015) suggest that resilience may be a ‘cloak of optimism’ which 
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incremental rather than punctuated, 
but mitigation may be a temporary 
effect 
 
underestimates impacts on users and remaining capacity. 
P6) There is evidence of second and 
third order change in local 
governance and systems 
 
Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., (2015 p.614) report a ‘rescaling’ of the state  
Kennett et al. (2015) discuss the ‘risk shift’ to localities and populations 
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Meanwhile a broad and growing range of studies (e.g. Clayton et al., 
2015; Meegan et al., 2014; Milbourne & Murray, 2014) concur with 
findings in proposition P3 that third-sector organisations are 
experiencing considerable financial stress as a result of austerity-
related policies.  Fitzgerald & Lupton, (2015, p.596) echo the 
suggestion emerging from research in Nottingham that sharper 
procurement practice was driving down wages in the sector.  These 
findings also chime with Janet Newman’s ideas that local authorities 
can act as sites of conflicting discourse, or ‘landscapes of antagonism’ 
as they implement the enabling and managerial instruments of a neo-
liberal agenda (Newman, 2013).  
Several findings in relation to proposition P4 are also supported by 
recent research, although this nuanced topic would benefit from further 
exploration.  Fitzgerald & Lupton find evidence for a broader civic 
engagement in a search for new solutions and opportunities (2015 
p.595), but  Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., (2015) also report a 
process of ‘citizen responsibilisation’, whereby communities and the 
voluntary sector are called upon to shoulder risks formerly borne by the 
state (see also Kennett et al., 2015).  The suggestion that councils may 
be withdrawing from local communities also connects with Gerry 
Stoker’s (2011) argument that community governance may not be a 
role that is sustainable for local government over the longer term.  As 
austerity progresses, the ‘hard power’ possessed by councils is eroded, 
whilst ‘soft power’ may also be diminishing, if, as suggested in this 
study, councils start to withdraw from the convening functions which 
previously strengthened their connection with communities.   
Issues of democratic engagement and legitimacy are also picked up by 
Donald, Glasmeier, Gray, & Lobao, who warn that austerity leads to a  
'giving away of democratic process' (2014 p.11).  Although councillors’ 
status as elected representatives continues to confer a degree of 
political legitimacy, a trend towards declining party membership, 
(Mcguinness, 2012) (with the exception of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour 
leadership campaign) as well as low local election turnouts, continues 
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to undermine the representativeness of their role.  Copus (2015) has 
recently noted that councillors require time, resources, advice and 
support to shape the local policy networks that are required to perform 
a community leadership function.  Given the context of austerity, which 
contributes to increasingly straightened training budgets and reduction 
in resources wielded by capacity-building bodies such as the Local 
Government Association, it is far from clear that such infrastructure is 
available.    
Proposition P5 speaks into the debate about the processes of change 
and resilience within local authorities, arguing that in Nottingham’s case 
the council was able to mitigate a punctuated financial change into an 
incremental change to services, but that the sources of resilience 
underpinning that mitigation may be eroding.   Fitzgerald & Lupton's 
(2015) study supports this latter point, suggesting that there are limits to 
resilience and the term may be a ‘cloak of optimism’ (p.583) which 
underestimates impacts on users and overstates remaining capacity to 
achieve savings.   
Finally, with regard to the outcomes of change for local governance 
systems (proposition P6) Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al. (2015 p.614) 
report a ‘rescaling’ of the state (consistent with Hall’s (1993) concept of 
first and second order change), whilst Kennett et al. (2015) describe a 
‘great risk shift’ to localities and populations which is arguably, in Hall’s 
terms, a ‘third-order’ shift in the goals of the welfare state.   Despite the 
outward stability of local government, there is henceforth some broader 
consensus that the pressures of austerity could be leading towards 
fundamental transformation. 
More widely the argument developed throughout the thesis as a whole 
aligns with historical institutionalist arguments (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005b) that institutions can act to mitigate 
exogenous shock, but emphasises that although effects of that shock 
may be (at least temporarily) offset, the incremental changes occurring 
in its wake still have potential to be transformative over the longer term. 
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10.5 Policy implications 
The unexpected outright victory of the Conservative party in the general 
election of May 2015 has set a trajectory for further radical public 
spending cuts and continued pressure on local government finances.  
In a general sense, the government’s ‘new fiscal mandate’ to run a 
surplus on public sector net borrowing, and for public sector net debt to 
fall as a share of GDP in each year from 2015/16 to 2019/20, will 
ensure that the size of the state continues to reduce in the next five 
years (Osborne, 2015a).  The Comprehensive Spending Review of 
November 2015 published an intention to reduce DCLG’s central 
funding for local government by a further 56% (HM Treasury, 2015b 
p.78) although (predictably) there were multiple creative figures applied 
to calculations of local authorities’ overall spending power, with the 
government claiming that - when local tax-raising powers were included 
- the reduction would amount to just 6.7%.  In addition, budget 
pressures at a local level will continue to increase.  The Chancellor’s 
summer 2015 announcement of a reduction of 1 per cent in English 
social rents (Osborne, 2015a) transfers £2.5bn of income from social 
housing providers, including many local authorities, back to the 
exchequer via savings in Housing Benefit (Hood, 2015).  The planned 
increase in the minimum wage to the ‘national living wage’ will also 
have a knock-on impact for councils, particularly regarding the costs of 
social care (Jameson, 2015).  Higher paid public sector staff will 
continue to face increased pressures with pay rises limited to 1 per cent 
until 2019 (HM Treasury, 2015c). 
 
Meanwhile, in the context of ever greater political differences between 
the nations of the United Kingdom, there are increasing calls for greater 
devolution to English Local Authorities.  Greater Manchester is currently 
in the vanguard of an experiment dubbed the ‘Northern Powerhouse’, 
which provides for a sub-regional combined authority whereby a 
powerful ‘metro mayor’ will manage significant new income streams and 
297 
 
administer a higher proportion of public spending.  The government has 
begun to extend the approach, initially to other cities, and more recently 
to other types of combined authority. What then are the policy 
implications of this research in relation to this challenging and rapidly 
changing environment? 
 
From central government’s perspective, this study adds to a growing 
body of evidence that the volume of cuts required by the government 
will be difficult to achieve within the current institutional landscape.  
Whilst the bulk of previous savings have been delivered through 
‘efficiencies’, they are proving harder to find.  Social care, in particular is 
beginning to resemble a source of ‘anomaly’ in relation to strains on the 
existing governance framework, where breakdown could quickly lead to 
rapid increase in policy attention.  This has been acknowledged in the 
press (Brindle, 2015; Municipal Journal, 2015b) and is implicit in the 
commitment within the Comprehensive Spending Review of November 
2015 to allow councils to add a 2% social care precept to council tax 
(HM Treasury, 2015b p.3). 
 
One likely source of future savings, drawing on this research, is further 
‘second order change’, involving mergers between councils, police and 
fire authorities, further education and the health service.  Whilst this will 
release some ‘efficiencies’, the resulting patchwork of different 
governance solutions (which will also be subject to differentiation in the 
extent to which they have been affected by austerity) will prove 
increasingly difficult to steer from a national level. 
 
In this context, from a central perspective, devolution provides a policy 
instrument with which to deal with the emerging complexity of the local 
public service landscape, obfuscate the extent of further public 
spending cuts (through cuts in complex devolved budgets) and to 
displace any political consequences occurring from retrenchment at the 
local level.  Yet despite the discourse of a ‘devolution revolution’ 
298 
 
(Osborne, 2015b) the Conservative government appears reticent about 
pursuing further ‘localism’.   
 
The devolution currently being promoted is focussed at a sub-regional 
level, with an emphasis on economic development, which – at least in 
the short term – is unlikely to provide local relief to the pressures of 
austerity (Donald et al., 2014; Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015 
p.616).  Though there have been recent adjustments in local tax raising 
powers, including the aforementioned social  care precept (HM 
Treasury, 2015b p.3) and a degree of control over business rates, 
announced in October 2015 (Osborne, 2015b), these are still tightly 
constrained within given limits. The government has also announced 
intentions to assume greater powers to intervene in local planning 
decisions (BBC News, 2015). 
 
Central and local government policymakers therefore face something of 
a dilemma.  There are clear advantages in devolution for both central 
and local government, but only under certain conditions.  If central 
government makes a partial devolution settlement, but retains control 
over local finances, it risks being held accountable for local service 
failures in an increasingly complex service delivery environment.  
Conversely, if more devolution is granted to local authorities, then 
councils must deal with new levels of responsibility and risk: greater 
fiscal autonomy and the capacity to borrow has not protected councils 
in the United States from financial failure (Peck, 2012).  Henceforth the 
devolution and responsibility settlement between central and local 
government is likely to need a great deal more negotiation and 
clarification.  This would arguably be best achieved within the context of 
a new national constitutional settlement, a topic which has been 
promoted on a cross party basis in Parliament for some time (House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2013). 
 
Returning to the issue of financial pressure, these research findings 
show that it is likely to get harder for councils – especially those in 
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opposition to the government – to protect core political values and non-
statutory services.  This situation is particularly acute for unitary and 
county councils with social services responsibilities; districts, although 
smaller, are already focussed on discretionary services and can 
therefore retain some political choice albeit over shrinking resource and 
within a complex political environment of collaboration.  Immense 
creativity has been deployed in sustaining services to date, and 
councils have developed many fresh sources of income generation, 
including commercialisation and applying to alternative funding bodies 
such as the National Lottery.  However, whilst such income raising 
measures have been effective in the short term they are also more 
vulnerable to change than an established funding stream.  If the current 
trajectory of spending cuts continues the capacity for local political 
choice will be further reduced and funding for local services will become 
more precarious.   
 
Whilst opportunities for civic leadership remain, this research suggests 
that leadership may be increasingly influence-led rather than resource-
based.  A significant aspect of councillors’ influence relates to the 
democratic mandate (Copus, 2015) and if local authorities wish to 
maintain this status (in the context of shrinking resources) attention will 
inevitably turn again to democratic renewal.  This study showed that at 
a community level reduced funding for initiatives including 
neighbourhood regeneration, local partnership working, and community 
development were combining to draw the council away from its 
community and neighbourhood facing roles.  At the same time the 
concentration of power in the political executive, likely to be 
exacerbated by plans for combined authorities and Whitehall-imposed 
directly elected mayors, is steadily focussing power and energy at a 
sub-regional level.  New solutions are needed to address the long-
standing issue of local democratic deficit.  A policy debate in this 
respect could form part of a wider reappraisal of the role of local 
government in post-austerity England. 
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At the level of civil society, this study offers a reminder that the effects 
of spending cuts stretch well beyond councils, with negative impacts for 
the wider economy, including smaller suppliers and voluntary and 
community sector organisations.  In a context of commissioning, the 
fate of the public, private and voluntary sector is increasingly 
intertwined, and central and local government policymakers will need to 
balance requirements and mechanisms for spending cuts with the 
health and diversity of local small businesses and voluntary services. 
 
Finally this study supports the contention that communities and 
individuals will increasingly find they bear responsibility for providing 
their own solutions to problems the state previously sought to solve 
(Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 2015).  For some of the people 
interviewed in this study this was perceived as a timely rebalancing 
(Interview, 2014y; Workshop, 2014b), for others a policy likely to lead to 
rising inequalities (Interview, 2014b).  Policy-makers of the future will 
need to take account of where this approach has succeeded, and 
where it has failed. 
 
 
10.6  Theoretical, empirical and 
methodological contributions 
This thesis employed a theoretical framework which drew strongly on 
new institutionalism for its understanding of stability and change in local 
governance, particularly Lowndes and Robert’s (2013) concept of 
institutionalism as the interplay of ‘rules, practices and narratives’, and 
Hall’s idea of policy paradigms as a means of analysing the extent of 
change.  New Institutionalist theories provided a means to identify the 
subtle changes occurring at a material and discursive level within 
institutions of local governance.  The original theoretical contribution of 
the thesis was to combine the insights which this theory offered in 
uncovering the process and extent of structural change, with 
interpretive theories which were essential in understanding the local 
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meanings (and related ideational and discursive contests) of austerity.  
This position resonates with Gains’ call for a ‘constructivist modern 
empiricism’, which recognises that actors interpret meaning within 
structural contexts (Gains, 2011) and brings a fresh perspective by 
arguing that the significance of institutional change can only be fully 
recognised within the context of local traditions and actors 
interpretations of meaning.  Interpretivist theory, particularly Bevir and 
Rhodes’s concepts of government traditions, provided additional 
insights into the historical and political aspects of austerity, assisting in 
explaining why certain courses of action appeared ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to 
different actors, and surfacing beliefs and narratives about what (and 
who) the local state was for. Meanwhile the actor-centric theories of 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) added further dimensions to the analysis, 
by exploring who could exercise agency and in what circumstances.  
This combinative approach has been vital in understanding the local 
significance of outwardly-subtle institutional shifts.   
 
The application of this novel theoretical approach to an empirical case 
also represents an important element of my empirical contribution. The 
findings broadly bear out historical institutionalist theories of change, 
showing that a significant exogenous change can be moderated by 
institutions, although in this case it was uncertain whether such 
moderation could persist over the longer term.  However it was also 
clear that incremental change still had the potential to be 
transformative, a point illustrated through examples of conflicting 
discourses, shifting traditions, and alterations to the institutional 
landscape categorised by reference to Hall’s concepts of first, second 
and third-order change (Hall, 1993).   
 
From a practice perspective, this research makes a further empirical 
contribution through creating a more holistic understanding of how 
responses to austerity are affecting the local governance framework, 
considering not just the service delivery function of councils but also 
their responsibilities as convenors of partnerships for service  delivery, 
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and their community leadership role.  This is an important extension of 
studies undertaken to date, as these governance roles are viewed as 
core to local authorities role and purpose, yet have received relatively 
little attention in literature examining the effects of the spending cuts.  
The case study underlines that in a context where local authorities are 
acting as commissioners, financial strain on a local authority can lead to 
changes in practice which have broader negative effects on local 
service suppliers, particularly the voluntary sector.  Equally, within this 
case study it appears that austerity was starting to impact upon the 
council’s ability to perform certain interpretations of the local community 
leadership role, particularly at the neighbourhood level.  These findings 
provide us with a fuller picture of the composite effects of austerity than 
service-focussed analyses. 
 
From a methodological point of view, this research was innovative in 
experimenting with the idea of using asset based theories, particularly 
appreciative inquiry, to try and prevent the process of research 
impacting negatively on organisations that were already under 
considerable stress.  This distinctive methodological stance was 
formulated within a collaborative, action research approach, which 
aimed to deliver beneficial outputs to participating research partners as 
well rigorous academic findings.   
 
In practice there were both opportunities and challenges in this 
approach.  On the positive side, the collaborative approach was 
extremely helpful in opening access to the council, and identifying and 
agreeing the core research question.  This was achieved by embedding 
the researcher with the council’s policy team, and spending a day a 
week for several months in participant observation and informal 
consultation.  Appreciative enquiry also provided a useful way of 
building trust with individual interviewees, and of eliciting positive 
stories of creativity and hope.  Such examples were well-received as 
part of an initial fieldwork report, offering an assessment of 
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organisational ‘strengths’ in the context of austerity, which could 
potentially assist the council in balancing the challenges it faced.    
 
However, whilst this tool proved a useful counterweight to this 
researcher’s preconceptions about the (likely) negative effects of 
austerity, it felt insensitive and critically naïve to pursue a pure and 
relentless focus on positivity in the context of a political enquiry about 
austerity.  A decision was therefore taken to moderate the application of 
appreciative techniques with some more critical questions, diluting the 
ethos of the approach.  In one sense this was a compromise, reflecting 
a problematic tension between method and context, which might have 
been anticipated.  Yet despite these problems there would be benefits 
in experimenting further with the combination of academic enquiry and 
asset-based methodologies in the future, particularly given that 
sensitivity to the balance of power and ratio of benefit between 
researcher and researched is core to the principals of action research.   
 
From a more negative perspective, there were undoubtedly challenges 
in using action research for a PhD thesis.  For the researcher it was an 
uncomfortable position, being neither fully independent and objective, 
or a local government colleague who could claim ‘we are all in it 
together’.  There was a tension between the relatively short term needs 
and pressures of the council, and much longer timescales of academic 
research, which meant that there were periods when both the council’s 
representatives and the researcher were unclear on their obligations to 
each-other.  The reductions in council personnel impacted in a very 
practical way when three of the project’s most senior sponsors left the 
organisation before the project was complete, resulting in a renewed 
need to justify the contribution of the research to senior stakeholders.  
Although fieldwork summaries were widely shared and discussed with 
all interviewees, the time pressure on council staff has meant that there 
has been less collaboration in producing more theoretically-informed 
academic outputs.   
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These experiences have resulted in learning on both sides, which will 
continue as the findings from this research are shared and built upon in 
the future.  Nonetheless, to re-iterate the point made above, although 
action research can be uncomfortable, it would be counter-intuitive to 
create studies of the local effects of austerity which were not in some 
sense in dialogue with the experiences of local actors and practitioners, 
and thus there is merit in persevering with the approach.  Once a 
research relationship is created, there is an obligation on the part of the 
researcher towards investing in and sustaining that relationship, even if 
the only contribution you have to offer is an unwelcome opinion.  
Through such dialogue, a better understanding is eventually attained by 
all participants, and in a context of austerity, where research resources 
are limited, all perspectives are valuable in building a richer picture of 
the policy environment.  The original methodological contribution was 
therefore to experiment with asset-based research methodologies that 
balanced the organisational needs of the researched organisation with 
the academic requirements of doctoral study.  Whilst the chosen 
solution was imperfect, this quest merits further attention. 
 
 
10.7  Future research 
There is a rich agenda for future research which can build on the 
modest contribution made by this study.  In particular there is an urgent 
need for research which can chart the longer-term impacts of austerity 
across a wider geographical and institutional canvas, as the new 
Conservative government enacts a further £12 billion of planned 
spending cuts, many of which will impact on local government and its 
governance partners at a local level.   
 
One way of fulfilling this goal would be to undertake broader 
comparative studies to test the revised propositions outlined above, 
drawing upon a sample of local authorities representing differing local 
historical economic and political contexts.  The findings of this research 
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suggest a focus on three distinct areas: the institutional changes 
occurring within local governance as a result of continued austerity; 
links between institutional change and the experience / impacts for 
service users; and the way in which austerity is influencing the values 
and traditions underpinning local governance and civil society.   
 
In relation to the institutional changes occurring to local governance, 
the current point in time, at the beginning of a new five year 
Comprehensive Spending Review period, provides an ideal moment to 
start monitoring whether existing governance institutions can continue 
to function in their current form throughout a further five years of 
spending cuts, or whether there are indeed ‘limits to resilience’, 
(Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015) which will force institutional change.  In 
particular, it would be helpful to draw comparisons between localities 
from rural and urban areas, to look at the differing experiences of single 
tier and two-tier local authorities, and to examine how austerity is 
affecting areas at the core and periphery of local economic growth.  
Much work on austerity to date has understandably focussed on the 
experience in cities, but if (as some commentators suggest) this is a 
pivotal moment for English local government (Bailey et al., 2015 p.579), 
a broader range of settings must be examined.  In designing such a 
study some of the depth of this research would need to be sacrificed.  
Nonetheless, by utilising learning from previous studies, and 
maintaining a strong focus on surfacing ‘rules, practices and narratives’ 
through document review and interviews in order to detect subtle 
instances of change, useful inferences about the nature, scale and 
pace of change could be drawn for the sector as a whole. 
 
It is also essential that researchers find new ways of understanding how 
service quality has been affected by changes to governance 
institutions, and the related impacts on users.  Definitive evidence on 
this issue has so-far proved elusive, not just for this study but also for 
national-level organisations such as the National Audit Office.   
However, comparative quantitative performance data (for those 
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services still publishing audited data, such as social services) will 
become more readily available in the next five years.  There will also be 
rich possibilities for working alongside practitioners and service 
advocates in a continuation of an action-research approach, possibly 
combining survey approaches with focus groups and interviews to 
understand how service redesign has impacted in practice, and how 
lives have been affected by that change.   
 
This research also raises important questions about how austerity may 
be influencing the values and traditions underpinning local governance 
and its wider implications for the voluntary and community sector and 
civil society.  The interesting finding that some voluntary organisations 
were beginning to step into local convening roles, as the local authority 
withdrew from community-level services, suggests questions exploring 
how the voluntary and community sector is attempting to compensate 
for the withdrawal of the state, and examining the power dynamics 
created by adopting such roles.  If voluntary sector bodies act as 
convenors, what does this mean for their relationship with statutory 
bodies and other funders? In this case, a comparative qualitative and 
interpretive analysis could examine how spending cuts in different types 
of locality (varied for example according to geography, urban or rural 
setting, political control, and level of deprivation) are affecting the 
relationship between the local state and civil society, including evidence 
for the responsibilisation of citizens (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, et al., 
2015) a critical analysis of which organisations are losing (or gaining) 
power and influence; and exploring the implications for social action, 
community leadership and democratic engagement.  Again such 
research might be co-produced working alongside existing voluntary 
sector infrastructure organisations, as well as local authorities 
interested in understanding the broader effects of spending cuts. 
 
In all these studies there would also be merit, from a methodological 
perspective, in exploring further the potential for using asset-based 
methodologies to capture some of the new approaches emerging from 
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austerity.  Whilst there is much in existing policy towards local 
governance institutions that could (and should) be challenged, it seems 
certain that actors at a local level will continue to exploit every available 
opportunity to enact change.  Research outputs need to be accessible 
and widely disseminated, and the academy should continue to engage 
with those affected by the spending cuts, as well as activists and media, 
to ensure that discourses on austerity are not controlled by those with a 
clear interest in minimising the reporting of adverse effects.  At the 
same time researchers need to be alive to the power of local ingenuity 
as a rich source of creativity and ideas.  It is vital that future research, in 
addition to protesting what has been lost, retains space and an open 
mind to celebrate fresh possibilities and opportunities for future 
development, working alongside practitioners, partners and service 
users as co-researchers. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: How are local public services 
responding to austerity?  Information for 
interview participants  
Background 
These interviews are part of a doctoral research study looking at how 
public services in Nottingham have responded to budget cuts 
introduced by the Coalition Government since 2010.    
 
The aims of this research include: 
 Challenging a national-level narrative that suggests cuts to public 
service expenditure have made little or no difference on the 
ground; 
 Understanding more about the factors that have helped to 
maintain local services during the past 4 years; 
 Exploring the opportunities for local service providers to exercise 
community leadership, despite regulatory and financial constraints. 
 
Approach to the interviews 
Interviews will be conducted in private at a time convenient to the 
interviewee.  Notes will be taken and interviews will be recorded to 
assist the researcher with accurate recall of the details, but any 
information provided will be used anonymously in the final research 
report unless the interviewee has given express permission to use 
attributable quotations.  
 
Issues that will be covered include: 
 Changes for you and your organisation during the past 4 years 
 Your contributions to, and expectations from, partnership 
working in Nottingham 
 The local impacts of austerity policies 
 The role and functions of strategic partnerships 
 Opportunities for the future 
 
Important information for participants 
Participation in the study is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time 
through writing to the researcher, Alison Gardner at the email address 
below or by contacting the School of Politics and International Relations 
at the University of Nottingham. 
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Results from the research will be summarised in a report which will be 
shared with participants and Nottingham City Council managers (NCC 
have been collaborative partners in designing the research).  However, 
care will be taken to ensure that any comments made are non-
attributable in all research outputs. 
 
Results from the research will also be used in my PhD thesis and may 
be drawn upon in contributing to the wider academic and policy debate 
on the effects of austerity. 
 
If you would like more information, please contact: 
Alison Gardner 
PhD Research Candidate Tel: 07910 983818 
Email:  NCC: alison.gardner@nottinghamcity.gov.uk  University: 
ldxag9@nottingham.ac.uk  
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Appendix 2: Consent to participate in 
research on responses to austerity in 
Nottingham  
The University of Nottingham attaches a high priority to the ethical 
conduct of research.  Please complete and sign this form to confirm that 
you are happy to participate in the study. 
 
Name: 
Position: 
Organisation: 
 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
 I have been provided with information about this research project 
and have been given the opportunity to ask any questions needed 
for clarification. 
 I have voluntarily agreed to participate and understand that I can 
withdraw from the project at any time through a written request to 
Alison Gardner or the School of Politics and International Relations 
at the University of Nottingham. 
 I understand that interviews will be recorded, but that any 
information provided will be anonymised in the final research report 
unless I have provided express permission to use attributable 
quotations.  
 
 Alison has outlined how the research will be used and disseminated. 
  
Signature: 
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Appendix 3: Responding to austerity: a 
summary of fieldwork findings  
During the spring and summer of 2014 a piece of research was carried 
out to explore how local public services were responding to the 
Coalition government’s austerity policies.  The research focussed 
principally on Nottingham City Council, examining how a range of 
stakeholders, including elected members, staff, and partner 
organisations, perceived the effects of austerity on the Council’s 
services, partnership work, and its wider ‘community leadership’ role.  
The work was funded through a collaborative studentship placement 
provided by the University of Nottingham, with a contribution from 
Nottingham City Council. 
 
Summary 
 Nottingham’s funding 
reductions were relatively 
severe and compounded by 
social and economic factors 
 
 The Council has evolved a 
wide variety of creative 
strategies to meet the annual 
budget gap, and had been 
able to partially mitigate the 
impact of austerity-related 
cuts.   
 
 Over the past four years the 
Council has lost a lower 
percentage of posts than 
cities in similar 
circumstances 
 
 At the same time, levels of 
citizen satisfaction have 
increased, both with the 
Council and the City as a 
place to live.  
 
 Whilst partnerships were 
generally surviving the cuts, 
a number of interviewees 
expressed concerns about 
the longer-term implications 
of new commissioning 
arrangements, particularly 
for the voluntary and 
community sector. 
 
 Most interviewees continued 
to see a strong civic 
leadership role for the 
council, but there was 
debate about how far 
communities could or should  
‘step up’ as the Council 
gradually withdraws from a 
range of community-based 
roles. 
Local authority responses to 
austerity 
The council has taken a 
conscious approach of seeking 
to ‘manage within the cuts’ but 
has attempted to mitigate the 
effects, for example by working 
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closely with the advice sector.  
Some interviewees praised the 
Council’s determination to 
shape the way cuts were 
applied, and respondents 
described examples of 
increased efficiency and new 
ways of working, including the 
adoption of a more commercial 
approach to service provision 
and the promotion of ‘municipal 
enterprise’. 
There were, however, a range 
of opinions on how radical the 
council and its partners should 
be in adapting their 
organisations to the changed 
financial climate, with some 
respondents believing local 
public services should explore 
more fundamental models of 
change and rationalisation.  
Concerns included the long-
term effects of some short-term 
savings measures, (such as 
cuts to ‘floating support’ 
services intended to prevent 
homelessness), pressures on 
staff in a context of continuous 
change; and a perceived 
increase in the requirement for 
targets and monitoring 
information, particularly at the 
front line. 
Partnership responses to 
austerity 
Despite severe funding 
pressures, relationships 
between the Council and key 
partners have been resilient.  
There is a shared commitment 
to the Nottingham plan, and 
respondents identified examples 
of productive joint working.   
There was also a recognition 
that partnerships could struggle 
without adequate time, co-
ordinating infrastructure and 
resource.  One Nottingham 
board members were keen to 
find new ways to add value 
through the partnership.   
Many interviewees expressed 
concerns for the long term 
health and diversity of the local 
voluntary and community sector, 
including perceptions that 
smaller local organisations were 
finding it difficult to survive and 
maintain their core mission in 
the context of new 
‘commissioning’ arrangements 
than larger, better resourced 
organisations.  This finding has 
also been observed by wider 
comparative studies in other 
parts of the country.   
Community Leadership 
responses to austerity 
The research showed that the 
Council can still exercise some 
autonomy in civic leadership; for 
instance in adopting the 
workplace parking levy as a 
means to fund major 
infrastructure projects. 
Nonetheless, austerity 
measures are to some extent 
re-shaping local practice, with 
the council increasingly 
focussed on mitigation, working 
through influencing as opposed 
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to direct provision, and gradually 
withdrawing from community 
development activities.   
There were a range of opinions 
on the degree to which 
communities were able to fill 
emerging gaps as frontline 
services are withdrawn.  Faith 
representatives, in particular 
expressed positive views about 
the potential for re-balancing of 
state and community initiative.  
For others there was ‘so much 
that can’t be done by 
volunteers’, particularly in 
frontline services where the 
safety of both volunteers and 
clients could be a concern. 
 
 
Conclusions and Next steps 
There were three key policy dilemmas and a number of process points 
which the Council may wish to consider as they face a further round of 
spending cuts.  These included dilemmas about the pace and extent of 
organisational change; future approaches to commissioning; and the 
balance between retrenchment and support for community initiatives.  
Process issues focussed on risk assessment for the implications of 
cuts, reviewing performance management processes, and considering 
how board members can ‘add value’ to the work of One Nottingham.  
A full report on research findings has been shared with the City Council, 
contact Helen Hill for further information 
helen.hill@nottinghamcity.gov.uk. 
The research data will form the basis of a PhD thesis, scheduled for 
completion in Autumn / Winter 2015.  For further information contact 
Alison Gardner, University of Nottingham ldxag9@nottingham.ac.uk. 
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Appendix 4: Propositions, case level questions, sources of evidence, and detailed 
questions 
     
Propositions Case level questions Sources of 
evidence 
Questions to explore through sources Rules / 
Practices / 
Narratives? 
The range and 
quality of services 
available to the 
public in the locality 
has been 
maintained, despite 
cuts in local 
government 
funding since 2010. 
 
How have funding 
levels changed? 
Exec board papers What mechanisms were presented to distribute 
spending cuts  
 
How far have cuts been offset by de-ringfencing 
and new areas of responsibility? 
 
Rules 
 
 
Practices 
What processes were 
put in place to address 
spending cuts? 
Exec board papers 
Budget 
consultation docs 
 
 
 
What were the guiding principles for delivering 
the cuts? 
 
What processes were created?  How did they 
change over time? 
 
Rules 
 
 
Practices 
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Interviews – Senior 
Managers / 
Members 
Which strategies are perceived as more or less 
successful? 
 
Narratives 
How has organisation 
structure / staffing 
changed? 
HR Structure 
charts 
 
Interview HR 
senior manager 
What changes have there been in terms of 
“boots on the ground”? 
 
Practices 
 
Narratives 
How have systems 
evolved? E.g. HR 
processes, ASC 
entitlements 
Exec board papers 
 
Interviews Senior 
managers / 
members 
What changes to entitlements and other 
systems have been approved? 
 
Would these changes have been considered 
without austerity as a driver? 
Rules 
Practices 
 
Narratives 
What examples are 
there of innovation? 
Transformation 
Board papers 
 
Interviews Senior 
managers / 
members 
What innovations have been employed to help 
deal with cuts? 
 
What role does commercialisation play? 
 
Practices 
 
 
Narratives 
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Has staff satisfaction 
been affected? 
 
Staff survey results 
Interviews with 
staff 
How did staff cope with change? What support 
systems were established (formal and informal) 
 
Do staff members see change as rapid or 
incremental? 
Processes 
 
 
Narratives 
Has customer 
satisfaction changed? 
 
Citizen first survey 
data 
National survey 
data 
 
Budget 
consultation 
reports to exec 
board 
What is the trend on satisfaction? 
 
How does this compare with national trend 
data?  
 
What do the budget consultations tell us about 
citizen priorities and the extent to which they are 
protected? 
 
 
 
 
 
Practices 
Is there any evidence 
of changes in 
performance? 
 
Nottingham Plan 
Council Plan 
(check revision 
which occurred 
post 2011) 
How is performance data used and monitored 
 
Has this changed compared to 2010? 
Practices 
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Partnership 
working between 
local government 
and other statutory 
agencies, business 
and voluntary 
sectors has been 
maintained since 
2010. 
 
How has strategic 
engagement with  
partnerships changed 
since 2010? 
Partnership 
register 
Nottingham Plan 
 
Interviews with ON 
board 
 
Mini case studies 
of TNT / framework 
 
 
What proportion of the City Council’s objectives 
involve partnership working? 
 
What were the practical consequences of 
austerity for strategic partnership activity?  
Examples? 
 
What factors helped to keep partnerships 
working?  What was different for those that 
have been closed? 
 
Rules 
Practices 
 
 
Practices / 
Narratives 
 
 
Practices 
Narratives 
What are the 
challenges and 
opportunities for 
partnership work at a 
strategic level? 
Interviews with ON 
board 
Interviews with 
members and 
senior officers 
Mini Case Studies 
Has austerity created new opportunities or 
approaches to partnership work?  
 
Has austerity changed the way that partnership 
work is conducted (e.g. is there evidence for a 
more commercial / contract-led approach?) 
Practices / 
Narratives 
 
Practices   
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with TNT and 
framework 
 
How has local 
partnership working 
developed since 2010? 
Collaborative 
events with three 
neighbourhood 
action teams 
What were the practical consequences of 
austerity for local partnership activity.  
Examples? 
 
What factors helped to keep partnerships 
working?   
 
Practices /  
narratives 
What are the 
challenges and 
opportunities for 
partnership work at a 
local (neighbourhood) 
level? 
Collaborative 
events with three 
neighbourhood 
action 
Has austerity created new demands at local 
level?  If yes, how does the partnership work 
together on those demands? 
 
Has austerity created new opportunities or 
approaches for partnership work at local level? 
 
Practices 
 
 
 
Narratives 
 
 
Local political 
representatives 
continue to 
Has austerity changed 
the influence of the 
council in relation to 
Interviews with 
local elected 
members at exec 
Do councillors perceive that they have more or 
less autonomy than they did under the Labour 
Government? 
Rules / 
practices 
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exercise 
community 
leadership and 
“place shaping” 
roles. 
 
national government 
and / or regional / local 
partners? 
 
and backbench 
level 
 
How influential do they perceive the council to 
be, locally, regionally, nationally.  Has this 
changed in the last five years? 
 
What has been the local effect of abolition of 
national performance management frameworks 
and the CPA regime?  (oversight, partnership, 
comparison, demonstrating strengths) 
 
 
Narratives 
 
 
 
 
Has austerity required 
political 
representatives to 
question or change 
any of their principles 
or approaches to 
political leadership in 
the city? 
 
Interviews with 
local elected 
members at exec 
and backbench 
level 
Has delivering the cuts changed their 
perceptions of the necessary shape / functions 
of local councils? 
 
If someone had come to them 10 years ago, 
and  shown them the organisation as it is today, 
how do they think they would have reacted? 
 
Has the council’s approach to partnership 
Rules / 
Narratives 
 
 
 
Narratives 
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changed in the last 5 years? 
 
Has commercialisation / commissioning become 
more mainstream because of austerity? 
 
 
 
 
How does austerity 
affect ward 
relationships and the 
role of ward 
councillors? 
 
Interviews with 
local elected 
members at exec 
and backbench 
level 
Are there any examples of specific actions 
members would have liked to take which have 
been prevented (or facilitated) by austerity? 
 
Narratives 
The change 
instigated by 
austerity represents 
incremental change 
rather than a 
moment of 
“punctuated 
evolution” for local 
What does the 
evidence gathered 
above tell us about the 
pace of change 
Full range of 
evidence (above) 
How rapid does change appear (in terms of 
functions and programmes, systems, 
governance, innovation) 
 
What hasn’t changed? 
 
Where does the impetus for change come from 
– internal or external?   
 
348 
 
government. 
 
 
Is austerity a driver for policy change, or do 
other priorities take precedence? 
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Appendix 5a: Topic guide, interview with 
senior staff 
Introduction 
Introduce self  
Explain aims of research: 
 Understanding how local services have responded to public 
spending cuts associated with austerity 
 Examining factors underpinning continuity, including the scope of 
local authorities and their partners to exercise local autonomy 
despite spending cuts. 
 
Explain that all quotations will be non-attributable unless they give 
specific permission for identification  
Request that interviewee reviews and signs consent form 
Ask if they are happy to be recorded 
 
1) You and the organisation 
 In your view, what have been the main influences on the 
organisation in the past 4 years (probe:  beneficial and non-
beneficial) 
 
2) Specific Issue 1  Budget Setting 
 Can you describe how the process works from your perspective?  
(prompts – who decides the budget envelope or level of savings 
required; how are efficiencies / strategic choices formulated; how 
much negotiation is there?) 
 How do commissioning reviews, big tickets and commercialisation 
join up in theory?  And in practice? 
 
3) Specific issue 2 Services 
 Would you say service redesign in the last 4 years has been 
incremental or radical?  Can you explain a bit more about why you 
think that?  And for the next 5 years? 
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 Do you think councils are taking more risks?  (any local examples?) 
 Have parts of the back office been moved to the frontline? 
 Have internal accountability frameworks and techniques changed to 
take account of fewer monitoring staff? 
 Has austerity changed your perceptions of the necessary shape or 
functions of councils? 
 
4) Specific Issue 3 Partnership responses to austerity 
 Do you think councils are able to fulfil a community leadership role?  
In what way? 
 Has the civic leadership role changed as a result of having less 
financial power (e.g. more negotiation?) 
 Are some service providers struggling more than others to adapt 
(VCS?)  Can the council do anything about that? 
 Is there gaming between agencies to shift costs?  Examples? 
 Have expectations on the role played by citizens / communities 
changed?  If so, what support is there for a new role? 
 
 
5) Innovations  
 What areas would you highlight as examples of innovation?  
(Prompt: commercialisation, asset management, co-production, 
workforce, customers.) 
 What principles or boundaries are there around innovation? What 
are the no-go areas?  (e.g. in commercialism) 
 Are there any principles/ boundaries that you’ve had to revise as a 
result of austerity? 
 
6) Autonomy and external accountability 
 Would you say that local government’s level of autonomy is greater 
or lower than 4 years ago?  In what ways?  
 To what extent would you agree that this organisation has been able 
to pursue its own agenda despite austerity?   
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 Has the organisation resisted the effects of austerity policies? In 
what ways? 
 
7) Opportunities for the future 
 In some areas the council’s scope has increased – Health, 
Economic Development, Energy.  Is this just about taking advantage 
of opportunities as they arise, or does it form part of a wider vision 
for you around role / future LG? 
 Does the focus on balancing the budget detract from the ability to 
pursue a vision? 
 How does Core Cities work inform your thinking? 
 What would enable your vision to happen? (is stability of leadership 
important?) 
 What do you see as the main constraints? 
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Appendix 5b: Topic guide, interview with 
members 
Introduction 
Introduce self  
Explain aims of research: 
 Understanding how local services have responded to public 
spending cuts associated with austerity 
 Examining factors underpinning continuity, including the scope of 
local authorities and their partners to exercise local autonomy 
despite spending cuts. 
 
Explain that all quotations will be non-attributable unless they give 
specific permission for identification  
Request that interviewee reviews and signs consent form 
Ask if they are happy to be recorded 
 
8) You and the organisation 
 What have been the main factors influencing your leadership of this 
organisation over the past 4 years? 
 What other factors would you identify as having had a significant 
impact? 
 
9) Specific Issue 1 Budget Setting 
 How do politicians steer the budget process?  Can you describe 
how the process works from your perspective?  (prompts – who 
decides the budget envelope or level of savings required; how are 
efficiencies / strategic choices formulated; how much negotiation is 
there?)  
 Have there been any differences of opinion in Labour group about 
how far cuts should go? 
 What were the key features of the approach agreed?  (lens of 
affordability prompt) 
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10) Specific Issue 2 Setting Policy Priorities / redesigning services 
 Do you see any tensions between values formerly protected by the 
council and the ethos behind commissioning / commercialisation?  
How do you balance them? 
 Where are your red lines (places you don’t go?)  Have they moved? 
 How far will policy aims change to meet pressures (e.g.change in 
family housing policy because of bedroom tax?) 
 Has austerity changed your perceptions of the necessary shape or 
functions of councils? 
 
11) Specific Issue 3 Partnership responses to austerity 
 Do you think councils are still able to fulfil a community or civic 
leadership role? In what way? To the same extent as previously? 
 Has the civic leadership role changed as a result of having less 
financial power (e.g. more negotiation?)  
 Do shared services impact on local political accountability? 
 Some service providers seem to be struggling more than others to 
adapt (VCS?)  Can the council do anything about that? 
 Is there gaming between agencies to shift costs? (examples?) 
 Have expectations on the role played by citizens / communities 
changed?  If so, what support is there for a new role? 
 
12) Autonomy and external accountability 
 Would you say that local government’s level of autonomy is greater 
or lower than 4 years ago?  In what ways?  
 To what extent would you agree that the council has been able to 
pursue its own agenda despite austerity?  (Prompt: Core Cities, 
economic agenda) 
 Has the organisation resisted the effects of austerity policies? In 
what ways? 
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13) Opportunities for the future 
 In some areas the council’s scope has increased – Health, 
Economic Development, Energy.  Is this just about taking advantage 
of opportunities as they arise, or does it form part of a wider vision 
for you around role / future LG? 
 Does the focus on balancing the budget detract from the ability to 
pursue a vision? 
 How does Core Cities work inform your thinking? 
 How do you want the role of councillors to develop in the future? 
 What would enable that to happen? 
 What do you see as the main constraints? 
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Appendix 5c: Topic guide, interview with 
partner organisations 
Introduction 
Introduce self  
Explain aims of research 
 Understanding how local services have responded to public 
spending cuts associated with austerity 
 Examining factors underpinning continuity, including the scope of 
local authorities and their partners to exercise local autonomy 
despite spending cuts. 
 
Explain that all quotations will be non-attributable unless they give 
specific permission for identification  
Request that interviewee reviews and signs consent form 
Ask if they are happy to be recorded 
 
14) You and your organisation 
 What role does your organisation play in relation to public services 
in Nottingham?   
 What does your own role entail? 
 What are the main changes for Nottingham and its citizens since 
2010 (probe:  beneficial and non-beneficial) 
 What are the main changes you would identify for your 
organisation over the past 4 years (probe: positive effects as well 
as negative effects) 
 Do you think these changes would have happened without the 
financial pressure of austerity? 
 Have any other recent reforms had a significant impact on your 
organisation? 
 
15) Partnership working in the City 
 What are your organisation’s main partnership links?  (define: 
statutory, co-ordinative, advisory, contractual) 
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 How long has it been engaged in these? 
 Why is it important to be part of these partnerships - what are the 
benefits to your organisation?  What do you contribute? 
 Are there any other important links you would not describe as a 
“partnership”? 
 
16) Partnership responses to austerity 
 What (if any) consequences have spending cuts had for the 
partnerships you engage in?   
 Has the way partners work together changed in the last 4 years? 
How? (e.g.types of relationships, formalisation of contracts etc.)  
 What factors helped to keep partnerships working?  Have these 
factors changed since 2008? If applicable, what was different for 
those that closed? 
 Have new opportunities or approaches developed?  If so, what were 
the main stimuli? (prompt: Lottery Funding) 
 
17) Specific question for One Nottingham partners 
(comment that in many local authority areas large multi-agency 
partnerships have folded) 
 What do you see as the purpose of a (Strategic) Partnership in 
times of austerity? (prompt: advisory, coordinative, challenge?) 
 To what extent would you agree that One Nottingham has been able 
to fulfil that purpose?  If not fully, how could it work better?  
 Is the partnership fully independent of the city council, or steered by 
the City Council?  
 Has the partnership resisted the effects of austerity policies? In what 
ways? (prompt: media campaigns, equalities). 
 
18) Opportunities for the future 
 What do you see as the key achievements of your partnership 
activity during the past (4) years? 
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 In what areas have you not achieved your aspirations?  Why was 
that? 
 How would you like to see your organisation’s partnership activity 
developing in the future? 
 What would enable that to happen? 
 What do you see as the main constraints? 
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Appendix 6: Neighbourhood Action Team 
workshops 
10 mins: Introductions Alison and Vivien (plenary) 
 who we are 
 purpose of the research 
 what we are going to do today 
 principles of appreciative inquiry 
 
10 mins: “Tell us your happiest memory about working in this area” 
(plenary) 
 
15 mins: (10 minutes discussion, 5 mins feedback.)  
 What’s been your biggest challenge in the last 3 years? (Write on 
post-its).  
 Map the challenges in terms of things you can control, things you 
can influence, and issues of concern.  Any things would you would 
like to move? (draw arrows) 
 
 
 
30 mins in pairs/ 3s – appreciative interviewing  
 
Concern 
Influence 
Control 
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1. What do you believe is the single most important thing that positively 
influences this area? 
 
2. Tell a story of how you involved others in bringing about real and 
sustainable change.  When was it?  What were the practical 
actions?  What qualities helped you to respond?   
 
(record results on flip chart paper)  
 
Pairs present results and facilitator marks key events / factors on a pre-
prepared map / timeline.  Q – are there any other key events / factors in 
the life of the neighbourhood and the NAT team which need to be 
recorded? 
 
20 mins – pairs / 3s  
 
 Have look back at the challenges we identified at the beginning, 
and the strengths and qualities of local partnerships which have 
been identified by the group. 
 
 Imagine your friends, your family, your colleagues and the wider 
community telling stories in the future about how you have 
worked together as equal partners.  What would these stories 
be? (give us a plot outline, flow chart or story-board) 
 
5 minutes - thanks, what happens next and wrap up. 
 
 
